Exousiology

The Scientific Study of Power
Manuscript, Beta 1.2

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Chapter 1

Preface

1.1 What is Exousiology?

Exousiology comes from the Greek word for power and authority, "exousia", and the well-known Greek word for rational explanation, "logos." As the name suggest, the purpose of exousiology is to construct a thoroughly scientific account of social power and authority.

There are currently two fields which have failed to provide such an account: sociology and political science. At their best, the former is too ignorant of hierarchy and the latter is too narrowly focused on government. Exousiology seeks to understand how power permeates every facet of society, every social relation, and every mind. It seeks to understand the outcomes of elections, the structure of government, and current cultural practices in terms of the whims of the powerful. Simply taking culture and government structure for granted will not cut it. In terms of exogenous and endogenous model variables, exousiology's exogenous variable are genes and environment, and its endogenous variable is phenotype and culture, a.k.a behavior. Sociology and political science do not believe in genetics or biology and therefore merely take in behavior and put out similar, correlated behavior, at their best. At their worst, these disciplines fill with the mediocre, the mathematically illiterate, and the dishonest. Activists exhibiting all three of these traits polute journals with articles about "social justice" and "diversity." Exousiology is to sociology and political science as chemistry is to alchemy, as Newtonian mechanics is to Aristotelian dynamics, and as behavioral genetics is to Freudo-Marxism.

1.2 Why Exousiology?

The West is deeply troubled. This is not because we have run out of resources. It is not because of plague, famine, or war. Rather, we are richer than ever due to the development of amazing technologies, such as those which allowed for the creation of this text for little monetary cost. Material conditions are amazing. The problem is that virtue and justice are all but destroyed. And this is due to the amazing power of power. Never before in history have exhibitionist crossdressers been so revered. It seems that never before have subsidies to unvirtuous groups been higher. The man of civilization has never been so burdened by involuntary tolls. Exousiology is needed because without it we do not have the names of the people in charge. Nobody knew who they were. The riff-raff said it was the voters. Peter Thiel said it was the professors. The Neo-Nazis said it was the Jews. The paleo-Marxists said it was the corporations. The schizos said it was the Illuminati Lizard Rothschilds. The task of distinguishing between these alternatives is impossible without a science.

Above all, exousiology is about seeking truth and creating a serious science of man and society. Behavioral genetics has laid the groundwork for this. Phenotypic data is easier than ever to collect due to websites like Prolific, and decades of published data have built up in journals, just waiting to be parsed by someone serious, and someone who has the intellectual freedom to pursue the naughty hypotheses. All of this data is free and instant to access thanks to the internet. The same goes for the books written about power, of which there are about a dozen, created over the course of the last 150 years. Just ten years ago there wasn't free access to all of this information. Just to catch up on the published books and articles would have required thousands of dollars and countless hours spent traveling to libraries in search of esoteric texts. Now books like Vilfredo Pareto's *The Mind and Society*

which have scarcely been printed in the last century are free on LibGen, or cheap on Amazon. Even if we lived in a nice, virtuous society, I would still like to take advantage of the very recent explosion of information, and what are frankly intellectual talents surpassing those of the typical social scientist, so that I could contribute uniquely to man's knowledge of himself. For me to contribute to society in this way is an altruistic duty.

1.3 On Credentials

Less educated, less intelligent, and less honest readers tend to care more about credentials, because, in the case of the first two traits, they must trust an author because they lack the ability to verify, and in the case of the last trait, they wish to shut down dissent and creativity by demanding that everyone who wishes to contribute to knowledge and discourse must be authorized by mainstream gatekeeping institutions, which submit to the orthodoxy. I am not orthodox any more than Newton, and consequently I do not have a degree in exousiology any more than Newton had a degree in physics when he published the *Principia*. Nonetheless, like Newton, I am trustworthy, because I have done my research, unlike many others who today claim to have written on power. Therefore, I will list my relevant credentials here.

First, general intelligence and education. I attended a top American public university with a full-ride scholarship called "National Merit" thanks to scoring a 1510/1520 on a test called the PSAT, which is basically just the SAT. Other recipients of this scholarship include Bill Gates, Peter Thiel, and Jeff Bezos. I also scored a 1580/1600 on the SAT. I did not attend a top private school because the one that let me in demanded $80,000 per year in tuition because my parents were merely middle-class. I watched several brown bodies of color with worse applications – test scores, grades, and extra-curricular activities – get full-ride offers to several HYPSM schools on account of skin color, alleged poverty (in one instance an Asian girl's immigrant parent did just fine with their small business, but were known to dodge taxes by paying people under the table, etc. This is very common, an immigrant software developer at a FAANG internship I worked at in college spoke loudly and openly about how his parents' business, which he ran the website for, also avoided many taxes by paying workers under the table, among other things), and political activities. It is scientifically proven that the fat woke harpies which staff the admissions committees at top schools grievously discriminate against people of my ethnic, geographic, and political background. Taken alone, having a clearly Scots-Irish name is worse than having an Italian one; being a white gentile is bad enough. But being from New York is far better than being from Kentucky.

I graduated with a degree in computer science with a 4.0 GPA and scored a 338/340 on the GRE. I am currently pursuing a PhD in CS. I have previously written a book called *An Empirical Introduction to Youth*.

Those are my general credentials. Hopefully readers are persuaded that I am at least as intelligent as their favorite official experts. Here is what I have read and learned in pursuit of creating exousiology:

1.3.1 Books on Power

- Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction by Norberto Bobbio
- Fascism: The Career of a Concept by Paul Gottfried
- Understanding Nazi Ideology by Carl Müller Frøland
- The Marx-Engels Reader
- The Machiavellians by James Burnham
- Nemesis by C.A. Bond
- Unqualified Reservations (the entirety) by Curtis Yarvin
- Who Rules America? by G. William Domhoff
- Studying the Power Elite: 50 Years of Who Rules America

- The Ruling Class by Gaetano Mosca
- Political Parties by Robert Michels
- The Mind and Society by Vilfredo Pareto
- On Power by Bertrand de Jouvenel
- The Managerial Revolution by James Burnham
- Think Tanks in America by Thomas Medvets
- The Rise and Fall of Elites by Vilfredo Pareto
- The Power Elite by C. Wright Mills
- G. William Domhoff's entire *Who Rules America?* Website
- Diversity in the Power Elite: Ironies and Unfulfilled Promises by Domhoff & Zweigenhaft
- Great Founder Theory (2020 Manuscript) by Samo Burja
- Power: A Radical View by Steven Lukes
- Public Opinion by Walter Lippman
- A Better Kind of Violence by Filip Palda and associated articles
- Politics of Bureaucracy by Gordon Tullock
- Propaganda by Bernays
- Manufacturing Consent by Chomsky and Herman
- Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition by Thomas Ferguson
- Modernity and Cultural Decline by Woodley et al.
- Debt: The First 5000 Years by David Graeber
- An Economic Theory of Democracy by Anthony Downs
- The Calculus of Consent by Tullock and Buchanon
- The Logic of Collective Action by Olsen

This is at least a year of reading, especially if done correctly. I also recommend taking notes on both this book and the books above, if you read them. Treat them like university lectures, not like consumer entertainment. This is a textbook, not *Bronze Age Mindset.*

1.3.2 Math and Economics Textbooks and Courses

- Linear Algebra Done Right by Sheldon Axler
- Price Theory by Landsburg & MIT Opencourseware's Introductory Microeconomics by Jon Gruber
- All of Statistics by Wasserman & MIT Opencourseware's Introduction To Probability And Statistics
- Univariate & Multivariate Calculus
- Graph Theory

Most of the listed the subjects I have taught myself for the purposes of founding exousiology. The reader should also be familiar with calculus and graph theory, which I learned at university. If you need to teach these to yourself, I recommend MIT Opencourseware's calculus courses and the textbook *Graph Theory and Its Applications.* In addition, the reader should also have some familiarity with basic biology, genetics, and especially HBD.

1.3.3 Biology, Genetics, and HBD Textbooks

- General Biology & Genetics
- HBD at Lightspeed by Werkat
- The g factor by Arthur Jensen
- Behavioral Genetics by Robert Plomin

It's hard to recommend books here because I learned most of this through a variety of sources. I learned basic biology by reading Campbell's biology textbook for high school classes. If you dodged all biology after the 9th grade I recommend reading the evolution chapters from that book as well as reading a whole genetics textbook, which should cover all of the basic Mendelian stuff and molecular stuff as well as stuff like GWAS, epigenetics, and linkage disequilibrium. I learned basic genetics through a college course I took as a throw-away elective due to my interest in HBD. I recommend the book "Essentials of Genetics" which I read for that class.

HBD is more essential here than general biology. I read Plomin's textbook for fun in high school and I definitely recommend it, especially the math appendix at the end which goes over the ACE model. You should also understand IQ and psychometrics in general – I have learned about these things over years of exposure to the academic literature on them but if you are totally in the dark and want to catch up I recommend Jensen's book. Finally, HBD at Lightspeed is a great synthesis of up-to-date studies on HBD, general intelligence, IQ, the cult of academia, and the power of power to delude you.

As you can see, all of this constitutes easily more than the equivalent of a bachelor's degree in exousiology. The only things on this list I have learned for my official degree, which is in computer science, in school, are calculus and graph theory. Most college educated people, in other words, are blindingly ignorant on these topics and need to do a lot of self education. A "normal" computer science major, for instance, is not required to and probably would not know any biology, HBD, psychometrics, statistics beyond the basics, economics, linear algebra, and certainly none of the verbal theory on power written in the last 150 years. A lawyer could easily know none of this, having majored in philosophy in school and law school being devoid of any of this information. A physician would know none of this save for univariate calculus and general biology and genetics. In other words, I am a preeminent expert on the subject of social power – if you are obsessed with official credentials, let these last few pages be my bachelor's degree in exousiology. The rest of the book is my PhD thesis. From henceforth I shall known as "Dr. Bronski, PhD Exousiologist."

1.3.4 Beta section: Future reading

Since this is manuscript is currently in "Beta", I have some future reading and learning to do. My current reading list includes Funding Feminism, Stalin, Dictator's Handbook, Power: A New Social Analysis, Manufacturing Consent, Influence: the Psychology of Persuasion, Propaganda by Bernays, Racial Integration in Corporate America 1940-1990, Constructing Affirmative Action, The Pursuit of Power by McNeil, Leviathan and Its Enemies, The Populist Delusion, Giants: The Global Power Elite, An Economic Theory of Democracy, The Calculus of Consent, The Logic of Collective Action, Economic Hierarchies, Public Choice III, Capitalism: Its Origins and Evolution as a System of Governance, Graph Theory and Its Applications, MIT Opencourse ODEs, Some PDEs text not yet determined, Microeconomic Theory by Nicholson, Intermediate Microeconomics by Varian, Some game theory text, Potentially real analysis, topology, and abstract algebra to prepare for study of complexity theory, though this may be irrelevant to exousiology; potentially some complexity theory text.

This basically breaks down to learning public choice theory, intermediate microeconomics, game theory, the higher level math found in a complete undergraduate mathematics program, verbal works on media, and specific histories such as those relating to the Bolshevik revolution, feminism, and the Civil Rights movement, which we seek to analyze scientifically with exousiology.

Chapter 2

A Theoretical Introduction to Exousiology

2.1 The General Subject Matter of Exousiology

It is not obvious to someone who is not well-read in the subjects from Chapter I where to begin with building a scientific theory of power. The field of possible questions and answers remains obscure. Contemporary claims feel disjoint. Some writers speak of "Cathedrals," others of "mind viruses;" some of conspiracies and some of spontaneous coordination; still others of an economic ruling class and some of a pluralistic landscape of coalitions and voters.

What is needed is a unified paradigm, a way to attempt to verify or reject these alternative hypotheses. Ideally, such a paradigm is universal and generic – for any social grouping σ, the paradigm ρ is effectively a mapping $\rho : \sigma \mapsto \theta_1, \theta_2, ..., \theta_n$, where each θ_i is the value of some metric, whether the metric be continuously valued, such as would be a measurement of centralization, or whether it be binary, like a yes or no test for minority domination of a larger ethnic group.

This ideal is strongly preferred over entropic methods of high societal specificity, which are sadly common in the relevant literature predating this book. Among the most scientifically offensive of the methods of high specitificity is the historical narrative method. Many practitioners, such as Curtis Yarvin, reject that the method can even yield true or reasonable results. The aforementioned, for example, states that history is a mere narrative, not a science, and that he is "not a big fan of empirical evidence ... or statistics." In other words, Yarvin makes no attempt to be scientific – he sees himself as a mere story-teller, an activist. It doesn't have to be this way.

Less offensive is Domhoff's method, which involves looking at who holds non-universal, symbolic seats of authority. His work has been valuable, but it is not directly applicable to any society outside of the current time. There were no CEOs in the middle ages, or antiquity. In animals and early man, there were no symbolic positions. It would seem there are real phenomena underlying the virtual phenomena of overt society – it is the aim of a scientific study of power to elucidate these covert workings. Domhoff's work merely shines light on lesser known aspects of the overt, virtual system. Its value is in the mapping of this system beyond the middle school understanding that "we live in a democracy." Domhoff shows that the virtual system is rather a republic. He sadly does not elucidate the underlying reality, and makes statements regarding it that run contrary to present findings throughout his work.

The first task of building the scientific theory of power is therefore to uncover ρ. The mapping has, of course, three broad components: the social grouping, or its argument; the mapping, its transformation; and the result, its return variables. An example will be enlightening. Consider a group of a hundred people stranded on an island. The people in their surroundings are the social grouping σ. There are a number of values we might want to predict – who will have the most power, given the initial conditions and subsequent events? How many people will be "powerful?" How will power be "wielded?" These questions, when properly operationalized, become the result $\theta_1, \theta_2, ..., \theta_n$. The procedure whereby the base conditions are transformed into the predictions is the transformation. With these three components realized, the map ρ is acquired.

Behavioral genetics gives a way to break down σ. The map ρ is really a specific instance of the

more general mapping of behavioral genetics:

$$G, E \mapsto P \tag{2.1}$$

Here, G specifies the genepool, E the environment, and P specifies behavior, or phenotype. $\theta_1, \theta_2, ..., \theta_n$ can really be viewed as dimensions of aggregate phenotype. If the inspiration here is unclear, consider animals. Why do lions form prides? Whence wolf packs? Chimpanzee troupes? Bee hives? Ant hills? For creative purposes, a society can be viewed as a single organism. Its power structure becomes a part of its phenotype, like an individual's height, weight, and intelligence.

Actual individuals become organs of society. In literal individuals, organs are differentiated by gene expression regulation. Likewise, in societies, individuals are differentiated by differences in genetics and environment. The question of predicting organ function P with organ gene expression G and environment E becomes, for the social organism, the question of predicting the different power levels and stations of individuals, P, by differences in individual G and E.

2.1.1 Class HBD

A major aim of exousiology can now be understood – to construct a theory of "class HBD", or in other words to understand the source and quality of class differences, and how those differences relate to power, on a deep, scientific level. This is precisely what will allow exousiology to break down σ. Once the different relevant dimensions of genes and environment are accounted for, predictions about initial populations, given their genes and environments, can begin to be made.

A mere theory of class differences is not enough. Imagine that one class buys more funko pops than another – this would be a class difference, but does this relate to social structure? Not necessarily. This is where the mapping comes in – the mapping is what takes the totality of G and E and filters its parts into statements about the social structure. The mapping is the set of relations between predictions and initial conditions, so to begin to understand what the overall mapping should look like, some θ_i must be considered.

Let θ_i be the power of some individual, defined by some power metric, such as wealth, influence, social position, etc. In theory there is θ_i for each individual i, and if each θ_i can be estimated from the initial characteristics of each individual i, a ranking of the set of θ_i's would give a prediction of the overall hierarchy of the social structure and the relative importance of each person on the behavior of the society as a whole.

The task here is clearly to define the mapping:

$$G_i, E_i \mapsto \theta_i \tag{2.2}$$

In practice this can be simplified to:

$$\vec{P_i} \mapsto \theta_i \tag{2.3}$$

And separately each $\vec{P_i}$ can be broken down into genetics and environment. Here, phenotype is referred to as a vector to emphasize its multidimensional nature with respect to human measuring and comprehension abilities. Each dimension of the vector reflects a human measurement technique applied to each qualitative individual. Examples include height or IQ. In theory there are infinite ways to assign a number to a man – a central task of this science is therefore to discover the measurements which best predict the quantity θ_i, and the function which best maps the measurements onto the prediction.

Theoretically, this function could be anything. Given some set of metrics, the best fit may be achieved by a neural network, since a neural network can accurately model nonlinear phenomena such as threshold effects or "phenotypic epistasis." In practice, however, the standard social science approach is to fit linear models. A linear model in this context would attempt to find the vector $\vec{u}$ of weights such that its dot product with the list of relevant traits $\vec{v}$, $\vec{v} \cdot \vec{u}$ most accurately predicts θ_i over the set of people examined, according to some loss function like mean squared error, i.e. $(\hat{\theta_i} - \theta_i)^2$.

A research program is clearly emerging: get the right list of people, hypothesized to vary in the metric θ_i, attempt to measure θ_i directly, as well as the hypothesized predictive variables, like IQ, conscientiousness, and psychometrics that don't yet exist (constructing appropriate political psychology psychometrics is a large task of exousiology). Ideally, the loss of a linear model constructed

from the hypothesized traits is relatively low, indicating that the rough importance of the traits has been correctly discovered. The significant traits can then be reduced to genes and environment via behavior-genetic analysis, including methods like twin studies and GWAS.

2.1.2 Hierarchies

This can be iterated for most θ_i. Some θ_i may be considered to be "higher level," however. For these, more complicated models are needed; linear regression is not enough. For instance, it would be nice to understand networks and hierarchies themselves, in other words the *connections between* people of varying "power levels." This can be thought of as studying the shape and vascularity of the social organism, not merely predicting what kind of tissue a cell is based off of various cell traits. Exousiology is therefore interested in measuring and predicting the relations between individual given the initial natures of said individuals.

Such relations are still behavior, or phenotype. Part of an individual cell's phenotype is how it responds to hormones and other signals, how it adheres to other tissues, and so on. Given its initial programming, a cell will behave differently depending on what is happening in the cellular network around it. Likewise, individuals vary in their hierarchy-psychology, and given the set of hierarchy-phenotypes around him, will end up in different positions in the network. Once individual traits relevant to hierarchy and network formation are understood, the formations themselves may be predicted with algorithms that procedurally connect individuals starting from initial conditions, where the accumulating state of the network effects the position of each individual as the network is built.

An example will be demonstrative:

```
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import networkx as nx
import random
import sys
sys.setrecursionlimit(10000)

def linearFunctional(data, weights):
    power = np.zeros( (data.shape[0], 1) )
    power[:,0] = np.dot(data, weights)
    return power

def getAttachmentPoint(godNum):
    children = len(list(DG.successors(godNum)))
    child = random.randint(1, children)
    childNum = list(DG.successors(godNum))[child-1]
    if ( len(list(DG.successors(childNum))) == 0 ):
        return childNum
    else:
        return getAttachmentPoint(childNum)

THRESHOLD = .2
def goUp(attachNum, child, power, graph):
    if (power < DG.nodes[attachNum]["power"] + THRESHOLD and power > DG.nodes[
    attachNum]["power"] - THRESHOLD):
        return list(DG.predecessors(attachNum))[0], -1
    if (power < DG.nodes[attachNum]["power"]):
        return attachNum, child
    else:
        return goUp( list(DG.predecessors(attachNum))[0], attachNum, power, graph )

SIZE = 1000000
data = np.zeros((SIZE,2))
data[:,0] = np.random.normal(0,1,SIZE)
data[:,1] = np.random.normal(0,1,SIZE)
power = linearFunctional(data, [.5, .5])

DG = nx.DiGraph()
for i, obj in enumerate(power[:,0]):
    DG.add_node(i+1)
    attrs = {i+1: {"power": obj, "IQ": data[i,0], "Work": data[i,1]}}
    nx.set_node_attributes(DG, attrs)
godNumber = power.shape[0]+1
```

```
DG.add_node(godNumber)
attrs = {godNumber: {"power": 999, "IQ": 999, "Work": 999}}
nx.set_node_attributes(DG, attrs)
DG.add_weighted_edges_from([(godNumber, 1, .5)])
DG.out_degree(godNumber)

for node in DG:
    print(node)
    if (node == 1 or node == godNumber):
        continue
    attachTo = getAttachmentPoint(godNumber)
    attachTo, displace = goUp(attachTo, -1, DG.nodes[node]["power"], DG)
    DG.add_weighted_edges_from([(attachTo, node, .5)])
    if (displace != -1):
        DG.remove_edge( attachTo, displace)
        DG.add_weighted_edges_from([(node, displace, .5)])

print(len(list(DG.successors(godNumber)))/godNumber)
mynum = godNumber
intelligence = np.zeros( len(list(DG.successors(mynum)) ))
for i, node in enumerate(list(DG.successors(mynum))):
    intelligence[i] = (DG.nodes[node]["IQ"])
print("Mean IQ = {} IQ STD = {}".format(intelligence.mean(), intelligence.std()))
plt.hist(intelligence)
plt.show()
```

Listing 2.1: Potential Hierarchy Algorithm

The algorithm above builds a graph which represents a hierarchy formed from an initial population, where two traits are assumed to contribute to a person's potential power, IQ and work ethic. Their power is calculated as the dot product of these two traits and a weight vector, in the example above set to [0.5, 0.5]. They are then sorted into a hierarchy according to the rules of the algorithm. At the top of the hierarchy sits a placeholder node with "infinite" power. One by one the nodes attach to a leaf in the hierarchy. The first node automatically attaches to the "God node." The next attaches to the first node, but according to its power will either rise to become an equal to the first node, stay subordinate to the first node, or subordinate the first node. This reflects human promotional behavior and willingness to follow.

Eventually a power-tree is built where there are a number of nodes at the top level, each with subordinate trees. These top nodes represent the "ruling class," or the Patriciate. It is thought that according to the initial traits of individuals which have existed in history, all societies to this point have been ruled by Patriciates, emerging out of a hierarchization and networking algorithm like the theoretical one examined here. With just a few reasonable assumptions motivated by observing human promotional structures and ability differences, Patriciates logically emerge from variation in initial potential power.



Figure 2.1: Hierarchy of 100 Stranded Islanders Generated with Autocratic Algorithm

Above is a visualization of a hierarchy tree generated with an algorithm where rising nodes displace those they overpower instead of becoming equal to them. What emerges is at most a 9 person Patriciate.

Some of the hierarchies are degenerative, however, and would likely be subsumed by others in real life. There are 3-5 serious hierarchies; repeat generations produce naive Patriciates of 3-9 people.

Statistics about the network can be generated from the results of the algorithm. For example, in the tree above, the Patriciate has an average IQ of 1.3 SD with a standard deviation of 1.1. All Patricians had above average IQs. When the population is increased, a smaller fraction of the population forms the Patriciate, and their average IQ increases. This meshes well with real life observations which indicate that smaller bands tend to be more egalitarian. The results of running this algorithm on a large population align with real life measurements of elite IQ and ruling class size.

Still, it would be preferable to refine the algorithm using carefully collected data. In theory, studies like the Stanford Prison Experiment but better could be run to observe the rules of hierarchy and network formation in real time. These studies would be in-person, lengthy, and expensive, so it is imperative that exousiology receive funding to run would become groundbreaking experiments. It is likewise important that the empirical structure of society, power, and individual hierarchy psychology be as well understood as possible prior to the initiation of such experiments. This will enable the correct metrics to be collected so that intelligently designed hypotheses can be effectively verified and modified by the results.

2.1.3 The Patriciate Network

What was just described is a representation of *hierarchy,* ranked relations of inequality. Among equals, however, there is another type of relational structure, that of the network. Whereas hierarchies are based on inequalities of capacity, leading to those on the lower end being controled, networks are by definition associations of peers. They therefore must be based not on coercion but rather on similarity.

Domhoff's research as well as the historical record indicates that the Patriciate is always a sovereign *network* of powerful people, working in concert to promote *their rule,* keeping potential rivals with differing agendas on the outs. We present a simple model for network formation based on preliminary data that is promising in its ability to explain phenomena like the "Overton window" and "Cthulhu may swim slowly. But he only swims left."

Let there be a set of powerful people $P_1, P_2, ..., P_n$. They may be powerful due to the result of a hierarchy algorithm like that shown in Listing 2.1. Let them form peer networks according to this algorithm:

```
SIZE = 100
data = np.random.normal(0,1,SIZE)
THRESHOLD = 0.10
ETHRESHOLD = .50
G = nx.Graph()
color_map = []
for i, obj in enumerate(data):
    G.add_node(i+1)
    attrs = {i+1: {"temperament": obj}}
    nx.set_node_attributes(G, attrs)
    s = hex(int(  255 - abs(obj * 63)   )  )
    if (len(s) == 4):
        num = s[2] + s[3]
    else:
        num = '0' + s[2]
    print(num)
    print(obj)
    if (obj >= 0):
        color_map.append('#ff00' + num)
    elif (obj <= 0):
        color_map.append('#' + num + '00ff')



for node in G:
    for node2 in G:
        if (node == node2):
            continue
        if(  abs(G.nodes[node]["temperament"] - G.nodes[node2]["temperament"]) <
    THRESHOLD  ):
            print("node : {} node2: {}".format(node, node2))
            c1 = nx.node_connected_component(G, node)
```

```
            Ec1 = 0
            Sumc1 = 0
            Nc1 = 0
            Temp1 = list()
            for n in c1:
                t1 = G.nodes[n]["temperament"]
                Temp1.append(t1)
                Sumc1 = Sumc1 + t1
                Nc1 = Nc1 + 1
            Ec1 = Sumc1 / Nc1
            c2 = nx.node_connected_component(G, node2)
            Ec2 = 0
            Sumc2 = 0
            Nc2 = 0
            Temp2 = list()
            for n in c2:
                t2 = G.nodes[n]["temperament"]
                Temp2.append(t2)
                Sumc2 = Sumc2 + t2
                Nc2 = Nc2 + 1
            Ec2 = Sumc2 / Nc2
            if ( abs(G.nodes[node]["temperament"] - Ec2) >= ETHRESHOLD ):
                continue
            flaked = False
            dontAdd = False
            for val in Temp1:
                if (  abs(val - Ec2) >= ETHRESHOLD ):
                    if( Nc2 > Nc1 ):   #flake from old network, join bigger one
                        d = G.neighbors(node)
                        for i in list(d):
                            G.remove_edge(node, i)
                        flaked = True
                    else:
                        dontAdd = True
            if (flaked == False and dontAdd == False): #check other way if no flake
                for val in Temp2:
                    if (  abs(val - Ec1) >= ETHRESHOLD ):
                        if( Nc2 > Nc1 ):   #flake from old network, join bigger one
                            d = G.neighbors(node)
                            for i in list(d):
                                G.remove_edge(node, i)
                        else:
                            dontAdd = True
            if (dontAdd == False):
                G.add_edge(node,node2)
```

Listing 2.2: Potential Network Formation Algorithm

This algorithm creates the following output:



Figure 2.2: Network of 100 Patricians

The nodes $P_1, P_2, ..., P_n$ are color-coded according to their randomly generated "political orientations." Purple is center and as they become more positive ("right wing") the dots become red, and so

on for blue in the negative direction. Political views were sampled from a standard normal distribution, e.g. $P_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$.

The THRESHOLD variable at the top represents the maximum tolerated difference between two direct connections. If two nodes in the graph differ by more than 0.10, in the instance above, they won't connect. The ETHRESHOLD variable is the "expected value threshold." After two nodes attempt to connect, because they are 0.10 SD apart in political space, the current networks of both nodes attempting to connect are checked and the expected value of the politics of those networks are computed. The networks will not allow too much deviation from the mean, in this case more than 0.50 SDs. If the node attempting to connect is too extreme for the mean of the network, it won't connect. If it's not too extreme, but it's connected to an extremist, it will decide which network to be a part of going forward based on the size of the network. A bigger network is preferred.

This simulates selling out, materialistic disloyalty, cancellation, and guilt-by-association, which are all common network phenomena. While they are common, we are as of yet aware of little data on these phenomena. It would be nice to quantify the real-life value of THRESHOLD, ETHRESHOLD, as well as the qualitative fit of this algorithm using methods similar to those already described.

This algorithm was inspired not only by qualitative Patrician accounts of their network experience as well as the phenomena of selling out, materialistic disloyalty, cancellation, guilt-by-association, it was also inspired by some real-world data [1]:



FIG. 2.—Network of reciprocated friendships among Marketville girls; the triangle at right indicates friendships illustrated in fig. 1. (From *The Adolescent Society* by James S. Coleman. © 1961 by the Free Press, a division of Macmillan, Inc. Used with permission.)

Above is real data on a high school friendship network. The largest network has 57 people in it. The second largest has 24. The third has 18, and it declines from there. In the case of the network generated by the algorithm, the main component has 41 members, the next two have 16, and all of the others have less than that. We have 100 people total; the study has about 150. Our numbers map surprisingly well onto theirs divided by 1.5. If we assume each of these people are equally powerful, then the largest network is more than twice as powerful as the second largest. In fact, it has about a third of the total power. Given that these are the final coordination configurations, the main network

can easily crush every competitor, taking followers by force from each other network one-by-one. If we conceive of power as the number of warm bodies one can throw at an enemy in a military campaign, then we can see that main network could easily destroy the second largest network, and then the third, and then the fourth, and so on, because the main network outnumbers the second largest network by a factor of two. We can therefore contend that only the main network will wield power; it will rob any natural leader outside of it of any power they might gather.

In other words, the Patriciate locks out leaders it doesn't like from having any power. We can imagine that the above network mirrors the graph of natural leaders, and that the Patriciate is simultaneously the largest component and a minority of vertices. Connections may be determined something like this: perhaps there are core friendship or coordination traits which matter. Scores on these traits can be assembled into a vector for each natural leader. That leader will attempt to form a connection with any other leader who is within some euclidean distance from him in the vector space. However, the connection will fail if a leader is attempting to join a network whose average is too distant from him; he is too radical for the network as a whole and is therefore "canceled". Only a limited amount of variation from the center is tolerated.

The network generated from our algorithm looks similar to that seen in the data. Still, this data is extremely limited. In theory, network formation happens along with hierarchy formation. In a potential in-depth study of hierarchy, network formation among top players could be spied on and modeled just like hierarchy formation among all subjects.

2.1.4 Centralization

We will now introduce a useful statistic about a social organism. Any social organism has individual members, as well as a sovereign network known as a Patriciate. From this much theory we can define a simple and important way in which social organisms vary:

$$\psi = 1 - n_{Patriciate}/n_{Society} \tag{2.4}$$

Here, $\psi \in [0, 1]$ and represents "centralization." ψ approaches 1 as a society becomes more centralized, and 0 as a society becomes more decentralized.

This statistic works when power in a society is modeled as binary. Another way to think of this is in terms of probability distributions; under this model, power is a Bernoulli distribution:



Figure 2.3: Bernoulli Distribution of Power, P(Power) = 0.01

Under this model, $\psi = 1 - P(Power)$. Is this model realistic? That depends on the nature of power, which is a topic unto itself. For now, we can think of power as the marginal influence of a subset of the social organism on the behavior of the social organism as a whole. As a concrete example, let the subset be you and the behavior be the existence of, say, the high school as an institution. What is the power of you to abolish the high school? When you decide it should be abolished, who listens? The likely answer is nobody, and you have no measurable impact on the behavior of the social organism. Now let the subset be the individual known as Donald Trump. If Donald Trump started shilling the book *An Empirical Introduction to Youth,* which sets out the scientific case for the abolition of the high school, as part of his plan to Make America Great Again, hundreds of millions of people would listen. While this may not lead to the total abolition of the high school, because Trump does not have total power, it may lead to some changes, such as less credentialism, shorter high school, or the rise of

apprenticeship programs as an alternative to attending a school. In this case Trump would have some power, but not zero, according to his marginal impact relative to his desired impact. If the subset of people is taken to be the 6,000 people that control every federal elected office, every Fortune 500 directorship and executive position, including, those of the mainstream media, the likely outcome is that the high school would be abolished shortly. This subset of people, "the Patriciate", has total power with respect to this behavior, because their marginal influence over society was enough to cause the complete desired behavior change.

Imagine you are a shapeshifting space alien from the Sirius solar system known as Imaginos who can control minds, but there is a cost associated with each mind you control. You want to know the most efficient combination of minds to control so you can achieve your purposes without more cost than is necessary. You want exousiology. This problem is analogous to attempting to control the behavior of an individual by establishing control over the energetic output of a subset of his cells. If you want to make him swim, you can control every muscle cell, or just his motor cortex. The cells in the motor cortex have much more power per cell, since there are far fewer of them. So too in a social organism could you mind control every voter to achieve a result. This requires mind controlling about 180 million people to be sure of controlling all US elections. If you can achieve the same or better results by controlling 6,000 Patricians, you know the marginal power of each Patrician is far greater than the marginal power of each voter.

Under this conception it's easy to see that any individual Patrician probably has low marginal power. Still, many will have nonzero power, while practically everyone else is likely to have zero power. Thus the Bernoulli distribution model makes some sense but is partially misleading – having power probably doesn't mean having total individual power. It is unclear if even figures like Hitler, Stalin, and Napoleon had total individual power over any dimensions of social behavior. Imagine if Hitler had decided to become a Marxist, or Stalin a Fascist. It is likely that Goebbels, Himmler, and the SS would decide to eliminate Hitler in such a scenario. On the other hand, if perhaps just a hundred key leaders of the Reich could have been mind controlled into becoming Marxists, including Hitler and his circle, then they could easily have turned Germany into a Marxist state overnight.

While binary power isn't necessarily a ridiculous simplification, it can make more sense to model power continuously, particularly when working under the marginal influence concept of power. A Pareto distribution can model a continuous spread of power. A Pareto distribution takes the form:

$$p(x \in [a, b]|\alpha) = \int_a^b \frac{\alpha}{x^{\alpha+1}} dx \tag{2.5}$$

ψ can be modeled as α, because the inequality of the distribution increases with α.



Figure 2.3: Pareto Distribution

Above, x is taken to represent the marginal influence of some person plus 1. If for some person, x = 1.05, then hypothetically 20 people at that power level are enough to accomplish some change in the relevant dimension of social behavior. Under this scheme, in the distribution showed above, about 50,000 people have a power-level over 1/10,000. The vast majority of people have essentially no power. Nobody has much more than 1/10,000 power over society, meaning this model efficiently represents a system where nobody has high individual marginal influenced, but a few people have extremely outsized influence when working in a large enough group with other "elites." So too will a single

defective neuron in the brain be isolated from the network – but if enough neurons are controlled, they can control the rest of the body efficiently.

2.1.5 Coordination

We may now define a second important statistic about a social organism, based on what we have covered. In the body, not only does cell type matter; a muscle cell and a brain cell may be connected, but only the brain cell can control the muscle cell – so too must an individual have certain capacities in order to be powerful. The relation between cells, the network, including the peer-to-peer network between neurons and the hierarchy between the brain and the body is also important; an isolated neuron controls nothing, and likewise an isolated "natural elite" has no real power.

It therefore makes sense to measure the connectedness of an individual to powerful people. This can be done simply by looking at how many direct neighbors they have in a network graph like Figure 2.2. The coordination of some peer network, such as the Patriciate, can then be defined as the average connectedness of the people in the network:

$$\omega = \frac{\sum_i N(P_i)}{n} \tag{2.6}$$

For patricians $P_1, P_2, ..., P_n$, where N is the function that returns the number of neighbors of node P_i.

One reason this is a useful metric is that it provides a clear framework for testing ideas about elite collusion. Many political entertainers, posing as intellectuals (when really all they have is verbal screeds), claim baselessly that there is no coordination, that what is apparently the work of powerful groups behind the scenes is really just the "emergent phenomena" of atomized individuals following their "incentives." This sounds nice to status-worshippers who fear being branded a "conspiracy theorist," but as we will show further along, the data clearly shows that there is significant coordination among the powerful, just as these models predict.

Coordination as a metric is also a nice complement to the centralization metric. Together, these metrics neatly demonstrate a synthesis between the two paradigms described in subsection 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 respectively. Centralization summarizes the distribution of individual power in a society, leaving out the relational view, while coordination sets aside the individual view in order to measure the relations between individuals.

2.2 Other Areas in Problem Space

We have attempted to describe the subject matter of exousiology as generally as possible. In doing so we have established two broad categories of research, to be explained in terms of, biology, i.e. genes and environment: understanding the shape of a social organism, or the relation between its parts; and understanding the composition of a social organism, or what type of parts it contains. Now we will narrow in on specific instances of these general problems which have been found to be of importance.

2.2.1 The Basis of Power

In section 2.1.1 we discussed predicting the potential power of an individual given his individual traits. Here we will formally name this the "basis of power." The basis of power is the information object that describes the traits, and in what combination, that predict someone's potential to wield marginal influence with respect to some dimension of social behavior. In practice we will be interested in the characteristics that set Patricians apart from non-Patricians in a given society.

2.2.2 Mechanisms of Power

Understanding mechanisms of power will help us derive the basis of power for some social organism. Understanding mechanisms of power is analogous to understanding the specific details of how neurons control other parts of the body. Marginal influence does not magically occur, just as neurons do not communicate with each other by divine fiat. We seek to understand what materially occurs when marginal influence is wielded.

In general, marginal influence always works by changing the environment of the individuals being influenced. A parent can assert marginal influence over their child's curfew by changing their child's environment such that the expected utility of staying out until 9:50 goes from positive to negative, since their parent has made them aware that they will be grounded for a week if they are not home by 9 PM, whereas before this was not the case. The parent successfully asserts marginal influence by virtue of being able to successfully invoke this environmental change. Likewise the State asserts marginal influence over its citizens via the law by changing the environment such that the expected utility of doing some activity becomes negative. If courting 18 year old girls becomes illegal because the age of marriage and consent has been raised to 28, most men will stop trying to court 18 year olds because of the negative utility associated with State violence. Corporations can assert marginal influence by threatening the economic status of disobedient individuals. They might increase college attendance rates by rewarding useless degrees, and decrease the expression of certain political views by economically discriminating against people who express them, by deleting their bank accounts, firing them, and refusing to hire them. The media might assert marginal influence by shaping a person's memetic environment. If someone believes that Mexican immigrants will steal their jobs and rape their children, they will probably vote against immigration from Mexico. If they believe that Mexican immigrants will boost GDP, assimilate, and take brutal jobs "white people won't do," they will probably vote for Mexican immigration. When there's little to no direct feedback on beliefs, such as for people who live in Wisconsin with respect to Mexican immigration, it's easy for the media to assert marginal influence like this.

Each of these mechanisms of power inform hypotheses about the basis of power of a particular social organism. If media control asserts the most marginal influence, then traits related to being able to successfully manage and build a major media enterprise will be important in the basis of power. When there is little marginal influence found in being able to beat people in sword fights, physical ability is probably less present in the basis of power than it is if the best mannerbund of hand combat warriors tends to assert a lot of marginal influence. In antiquity there was perhaps a lot more marginal influence found in being stronger than average than there is in a society with assault rifles, where the law is enforced by obese 95 IQ people with handguns. An extremely alpha band of Bronze Age Warriors could assert a lot of marginal influence over late Rome via the mechanism of demanding gold under the threat of pillage. That same band would easily get exterminated by by a few LEOs today who are totally average or below average in their physical and mental abilities. Technology has made it to where there is practically no marginal influence present in violence committed by small minorities – marginal influence now seems to rest mostly in differences in abilities to generate wealth, manage organizations, spread information, and impress the mass.

A popular verbal theory in academia related to this is the "IEMP" theory of the sociologist Michael Mann [2]. It posits that four types of institutions wield significant power in a society: ideological, economic, military, and political. At a glance this seems correct and aligns with what was said above. Ideological institutions wield marginal influence by shaping the memetic environment. People with above average abilities in spreading information and persuading people will in theory have more potential ideological power. Economic institutions generate wealth and can assert marginal influence by affecting how the wealth they generate is distributed. People who have above average abilities to generate wealth and lead enterprises will have more potential economic power. Military organizations specialize in organized violence and can assert marginal influence by threatening violence. People who are above average at violence and organized violence will have more potential military power. As stated above, firearms and more sophisticated technologies seem to have crushed variation in violence abilities. Now anybody with the right weapons can commit efficient violence – thus there is hardly marginal influence found in violence organizations today. Finally, the political consists of the violence of quantity, as opposed to quality as in the military. In the age of mass warfare and law enforcement by firearm, violence or potential violence by quantity still contains marginal influence potential insofar as differences in demagogic abilities have not been crushed by technology.

Exousiology exists to go beyond verbal theory – we therefore must create a quantified, verifiable model of the mechanisms of power that are present in society. One way to do this could be to simply randomly sample instances of marginal influence being asserted, classifying the mechanisms of power used in each instance. This is easier said than done, however. History is hard to parse, and one major purpose of exousiology is to allow for scientific history. It's not always clear why some social change occurred, or who initiated it. By the time the change propagates across society, there is often little

record of its origin point. Ancients thought muscles moved themselves.

2.2.3 The Psychology of Obedience and Political Psychology

A better way might be to investigate the details of what causes individuals to obey. In particular, we want to understand what motivates their political beliefs and how potent a particular stimulus is in changing their behavior.



Figure 2.4 Hidden Markov Model

This is similar to a hidden Markov model. In a hidden Markov model, there are hidden states which have different impacts on observable states. In the picture above, the observable state is a person either being happy or sad, and the hidden states are three weather conditions. Rain is more effective at causing sadness than sun. Say we want to know how powerful each weather state is at making people sad. If we can just observe 100 sadness transitions along with the weather states at the time, we can directly quantify the relative influences of each state. What if the states are hidden, but we know they're there?

In this case we can test the relative efficacy of each state upon the transition in a lab. Bring in 100 happy people, and expose them to either rain, cloudiness, or sun. We would find that rain is the most potent sadness causer. If we know each weather condition is equally common, we can then infer that when there is a sadness epidemic, it's probably raining.

In exousiology, we specifically want to test the relative importance of material incentives and moral incentives when it comes to obedience. Do people go along with transsexuals because they think it's best for their wallet in an environment of cancellation, or because they genuinely believe themselves to be altruists based on what the media has said about transsexuals? If we find that people are generally motivated by economic preferences, placing little value on the law regarding transsexuals or gay marriages relative to their own wallet size, then it's unlikely that Democrats vote Democrat because they are just so ideologically convinced that Progressivism is moral. They are not "virtue signalling" in this case – rather they are just voting for handouts and could hardly care one way or another about most "moral issues." So too when they go along with trans at work, it's probably because they don't want to be fired. Marginal influence via economic control begins to look much more important than being good at "idea spreading," when nobody really cares about the ideas, assuming they have the capacity to understand them. This informs the basis of power – traits related to wealth generation, acquisition, and control will grant the most expected marginal influence.

On the other hand, if people are prone to vote against material interests for moral reasons, ideological skills look a lot more important. If people can be convinced that, based on the facts, it is actually altruistic to be against sex changes, then they will happily risk getting fired to express that. They will happily vote against sex changes; and cancellation becomes the epiphenomena of economic elites believing in the altruism of the sex change. The ideological network is not ineffective, the economic elites probably do not cynically generate their desires based on material urges, and ultimately do not hold the most sway over the behavior of society as a whole anyway. Since altruistic motives predominate, the people who control the information stream about moral outcomes hold the most marginal power. These people don't have to be the best at wealth creation; rather they will probably tend to have skills in communication, information synthesization, and persuasion.

As we will argue in the coming empirical sections of this manuscript, the current findings point to the economic model being more correct. People tend to be too dumb to understand ideological arguments and factual information. The few who are intelligent enough such that this does not apply tend to be extremely materially, selfishly motivated, assigning little to no dollar value to being altruistic. Because the average person is so materialistic, the economic elite have a lot of marginal influence, and in turn those elites are unlikely to be motivated by altruism when it comes to their politics. There are more selfish motives at play, nullifying the marginal influence of ideological specialists in the face of those who own them and operate off of their own self interest.

2.2.4 The Psychology of Elite Differences at the Present

The character of the Patriciate and with it the culture of a society, i.e. the behavior of the social organism, changes over time; also, at any one time there is variance in political behavior among the Patriciate and as a result among the masses. It would be nice to understand what factors cause variance at a given time. The standard model of behavioral genetics is helpful here:

$$P = G + E \tag{2.7}$$

$$\mathbf{Var}(P) = \mathbf{Var}(G) + \mathbf{Var}(E) \tag{2.8}$$

As is typical, $\mathbf{Cov}(G, E)$ is assumed to be zero or negligible. We would like to calculate the heritability and non-genetic equivalents for Patrician political behavior:

$$h^2 = \frac{\mathbf{Var}(G)}{\mathbf{Var}(P)} \tag{2.9}$$

$$e^2 = \frac{\mathbf{Var}(E)}{\mathbf{Var}(P)} = 1 - h^2 \tag{2.10}$$

We can break E down into two juicy variables relevant to the IEMP model, and an error term.

$$P = G + \$ + M + \epsilon \tag{2.11}$$

$$\mathbf{Var}(P) = \mathbf{Var}(G) + \mathbf{Var}(\$) + \mathbf{Var}(M) + \mathbf{Var}(\epsilon) \tag{2.12}$$

Here \$ represents economic incentives, which might differ by industry and economic role, and M represents a person's knowledge, or "memetic environment." Grifters and political entertainers often claim that political differences are just the result of differences in information exposure, so showing that $m^2 \approx 0$ is a fun way to ruin their grift. We now want to estimate:

$$h^2 = \frac{\mathbf{Var}(G)}{\mathbf{Var}(P)} \tag{2.13}$$

$$\$^2 = \frac{\mathbf{Var}(\$)}{\mathbf{Var}(P)} \tag{2.14}$$

$$m^2 = \frac{\mathbf{Var}(M)}{\mathbf{Var}(P)} \tag{2.15}$$

It will be shown in the empirical section that h^2 is high and m^2 is low according to preliminary data.

2.2.5 The Psychology of Elite Differences Through Time

A more original model is needed to map sources of elite variation through time. At time t_i there is a patriciate composed of individuals $P_1, P_2, ..., P_n$. For each political trait, an empirical c.d.f can be computed based on the traits of $P_1, P_2, ..., P_n$. For the sake of simplicity, only the expected value of each trait will be considered here, although the full information of the c.d.f. can in theory be taken into consideration if it is warranted.

From the standard model of behavioral genetics:

$$P_i = G_i + \$_i + M_i + \epsilon_i \tag{2.16}$$

This implies:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t_i}[P] = \mathbb{E}_{t_i}[G] + \mathbb{E}_{t_i}[\$] + \mathbb{E}_{t_i}[M] + \mathbb{E}_{t_i}[\epsilon] \tag{2.17}$$

Where $\mathbb{E}_{t_i}[P]$ is the expected value of a patrician's phenotype at time t_i. Now consider three times:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t_1}[P] = \mathbb{E}_{t_1}[G] + \mathbb{E}_{t_1}[\$] + \mathbb{E}_{t_1}[M] + \mathbb{E}_{t_1}[\epsilon] \tag{2.18}$$

$$\mathbb{E}_{t_2}[P] = \mathbb{E}_{t_2}[G] + \mathbb{E}_{t_2}[\$] + \mathbb{E}_{t_2}[M] + \mathbb{E}_{t_2}[\epsilon] \tag{2.19}$$

$$\mathbb{E}_{t_3}[P] = \mathbb{E}_{t_3}[G] + \mathbb{E}_{t_3}[\$] + \mathbb{E}_{t_3}[M] + \mathbb{E}_{t_3}[\epsilon] \tag{2.20}$$

We can take the variance of the expected values through time:

$$\mathbf{Var}(\mathbb{E}_{t_i}[P]) = \mathbf{Var}(\mathbb{E}_{t_i}[G]) + \mathbf{Var}(\mathbb{E}_{t_i}[\$]) + \mathbf{Var}(\mathbb{E}_{t_i}[M]) + \mathbf{Var}(\mathbb{E}_{t_i}[\epsilon]) \tag{2.21}$$

Again assuming all covariance terms are negligible. Now we just compute the through-time heritability and equivalents:

$$h_t^2 = \frac{\mathbf{Var}(\mathbb{E}_{t_i}[G])}{\mathbf{Var}(\mathbb{E}_{t_i}[P])} \tag{2.22}$$

$$\$_t^2 = \frac{\mathbf{Var}(\mathbb{E}_{t_i}[\$])}{\mathbf{Var}(\mathbb{E}_{t_i}[P])} \tag{2.23}$$

$$m_t^2 = \frac{\mathbf{Var}(\mathbb{E}_{t_i}[M])}{\mathbf{Var}(\mathbb{E}_{t_i}[P])} \tag{2.24}$$

If $t_i \in [1900, 2000]$, then m_t^2, for instance, will measure the relative contribution of change in knowledge to change in political behavior. If $m_t^2 = 0$, then there was no relevant change in knowledge. If $h_t^2 \approx 1$, then almost all of the change in Patriciate behavior and therefore culture was due to change in the Patrician gene pool.

Clear estimates of these parameters should be of high importance to historians. They say, in general, where to look when it comes to explaining social change. It is popular for regime historians to claim that all social change is due to enlightenment – if m_t^2 is substantially less than 1, this becomes untenable, scientifically speaking.

2.2.6 Metrics of Power

It is important to be able to efficiently measure someone's actual power, for the purposes of model fitting. This is not trivial – there is no official "power level" of some person, and "marginal influence" can be quite potential and abstract. Therefore some work will need to be done to properly validate useful external metrics of power.

There are three main metrics of power currently used by the academy: qui vincit, cui bono, and qui regit, or in English, who wins, who profits, and who rules [3]? The qui vincit metric is generally considered to be the golden standard. This makes sense because it most closely observes "marginal influence." When someone wins, they are getting their way when it comes to new policy. Qualitative studies that use this metric have generally focused on local legislation, looking at what parties can change it, especially under conditions of controversy, since controversy helps reveal the origin of the change, whereas when there is no controversy it is hard to "prove," without exousiology, that something was not genuinely the "people's will."

The qui regit metric simply looks at who holds the positions of power in society. This includes not only elected officials but also leaders of powerful private institutions such as foundations and corporations. This method can be uncritical because it ignores the precarious nature of official positions and might mistake the formal for the real, to put it in Burnham's terms [4]. Who has power under a child king, under Joe Biden? Often it will be hidden advisors and Patricians who may not necessarily have official titles.

The cui bono metric has the nicest theoretical properties, but requires some validation. This metric simply involves finding out somebody's net worth. The more money is power, the more this metric

wins. Investigations such as those into temperamental materialism as detailed in subsection 2.2.3 can help validate this metric – the more people are motivated by money, the more powerful money is. If everybody wants money, and will do what they can do for money, then the people with the most power will end up controlling the most of this scarce, universally desired resource. They will then be able to pay people to do what they want. If people are more altruistically motivated, they will not be as influenced by money, and many powerful altruism-definers might not have the most money, since money would not be as central to their desires. It will be harder or impossible to reliably pay people to obey, if they care about ideals beyond money. Research getting to the bottom of these questions will inform the usefulness of the cui bono metric for measuring marginal influence.

In addition, the cui bono metric could be validated by associating it with the qui vincit metric. If those with more money tend to get their way legally, then it would appear that money is at least associated with marginal influence. It may not be the total mechanism of marginal influence, but as an indicator it would offer a good ranking of power. There are studies which have done this, and they will be discussed later in the empirical chapters of this manuscript.

Studying the general psychology and social dynamics of money will be informative as well. Why do people spend most of their lives working for mere paper and computer bits that the State can freely print and give to their friends at Goldman Sachs? Why do people see such paper as valid representations of real material needs and desires at all? Why is the bank system respected? Why does a bank get to determine what a person can afford by merely writing on their electronic ledger? How was money designed, why are people comfortable with something so abstract representing their needs and wants, why are fortunes of green paper and bits made by shuffling around green paper and bits respected? People apparently care deeply about money and their material well-being, regardless of how much they also care about altruistic ideals on average. It is a deep mystery, intimately connected to power, as to why people are therefore so uncritical and submissive when it comes to money. The more materialist people are, the weirder it gets – why not constant revolution over Jeff Bezos having a yacht while you slave away? The answer could lie in the biology of will power, agency, and wealth accumulation.

Chapter 3

Political Agency

3.1 Introducing Political Agency

3.1.1 Introduction

In this chapter we introduce the concept of political agency, propose that it is a function of intelligence and temperament, and that people with low political agency will not assert marginal influence on the political behavior of a social organism, because they lack the will or capacity to do so. In other words, it is proposed that intelligence and various temperamental measures are important in the basis of power. We attempt to estimate the proportion of the population that possesses enough political agency to assert non-zero marginal influence – this is shown to be, at most, very low, and as such it serves as a seminal quantitative proof of elitism, i.e. high centralization. Importantly, this is understood in terms of genes and environment, and as the mean level of traits related to political agency in historical societies have been similar or lower than they are now, high centralization is taken to hold for virtually all societies in human history, and for all future societies short of large-scale evolution or techno-augmentation.

3.1.2 Intelligence

IQ is the most well-studied psychometric in existence, and consequently we should milk it as much as possible. The fact is that most people are very stupid, too stupid, in fact, to conceivably have political agency. To see why this is true we first must define political agency. What we are interested in is the following: what is the set of people whose phenotypes matter to history? In other words, who do we have to track in order to predict social change? If everyone had political agency, the answer would be the whole population. If very few people have agency, then "democracy" is really about the people with agency fighting for control over the people without agency. And if some of these high agency people are clearly more capable than others, we can just look at them to be able to predict what will happen in a society. In other words, we will have found our ruling class, or governing elite.

Political agency, then, can simply be defined as the extent to which a person thinks for themselves on political matters. If they outsource their thinking, either because they aren't capable of doing it, don't have the time, don't want to, or aren't willing risk the status of doing so (this last effect would mostly arise from the first few effects allowing there to be a pre-existing consensus which status is assigned to), then they become an object of control, and it follows pretty easily from some basic assumptions that elites will successfully seize that object the vast majority of the time, rather than high agency proles engaging in un-backed grassroots activism.

It follows that intelligence is relevant to political agency in that it may allow us to prove that some portion of the population is necessarily too stupid to think for themselves on political matters. Consider HBD. Most people seem to be HBD denialists. Is this something that people thought up themselves, or were they told to believe this? We can begin to estimate the number of people who believe what they're told on this subject by estimating the number of people who even have the minimum intelligence required to understand HBD research. For many high IQ people, it's surprising to find out how profoundly stupid the average person is; I recall that in high school I used to project my own, highly atypical mind onto others, and consequently I was a libertarian. Slowly I started

learning about the science of intelligence, the basics of probability distributions, and that intelligence is normally distributed and that I was easily at the 99.9th percentile for the trait per testing, and that this is basically all due to genes and not choice or some other malleable property. Eventually I told my friend these things; he was also a high IQ libertarian. We were in an almost de-facto segregated, difficult program, and he refused to believe me. He explicitly said he believed that everyone is about as intelligent as everyone else, for all intents and purposes. Highly intelligent people believe this, but it's not the case.



Above is a chart displaying the findings reported in Jayaratne et al. (2006) [5]. We can do some simple reasoning: the correct answer is "a lot" or "just about all." Without a doubt, 74% of respondents were wrong and therefore don't have political agency (when it comes to HBD — we will see later if this generalizes to other topics, whether they be contemporary or historical). It's reasonable to also deny agency to the "some group" , meaning 94% of people lack political agency, but need this be done in the context of the Iron Law of Oligarchy? Is not a crushing, super-duper majority of 74% of people enough to essentially make history the interplay of elites who capture portions of the low agency mass to use against rivals? Would not the 1 in 4, insofar as they have agency yet lack elite talents, be totally subordinated to the very few who are outstandingly intelligent, conscientious, and ambitious, who build their power over the 3 in 4 while the 1 in 4 must spend their days working to get by?

It would be enough. The 1 in 4 are conservatives and the 3 in 4 are liberals. It maps onto reality well — only about 45% of the overall population actually vote, and Democrats are always the ones trying to increase turnout. We see how that works out for the 1 in 4: the liberal elite dominate everyone and everything more or less.



It's hard to draw an exact border between "has agency" and "does not have agency." Like IQ, "agency" can be more appropriately conceptualized as a continuous variable. It is interesting that Jayaratne's results form roughly a Gaussian where the whole left side is thrown into the "no genetic effect" box and where the other boxes more cleanly capture the right side. You can see that you might draw the meaningful agency line somewhere in between .5 SDs and 1.8 SDs.

Let's try to get a clearer picture by examining why so many people seem to lack agency. First, how many people are actually intelligent enough to have an informed view on race and genetics? To understand this topic, a person must be able to understand basic statistics like linear regression.

One major statistics test given yearly is the AP Statistics test.

2021 Score Distributions: Math & Computer Science

Exam	5	4	3	2	1
AP Calculus AB	17.6%	14.1%	19.3%	25.3%	23.7%
AP Calculus BC	38.3%	16.5%	20.4%	18.2%	6.6%
AP Computer Science A	23.9%	21.9%	19.3%	12.1%	22.8%
AP Computer Science Principles	12.4%	21.7%	32.5%	19.9%	13.6%
AP Statistics	16.2%	19.9%	21.8%	17.2%	24.9%

From Collegeboard's website, 42% of test takers fail the exam by scoring below a 3. This is very sad considering it is extremely easy. So by naively accepting College Board's standards and by ignoring the fact that the average IQ of a test taker is probably above 100, we can estimate that at least 42% of people are incapable of forming a basic independent understanding of race and genetics. This is almost certainly an underestimate, however. From a 2012 practice test, we can see that by normal academic standards an F becomes a 3 for College Board.

AP Score Conversion Chart
Statistics

Composite Score Range	AP Score
70-100	5
57-69	4
44-56	3
33-43	2
0-32	1

A reasonable thing to do here would be to just declare half of the 3s failures, and this would be charitable at any rate. That tells us that 53% of the population can't understand race and genetics, they have to be told what to think even if they had the time and desire to look at research.

But the 53% figure assumes the average AP Statistics test taker has an IQ of 100. In reality they should have a higher IQ than that. Pumpkin Person reports that the average IQ of a US college graduate is 108. It's reasonable to take this as a charitable estimation of the average AP Statistics test taker IQ since AP tests are generally only taken by college bound students. In reality the average might be even higher since quantitative AP tests skew toward an even higher IQ, mirroring quantitative majors. Many of the lower IQ college students choose majors which allow them to avoid calculus and statistics.



Above is data presented by Randy Olson showing that it could be fair to estimate the average AP statistics test taker to have an IQ as high as 124. Despite this, let's charitably stick with 108 and see what we get. The 53rd percentile IQ of a normal distribution with a mean of 108 and a standard deviation of 15 is 109. That's 0.6 SD in a distribution with a mean of 100 and an SD of 15, or 72nd percentile. This means that 72% of the population basically can't understand race and genetics at all.

If instead we assumed the average AP statistics test taker has an IQ of 124, we discover that 95% of the population basically can't actually understand HBD. We are getting strangely convergent numbers — somewhere between 72% and 95% of the population is too stupid to have meaningful political agency. 72% is the charitable estimate and 95% is the rationally defendable, low charity estimate.

Before moving on from IQ for now, let's look a few more things. Some of these will focus on verbal intelligence instead of mathematical. Whereas you can't really form hypotheses or understand the state of knowledge of most political questions today without knowing what linear regression is (immigration is race HBD, feminism is sex HBD, education is age HBD, democracy is this, class HBD, economics is economics, etc [one interesting thing to note is conservatives/dissidents seem to have more "power" when it comes to mostly "moral" things like abortion, gun control, etc, but even there an informed opinion only comes from statistical understanding]) in the past political agency was more verbal. You are probably not coming up with your own new political ideas in 1750 if you can't at least comprehend Plato, Aristotle, the Bible, Aquinas, St. Augustine, etc in theory. If you cannot understand these people, you aren't going to understand new ideas from e.g. Voltaire either, anymore than you will understand this post if you can't pass AP Statistics. So, given that genetic IQ has only increased since antiquity, finding extreme deficits in reading comprehension for most people will demonstrate that they wouldn't have been any more capable of intellectual political agency 1000 years ago.

It turns out most people are functionally illiterate. The NCES estimates that, as of 2003, only 57% of adults are able to analyze a passage of prose.



The NCES classifies literacy into 4 categories: 1) Below Basic - This runs the gamut from "doesn't know the alphabet" to "can read some words", and represents 14% of American adults. 2) Basic - This means someone capable of reading signs and labels to the point they can function in everyday life, and understand enough of small texts to extract basic ideas and information. 29% fall into this category. 3) Intermediate - This means someone who is able to digest basic prose and draw conclusions from, summarize, and otherwise meaningfully analyze the contents. 44% fall into this category. 4) Proficient - This is someone who can do all the things the Intermediate level can, but while analyzing more dense and complex texts. 13% fall into this category.

This means 43 - 87% of the population is functionally illiterate. Split the difference on the iffy Intermediate category and that's 65% of the population.

Let's look inside a test like this. Robin Hanson gives us the following:

> A common bias among the smart is to overestimate how smart everyone else is. This was certainly my experience in moving from top rank universities as a student to a mid rank university as a teacher. A better intuition for common abilities can be found by browsing the US National Assesment of Adult Literacy sample questions.
>
> For example, in 1992 out of a random sample of US adults, 7% could not do item SCOR300, which is to find the expiration date on a driver's license. 26% could not do item AB60303, which is to check the "Please Call" box on a phone message slip when they've been told: "James Davidson phones and asks to speak with Ann Jones, who is at a meeting. He needs to know if the contracts he sent are satisfactory and requests that she call before 2:00 p.m. His number is 259-3860. Fill in the message slip below."
>
> Only 52% could do item AB30901, which is to look at a table on page 118 of the 1980 World Almanac and answer: "According to the chart, did U.S. exports of oil (petroleum) increase or decrease between 1976 and 1978?"
>
> Only 16% could do item N010301, which is to answer "What is the purpose of the Se Habla Espanol expo?" after reading a short newspaper article called "Se Habla Espanol Hits Chicago; September 25,26,27 are three days that will change your marketing." The article includes this quote: "It's Mr. Martinez's job—his mission in life—to make sure companies learn how they can serve and sell to America's Hispanics. He has been marketing to the community for many years, working with the best in the business, including Coca-Cola and the advertising firm of Castor GS&B. Now his staff is organizing the largest annual Hispanic market trade show in the business—Se Habla Español."
>
> Acceptable answers include statement such as: "To enable people to better serve and sell to the Hispanic community; to improve marketing strategies to the Hispanic community; and to enable people to establish contacts to serve the Hispanic community."
>
> Only 11% could do Item N100701, which asks: "Using the information in the table, write a brief paragraph summarizing the extent to which parents and teachers agreed or disagreed on the statements about issues pertaining to parental involvement at their school."

Parents and Teachers Evaluate Parental Involvement at Their School

Do you agree or disagree that...?

	Total	Level of School		
		Elementary	Junior High	High School
		percent agreeing		
Our school does a good job of encouraging parental involvement in sports, arts, and other nonsubject areas				
Parents	77	76	74	79
Teachers	77	73	77	85
Our school does a good job of encouraging parental involvement in educational areas				
Parents	73	82	71	64
Teachers	80	84	78	70
Our school only contacts parents when there is a problem with their child				
Parents	55	46	62	63
Teachers	23	18	22	33
Our school does not give parents the opportunity for any meaningful roles				
Parents	22	18	22	28
Teachers	8	8	12	7

Source: The Metropolitan Life Survey of the American Teacher, 1987

Something like 84 to 89% of people are totally functionally illiterate according to this test.

Another common reading assessment is the reading SAT. The overall average for the verbal section is a 530/800. This implies that the average for the reading section is about a 26.5/40, maybe lower because the reading is generally harder than the grammar for people. This score requires missing about half of the questions on the test according to the curve from the first SAT (version 3) practice test. College Board provides percentiles for the overall verbal test:

Percentiles for Section Scores

	Evidence-Based Reading and Writing		Math	
Total Score	Nationally Representative Sample	SAT User	Nationally Representative Sample	SAT User
800	99+	99+	99+	99
790	99+	99+	99+	98
780	99+	99+	99	98
770	99+	99	99	97
760	99+	99	99	96
750	99	98	98	95
740	99	98	98	95
730	99	97	97	94
720	98	96	97	93
710	97	95	96	92
700	97	94	95	91
690	96	92	94	90
680	95	91	93	88
670	93	89	92	87
660	92	87	91	85
650	90	85	90	84
640	88	83	89	82
630	86	81	87	81
620	84	78	85	79
610	81	76	83	77
600	79	73	81	75
590	76	70	79	72
580	74	67	76	69
570	71	64	73	66
560	68	61	71	64
550	65	58	68	61
540	62	54	65	58
530	58	51	61	54
520	55	48	57	50
510	51	45	52	46
500	48	41	47	43
490	44	38	44	40
480	41	35	40	37
470	38	31	36	34
460	34	28	32	31
450	31	25	29	28
440	28	22	25	25
430	24	19	23	23
420	22	16	20	20
410	19	14	17	18

	Evidence-Based Reading and Writing		Math	
Total Score	Nationally Representative Sample	SAT User	Nationally Representative Sample	SAT User
400	16	11	15	16
390	13	9	13	13
380	11	7	10	11
370	9	5	9	9
360	7	4	7	7
350	5	3	5	5
340	3	2	4	4
330	2	1	3	3
320	2	1	2	2
310	1	1	1	1
300	1	1-	1	1
290	1-	1-	1-	1
280	1-	1-	1-	1-
270	1-	1-	1-	1-
260	1-	1-	1-	1-
250	1-	1-	1-	1-
240	1-	1-	1-	1-
230	1-	1-	1-	1-
220	1-	1-	1-	1-
210	1-	1-	1-	1-
200	1-	1-	1-	1-

We can estimate what percentile a certain reading score is by just assuming it's the whole verbal test (the sections are very similar and correlate well anyway). From my own experience I would struggle to consider someone literate if they missed more than 20% of the questions. The test is very easy and requires hardly any specific outside knowledge, unlike the math section. See for yourself here. Getting 80% of the questions right would translate to a 680 which is 95th percentile. I didn't plan that outcome but yet that number has popped up again. Curious!

To finish off our look at intelligence we will quote Anatoly Karlin.

TEST QUESTIONS (LEVEL 5)
CLIMBING MOUNT FUJI

Mount Fuji is a famous dormant volcano in Japan.

QUESTION

The Gotemba walking trail up Mount Fuji is about 9 kilometres (km) long. Walkers need to return from the 18 km walk by 8 pm.

Toshi estimates that he can walk up the mountain at 1.5 kilometres per hour on average, and down at twice that speed. These speeds take into account meal breaks and rest times.

Using Toshi's estimated speeds, what is the latest time he can begin his walk so that he can return by 8 pm?

Type your answer here

SUBMIT

Only 13% of OECD citizens could answer this basic question correctly, aka 87% failed it.

TEST QUESTIONS (LEVEL 6)
HELEN THE CYCLIST

Helen has just got a new bike. It has a speedometer which sits on the handlebar.

The speedometer can tell Helen the distance she travels and her average speed for a trip.

QUESTION

Helen rode her bike from home to the river, which is 4 km away. It took her 9 minutes. She rode home using a shorter route of 3 km. This only took her 6 minutes.

What was Helen's average speed, in km/h, for the trip to the river and back?

Average speed for the trip: ..... km/h

Type your answer here

SUBMIT

97% of OECD citizens got this one wrong.

The vast, vast majority of people, 75-95% of white people, are too stupid to actually understand what they're talking about when they say race isn't real, or genetics don't matter. These people can't read, they can't understand a linear regression, they are surely not coming up with these ideas themselves. Rather, they are repeating others. They do not have the capacity to seriously consider the Divine Right of Kings and whether or not Popular Sovereignty trumps it. When they are told these things they are going to understand them at about the level of a 145 IQ person at the age of 11 or 12. The same goes for all other views — the evidence indicates that the average person, intellectually speaking, is about as smart as I was at 12. This gives me, and should probably give you, a good, intuitive model of what most people are like. At 12 you repeat the adults. 12 year olds are obedient. When you are 12, if the food is good then life is good. When you are 12, you throw a tantrum because you didn't get some material good you wanted — likewise basically all true spontaneous protests are economically motivated and boil down to proles wanting more stuff (more on this at another time).

More continuously, we could say that the bottom 75% think like me, and hopefully you, at 11 or under. The next 10% are like us at 12, the next 10% at 13 or so, and then finally we reach people with some serious amount of intellectual political agency, although 95th percentile is certainly not the ceiling. This is simply where people begin to show mere reasonable capacity to think for themselves in a sufficiently complex, adult sort of way.

We should end by this section by predicting that if intelligence is so important for political agency, then it follows that the ruling elite will be highly intelligent, almost all beyond the 95th percentile, if capacity for political agency (i.e. the ability to come up with new policies, persuade people to accept them, to direct people with a purpose of your own such that you capitalize bigly) is important for being a ruling elite. This is in fact the case.

3.1.3 Temperament

Low IQ is a hard barrier to political agency, but how many high IQ people "choose" to express political agency? There are several considerations here, some environmental and some genetic. Some people naturally don't care for politics. Who among you have not noticed the mathematician's haughty and embarrassing political ignorance, his tendency to use his sharp mind to solve abstract theorems in a day and age which calls action from anyone who can give it? There are many such people, perhaps the majority of the high IQ are like this mathematician we have thought up, living their whole lives just going with the flow, never shedding their ignorance of the science and intricacies of the most important questions of the day, blindly trusting the talking head as much as the factory worker, if not more due to status considerations. Such people cannot be said to have political agency.

Others don't have the time or the opportunity but perhaps aren't naturally opposed to the idea of expressing agency under the right conditions. They simply care more for money, or video games, or sex, and so on. Most people in the 95th percentile of intelligence still have to wage slave for 40 hours a week. Between that and all the distractions of daily life they choose to indulge in, when do they have the time to read Arthur Jensen? Whereas the mathematician could never be made to exercise political agency, this second type will if his other desires are saturated. Truth is merely another good on an indifference curve for such a person. I know of at least one Bitcoin millionaire who, after spending all of his time before making his small fortune focusing on money acquisition, has now settled into political thought. Curtis Yarvin may be another example of this type; it is unclear if he did much of anything political in his youth but a few years after retiring on his dot com bubble profits he was writing UR. I have talked to countless intelligent people who linger around dissident blogs, never quite going beyond a certain subtle level of ignorance, which when questioned will admit their lack of time. They are only halfway exercising their agency because of their relative indifference to the consumption of the good Truth.

Whereas these types are constructed as lacking intrinsic appreciation for political agency, still others may lack certain moral virtues which its full pursuit requires — bravery, honesty, confidence, diligence, integrity, altruism, conscientiousness, and so on. Thinking outside of the box is dangerous work. Not only may intelligent people derive limited intrinsic pleasure from the act, they may also be positively scared by it. They may not see it as useful to them even if they find enjoyment in it. The truth may be a danger to their position in society and consequently they may lie about it. They may even be too lazy to seriously pursue it.

Let's examine the distribution of these traits. We will first begin with moral reasoning. Kolhberg infamously found that 85% of adults exhibit "conventional" morality. This means that they lack moral agency, which as far as I can see is a necessary precondition to political agency. In other words, for 85% of adults, the secular law is what is moral. This means that they will be incredulous towards any new policy unless the need for it is demonstrably shown by someone who they feel is morally authoritative. These people, this vast majority, are temperamentally followers.

Only a few are "post conventional" are exhibit moral reasoning based on eternal principles, meaning only a few have the capacity to say "that law is morally wrong and it must be repealed." The question is, what percent of our cognitive political agents exhibit conventional moral reasoning?

Derryberry et al. (2005) [6] found that, among college students, conventional morality was predominant and post-conventional morality correlated with ACT scores are r = .335. It follows that a smaller, yet sizeable amount of intelligent people will exhibit conventional morality. Extrapolating from this data we would expect people with a 98th percentile intelligence to still be slightly predominant in conventional morality, on average, although this assumes that there is not a negative correlation between IQ and conventional reasoning.

The study also examined "gifted youth" who were 12 to 16 (14.39 +/1 1.14 years old on average) who needed average scores on the ACT or SAT to be considered "gifted." This means they were merely representative of the top 50%, plus a little for being on the younger side. Post-conventional reasoning

predominates in about half of them but the correlation with test scores is weaker. From this study alone, 40-50% of 95th percentile IQ people probably have predominate conventional moral reasoning.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics

Gifted Youth (N = 97)	*M*	*SD*	College Students (N = 140)	*M*	*SD*	Males (N = 75)	*M*	*SD*	Females (N = 160)	*M*	*SD*
P	34.88	11.41	P	29.57	10.79	P	32.43	13.05	P	31.38	10.45
MN	33.22	13.36	MN	37.76	12.23	MN	31.93	14.03	MN	37.80	11.87
PI	24.83	9.91	PI	26.08	10.69	PI	27.77	11.69	PI	24.55	9.58
ACSmot	3.01	5.39	ACSmot	4.57	4.41	ACSmot	3.35	5.26	ACSmot	4.22	4.69
ACSce	3.46	4.65	ACSce	2.34	4.18	ACSce	2.60	4.85	ACSce	2.89	4.19
ACSmeta	4.55	4.65	ACSmeta	5.86	3.40	ACSmeta	5.04	4.47	ACSmeta	5.47	3.76
ACSbfi	4.52	4.77	ACSbfi	6.31	3.53	ACSbfi	5.17	4.63	ACSbfi	5.78	3.93
ACScin	4.57	5.24	ACScin	4.97	3.37	ACScin	4.67	4.19	ACScin	4.88	4.25
ACScext	5.58	4.11	ACScext	5.48	3.74	ACScext	5.05	4.30	ACScext	5.74	3.67
ACStemp	1.68	4.69	ACStemp	4.53	4.19	ACStemp	2.19	4.37	ACStemp	3.94	4.62
ACScomp	27.53	25.16	ACScomp	34.07	20.11	ACScomp	28.07	25.06	ACScomp	32.90	21.19
ACT	22.38	3.39	ACT	21.10	3.63	ACT	22.47	3.94	ACT	21.25	3.36
HPO	1.53	.97	HPO	1.24	.88	HPO	1.43	.95	HPO	1.32	.91
LPA	.58	.89	LPA	.38	.68	LPA	.53	.92	LPA	.43	.71
HPC	2.12	1.30	HPC	2.39	1.22	HPC	2.21	1.17	HPC	2.31	1.30

Note. No significant interactions observed. P = Postconventional schema, MN = Maintaining Norms schema, PI = Personal Interest schema, ACSmot = ACS Motivation, ACSce = ACS Preference for Complex Explanations subscale, ACSmeta = ACS metacognition, ACSbfi = ACS behavior as a function of interaction, ACScin = ACS complex internal explanations, ACScext = ACS complex external explanations, ACStemp = ACS temporal dimension, ACScomp = ACS Composite Score, ACT = American College Test, HPO = High Pole Openness to Experience, LPA = Low Pole Agreeableness, HPC = High Pole Conscientiousness

Table 2

Correlation Matrices

Gifted Youth	P	ACSce	ACScomp-ce	ACT	HPO	LPA	HPC
P							
ACSce	.240*						
ACScomp-ce	.220*	.673**					
ACT	.231*	.132	.030				
HPO	.081	.072	.136	-.145			
LPA	.045	-.100	-.151	.083	-.151		
HPC	-.109	.193	.109	.187	-.062	-.313**	

College Students	P	ACSce	ACScomp-ce	ACT	HPO	LPA	HPC
P	1.00						
ACSce	.283**	1.00					
ACScomp-ce	.244**	.539**	1.00				
ACT	.335**	.180*	.050	1.00			
HPO	.180*	.230**	.062	.205*	1.00		
LPA	.037	.047	-.027	-.039	-.162	1.00	
HPC	-.056	-.022	-.081	.159	-.161	-.336**	1.00

Note. P = Postconventional schema, ACSmot = ACS Motivation, ACSce = ACS Preference for Complex Explanations subscale, ACScomp-ce = ACS composite minus complex explanations, ACT = American College Test, HPO = High Pole Openness to Experience, LPA = Low Pole Agreeableness, HPC = High Pole Conscientiousness.
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .005$

Another study on high schoolers [7] with 75th percentile SAT scores on average found really weak correlations between SAT score and post-conventional reasoning. Conventional reasoning actually yielded higher a higher correlation in this study.

Table 2
Correlations Between Academic, Emotional, Moral, and Leadership Abilities in Gifted Students

	SAT			BarOn EQ-i: YV(S)					DIT-2			RRSL
	Verbal	Math	Combined	Total	Adapt	Stress	Intra	Inter	PC	MN	PI	Total
BarOn EQ-i: YV(S)												
Total	-.10	.02	-.02	-	.65**	.50**	.61**	.60**	.06	-.06	-.05	.00
Adapt	-.03	.15	.08	.65**	-	-.05	.26**	.34**	.04	.03	-.05	-.13
Stress	-.12	-.15	-.13	.50**	-.05	-	.05	-.07	.06	-.15*	-.06	.06
Intra	-.06	.04	.05	.61**	.26**	.05	-	.32**	.10	.00	.00	.05
Inter	-.03	-.02	-.02	.60**	.34**	-.07	.32**	-	-.05	.03	.01	.01
DIT-2												
PC	.03	.03	.06	.06	.04	.06	.10	-.05	-	.09	.13	-.05
MN	.10	.08	.10	-.06	.03	-.15*	.00	.03	.09	-	.41**	-.09
PI	.11	.04	.07	-.05	-.05	-.06	.00	.01	.13	.41**	-	-.10
RRSL-Total	-.15	-.19*	-.20*	.00	-.13	.06	.05	.01	-.05	-.09	-.10	-

Note. Adapt = Adaptability, Stress = Stress management, Intra = Intrapersonal ability, Inter = Interpersonal ability, PC = Post-Conventional, MN = Maintaining Norm, PI = Personal Interest. No subscale scores are available for the RRSL.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

One interesting study [8] actually looked at the moral reasoning of CEOs by examining their public statements and found 8 out of 10 exhibited sub-post-conventional reasoning. CEOs of course are going to almost always cognitively elite, the study linked above in this connections found, for instance that over 38% of Fortune 500 CEOs went to elite colleges that require top 1% SAT scores.

TABLE II
CEO moral reasoning

Company (Fortune 100 Rank)	CEO	Predominant stage of reasoning
General Motors (#5)	George "Rick" Wagoner, Jr.	Stage 2
Toyota (#6)	Katsuaki Watanabe	Stage 3/4
Daimler (#8)	Dieter Zetsche	Stage 4
Ford (#12)	Alan Mulally	Stage 2
Volkswagen (#16)	Martin Winterkorn	Stage 2
Honda (#37)	Tetsuo Iwamura	Stage 4
Nissan (#45)	Carlos Ghosn	Stage 2/3
Peugeot (#68)	Jean-Luc Vergne	Stage 2/3
Hyundai (#76)	Dong Jin Kim	Stage 2/3
Fiat (#84)	Luca C. di Montezemolo	Stage 2
BMW (#88)	Ing. Norbert Reithofer	Stage 2

Stage 2 = General Motors, Ford, Volkswagen, Fiat, BMW
Stage 2/3 = Nissan, Peugeot, Hyundai
Stage 3/4 = Toyota
Stage 4 = Daimler, Honda



Figure 1. Distribution of CEO's moral reasoning by company nationality.

One study actually looked at highly intelligent young adults [9]. It was found that many of those above the 95th percentile, even a majority, were primarily conventional thinkers, like the average. Furthermore a correlation between post conventional moral reasoning and cognitive ability was found to be 0.30 similar to the previous study.



Figure 1
Scatterplot of P-scores by Combined Scholastic Ranks

Above, P-score is post conventional reasoning, and scholastic rank is actually the student's percentile on a 7th or 8th grade placement test.

It is reasonable, given this data, to claim that about half of those with an intelligence beyond the 95th percentile will reason conventionally, and consequently will be too obedient to exercise political agency. We may therefore expect that 2 or 3% of people will ultimately express political agency, based on what we have seen so far.

I have only one trick left for this excursion: attempting to measure, in abstract, how many people actually engage in serious, independent political thought.

For now I will cite only one thing, the average number of books read per year. Serious independent thought requires going beyond memorizing facts you don't understand — it requires learning the theory behind things. This can only be done by reading books, journal articles, and writings like these. I assume that most people don't do the latter two, so how many non-fiction books do people read?



According to Gallup that average American reads only 12 books per year. This distribution is skewed, however. Only 27% read more than 11 books per year. It's fair to say that bottom 73% are not going to be informed about much of anything with that low amount of reading. Frustratingly there was no data on nonfiction books in particular but one study [10] estimated by magazine subscriptions that it was 1% of the population in 1998. We'll charitably assume 40% of the books read according to the Gallup poll are nonfiction; this is the sales ratio given by a 2018 [11]. This means the average American reads only 4 or 5 nonfiction books per year. The median probably reads less than 2. Hardly any are reading at least one nonfiction book per month — charitably we might assume people read either nonfiction or fiction, meaning 10% of the population reads 11 or more nonfiction books per year.

And what do they read? Is it rigorous non-fiction, like *HBD At Lightspeed*, *An Empirical Introduction to Youth*, *The Mind and Society*, or *Exousiology: The Scientific Theory of Power*? Of course not, they read absolute garbage.

Current Amazon nonfiction bestsellers:

1. Ignite a Shift: Engaging Minds, Guiding Emotions and Driving Behavior
2. DSM 5
3. BEQOMING: Everything You Didn't Know You Wanted (lol)
4. Pati's Mexican Table: The Secrets of Real Mexican Home Cooking
5. Tiny Habits: The Small Changes That Change Everything
6. Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire (this is basically a novel, a bunch of anecdotes with horrible exuberant prose)
7. If You Tell: A True Story of Murder, Family Secrets, and the Unbreakable Bond of Sisterhood
8. Dreaming of Flight: A Novel
9. The Greatest Survival Stories of All Time: True Tales of People Cheating Death When Trapped in a Cave, Adrift at Sea, Lost in the Forest, Stranded on a Mountaintop, and More
10. Villains, Scoundrels, and Rogues: Incredible True Tales of Mischief and Mayhem
11. The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics (actually decent looking! surprising)
12. The Biology of Belief 10th Anniversary Edition (decent book above countered by literal misinformation — I can already imagine the proles uncritically repeating the blurb — "In this greatly expanded edition, Lipton, a former medical school professor and research scientist, explores his own experiments and those of other leading-edge scientists that have unraveled in ever greater detail how truly connected the mind, body, and spirit are. It is now widely recognized that genes and DNA do not control our biology. Instead, they are controlled by signals from outside the cell, including energetic messages emanating from our thoughts." — and them staring blankly as I try to explain that, yes, medical degrees and bestseller status don't always mean trustworthy).
13. Embers of Childhood: Growing Up a Whitney

14. Reasons to Stay Alive (lol shitlibs be like)
15. The Community: A Memoir
16. Whiskey Lies (Falling For Whiskey Book 1)
17. Gravity: A Billionaire Romance (The Wilde Boys Book 1)
18. Here's the Deal: A Memoir
19. In Love: A Memoir of Love and Loss
20. Atomic Habits: An Easy & Proven Way to Build Good Habits & Break Bad Ones (literally the same thing as number 5???)

I could go on. It continues like that, forever I assume. I can say with absolute certainty that not a single book on this list is worth reading save for maybe number 11 which actually appeared to be a somewhat decent summary of the history of ethical philosophy written by a somewhat serious author. The rest of the books are just worthless, no-info smutt except for the gene denialist spirit wackjob book at number 12. So a top 10% reader will read 12 books from this list or something like it in a year. If they are lucky they will learn something about ethics which they may or may not understand or have the capacity to finish.

From the United States

VSK

★★★☆☆ **Three Stars**

Reviewed in the United States on October 11, 2018

Verified Purchase

BORING

Helpful | Report abuse

Victor Z

★★★☆☆ **interesting but somewhat boring.**

Reviewed in the United States on November 5, 2015

Verified Purchase

interesting but somewhat boring. havent finished reading

One person found this helpful

Helpful | Report abuse

Leslie W.

★★★☆☆ **There are better reads for this essential message**

Reviewed in the United States on September 25, 2015

Verified Purchase

BORING, BLAND, NOT EASY TO READ. I DID NOT FINISH

One person found this helpful

Helpful | Report abuse

> from the structure of heroic society, shaped by its needs and constrained by its particular conception of human nature. As society changed, and as new languages developed through which to understand the human soul, the human mind and humanity's place in the cosmos, so inevitably moral ideas also evolved.
>
> 3
>
> Aeschylus' magnificent *Oresteian* trilogy begins where the *Iliad* ends. Troy has fallen. Greek warriors are returning home. The first play, *Agamemnon*, opens with Clytemnestra, wife of the Greek king and sister of Helen, awaiting her husband's homecoming in the city of Argos. She is brimming with fury and rage. Ten years previously, on the eve of the war, Agamemnon had sacrificed their daughter Iphigenia to placate the gods and ensure favourable winds. Now Clytemnestra wants revenge. The play climaxes with the brutal murder of Agamemnon, his wife hacking him down with an axe, as if she were ritually sacrificing an animal.
>
> In *The Choephoroi*, the second of the *Oresteian* plays, Agamemnon's son Orestes, who has lived his life in exile, returns to Argos at Apollo's command to avenge his father. He is faced with a terrible dilemma: murder his mother or leave his father unavenged. He kills both Clytemnestra and her lover.
>
> In the final part of the trilogy, *The Eumenides*, Orestes is pursued by the Furies, ancient pre-Olympian deities, more hag-like than god-like, whose role was to exact vengeance for major sins: blasphemy, treachery and the shedding of kindred blood. Orestes finds refuge in Athens where, on the Acropolis, Athena convenes a jury of twelve to try him.
>
> Apollo acts as attorney for Orestes, while the Furies become advocates for the dead Clytemnestra. The jury is split. Athena casts her vote in favour of acquittal, a verdict

Is this so boring? It is no drier than any of the serious books I have read this year. The prole whines that the book does not cater to its twitterfied attention span!

Is this list not hilarious and pathetic? Less than 1% of people do any serious reading.

3.1.4 Conclusion

Democracy is fake; the Iron Law of Oligarchy's fifth tenet is verified. Only 1-5% of people have political agency. The rest are too stupid to understand basic math or two have basic reading comprehension skills. Of the tiny intelligent fraction, perhaps a majority cannot morally reason beyond the current law of the State and by extension the norms of the day. And finally the top 10% of readers, those who read just one non-fiction book per month, are reading absolute trash, wasting their precious intellectual time on "Tiny Habits" and other garbage in the same vein. How many people of both intelligence and moral capacity are actually reading Arthur Jensen, Elite Theory, or Smart and SeXy? This is

maybe 2.5% of the population. It would be generous to say that a quarter reads at this level. Many probably don't read at all. Of those who do, I have seen far too many reading lists of those who may have agency be filled with New York Times bestsellers and books on random soyboy topics that have nothing to do with politics, like Chinese history or AI. These people will then talk about how they just aren't sure about what the black-white IQ gap is, but it doesn't matter anyway because Nick Bostrom says the superintelligence is coming on the clouds any day now to wipe away their tears! Or turn them into paperclips. So they go along with the rigmarole, a rare member of the 2.5% who is ripe for practicing political agency totally squandering their precious gift, forever ignorant of the actual goings on of society, a true idiot by the Aristotelian definition of the word, one who does not take part in public affairs.

3.2 The Process of Political Agency

3.2.1 Introduction

In the first section on political agency, three facets of the concept were explored: intelligence, moral capacity, and active curiosity, corresponding to the ability to understand politics, care about politics, and actively learn about politics respectively. Each of these facets were derived from the idea that a person who is deficient in one of these metrics will be essentially incapable of pursuing their own political best interests. Consequently, such people are taken to be irrelevant when culture changes, i.e. when marginal influence is wielded. Such people will not assert autonomous marginal influence because they do not have the agency to pursue their interests; thus the consequence of finding that $> 95\%$ of people are deficient in one of these facets was taken as a verification of the Iron Law of Oligarchy (ILO), particularly its fifth tenet, which hypothesizes that oligarchy is inevitable because of the natural docility and inferiority of the majority of people in any social organism.

In the last section on political agency, the concept remained verbal and rather vague. It is indirectly defined as a necesarry condition for having a marginal influence above zero:

> In this chapter we introduce the concept of political agency, propose that it is a function of intelligence and temperament, and that people with low political agency will not assert marginal influence on the political behavior of a social organism, because they lack the will or capacity to do so. In other words, it is proposed that intelligence and various temperamental measures are important in the basis of power. We attempt to estimate the proportion of the population that possesses enough political agency to assert non-zero marginal influence – this is shown to be, at most, very low, and as such it serves as a seminal quantitative proof of elitism, i.e. high centralization. Importantly, this is understood in terms of genes and environment, and as the mean level of traits related to political agency in historical societies have been similar or lower than they are now, high centralization is taken to hold for virtually all societies in human history, and for all future societies short of large-scale evolution or techno-augmentation.

In other words, political agency α is defined as α such that $\psi > 0 \implies \alpha > 0$, motivated by the idea that $\alpha = 0 \implies \psi = 0$ where ψ measures marginal influence. It is argued that when various empirical metrics, like IQ, Kohlberg moral stage, or reading habit are under some threshold, political agency is 0, meaning marginal influence is also 0. It is shown that based on these thresholds, $P(\alpha = 0) \geq 0.95$, implying $P(\psi > 0) \leq 0.05$.

Under this formulation, α is essentially binary and is identical to whether or not one of the three empirical metrics considered is under the threshold described: $\alpha = IQ > t_{IQ} \wedge moralStage > t_{moralStage} \wedge readingHabit > t_{readingHabit}$. This means the claim was actually nothing more than $(IQ \leq t_{IQ} \implies \psi = 0) \wedge (moralStage \leq t_{moralStage} \implies \psi = 0) \wedge (readingHabit \leq t_{readingHabit} \implies \psi = 0)$.

To be able to better verify this set of claims, it would be nice if α could be given some of its own substance; if this is doable, then new empirical research will have an easier time showing that zero political agency implies zero marginal influence, and that traits below a certain threshold imply no political agency.

In particular, the idea is that the claim $\alpha = 0 \implies \psi = 0$ will be analytical true based on the definition of political agency, that the definition of political agency will be clearly measurable, and

therefore traits will be able to be associated with political agency in empirical research.

Therefore, I want to describe my own process of exercising political agency in depth, and propose direct measurements for the tendency to engage in this emergent process. It will hopefully be clear that doing poorly on these metrics implies the incapacity to exercise one's political will; research can then begin which directly associates different traits like IQ with capacity for political agency.

3.2.2 Describing Political Agency

I consider myself to be high political agency, and I believe it's pretty clear that without this agency, I would never be able to exercise marginal influence upon the current social order, because the exercise of influence involves wanting to change the status quo. Without political agency, I, like many I observe, would never begin to *oppose* the status quo, and therefore would never work to change it.

One key example of my political agency is my book *An Empirical Introduction to Youth.* I believe this text represents the fruit of an extremely agentic individual, and reveals the lower agency of the vast majority of the rest of the population, because the book shows that the high school system is contrary to the interests of the great majority of people. It is obviously a Pareto-optimum increasing move to abolish the high school. More than 95% of people would directly benefit; a few parasites would be losers and suffer from redistribution. In a high political agency democracy, the high school would already be abolished, because 95% of the population would vote for it.

But something is wrong. People don't realize that this is in their best interests. I am original in my arguments, but I have trouble reaching people with them because this simple, massively altruistic change to the social state is not even conceived as a possibility in the minds of the average person. There is a seeming lack of creativity; what should be a non-controversy is a type III controversy (according to my controversy typology, a type I controversy is an allowed controversy with elites on both sides, such as abortion. A type II controversy is a censored controversy with significant minority support but a unified elite against it, like HBD. A type III controversy is memory holed; very few people ever think about it, and the reaction to them is usually bafflement and ignoring. The controversy is not in the discourse at all). What explains the discrepancy between the high political agency democracy, where agentic citizens comprehend their interests and take steps to secure them, and the world we live in, where a trillion dollar improvement can't get any air-time, while dumber and dumber issues continue to appear out of thin air, like whether or not society should worship a small minority of exhibitionist crossdressers?

Evidently, people are, for some reason, failing to go through the same process I went through in arriving to my conclusions on what is to be done about the high school system. Therefore, I will attempt to critically describe this process, so that we may discover how to measure whether someone has a tendency to engage in it.

The process began with me trusting my own eyes. I was in high school, and it was clear that for me, and probably for most people, less that system would mean more, to put it in micro-economic terms, utility. I evaluated what I was getting from the 3rd year of Shakespeare plays, paid for by tax dollars. The case for spending money and coercing young adults into reading specific fiction, when they can just read it on their own or join a book club if that's their thing, is very thin to begin with, but by the fifth play the case in non-existent; at that point the reader will either want to read more Shakespeare, or will not want to read more Shakespeare. They have been enriched enough, and the marginal utility gained from one more enrichment is obviously not worth the English teacher's salary.

The derivative of my utility with respect to amount of English class was clearly negative, and I was prevented from getting rid of English class from my life. This was, essentially, coercion and exploitation. I occasionally complained about this; I was told that my own judgment was wrong or that I was selfish and it was for the greater good. I was supplied with scant evidence; only Paretian derivations about cultural enrichment and apparent gaslighting about brain development, which I did not believe because of my own judgment that I was superior in decision making capacity to my loser public school teachers.



Thus the first step in my process of political agency was imagining how my life would be without an apparently offensive stimuli. I had to look at English class, think "it doesn't have to be like this," imagine life without English class or non-natural consequences for not doing English class, and decide if that would be a better life. This seems to be what it takes to calculate the derivative of utility with respect to some policy; I calculated my derivative of utility with respect to amount of English class and discovered it was negative. Apparently, others do not do this calculation, or fail to find that it is negative, even though *An Empirical Introduction to Youth* shows that it is negative for most people.

In order to complete this step, people have to think critically about their surroundings and their social conditions. They have to be able to freely imagine alternatives. They have to have the capacity to make their own judgments, and they need the knowledge and intelligence that causes those judgments to be correct.

It seems obvious that this step in the process of political agency, which I will call *recognition*, mainly has to do with intelligence first, then openness or creativity, and finally disagreeableness. To imagine a social counterfactual is at once an act of intelligence, creativity, and defiance. To correctly judge the counterfactual as superior is both defiance and intelligence. The overly obedient, agreeable type would second-guess himself; he would say, "surely my judgment is wrong; everyone else would disagree. I better keep quiet and forget this." Worse than that, he may not imagine the counter-factual to begin with, despite the intelligence to do so. To imagine is an act of defiance; if the agreeable person derives negative utility from defiance, what motive does he have to imagine? If the *act* of attempting to imagine an improvement to one's social arrangement is unpleasurable, the improvement will never be imagined. If the improvement is never imagined, it can never be implemented.

Likewise, the unintelligent or uncreative type may be unable to imagine a change in the social state. Others, especially those with power, may seem more like constants of nature and less like variables of man. A child can say, "I don't like English class", but is probably incapable of thinking, "there should be less English class in the curriculum." In my experience, it is a common retort of the unintelligent and uncreative to say, in response to a complaint like "I don't like English class", or even, "there should be less English class in society" (which they interpret identically to the former statement), to say, "that's just the *way it is*. You have to deal with it", as if English class were death or the need to eat, and not an ahistorical recency imposed upon society by a small class of benefactors, which could easily be voted into oblivion in this supposed "democracy."



We should all be able to remember when we couldn't formulate the idea of less English class. We were all children once. Above is a chart showing how IQ develops from 12 to 17 in men and women. I first began to think malleably about social systems at 12 or 13. If we assume that the rate of change for IQ is roughly the same at different IQ levels (which is probably not completely true, but close enough), and if we assume that I am 145 IQ, then we just subtract 9 to 20 IQ points to get the threshold for critical thinking. This would set the threshold in between IQ of 125 and 136.

The lower end of this threshold aligns with my findings in my first essay on this topic. This is probably not a coincidence. Some might ask why this is so high. For one, social counterfactuals are a lot more complicated than personal counterfactuals, which usually can be answered with personal experience. "What would happen if you hadn't eaten breakfast today?" can be answered by remembering a day when you didn't eat breakfast. Only the dumbest can't link the question to such a memory. Social counterfactuals need raw imagination, and they need to consider a lot of downstream effects. On the breakfast question, if they have never not eaten breakfast, they only have to imagine one thing, and they have probably been hungry before. In contrast, the process of imagining a social counterfactual is 1) imagine new policy 2) imagine all downstream effects 3) imagine remedies to any negative effects if possible 4) for each remedy check downstream effects 5) form good judgment if at some point the net benefit is positive, else if this can't be found, reject the change. Midwits will halt halfway through 2) and say "but your change would make this worse" and the answer is always "I just fix that like this it's not big deal" and they sit there confounded thinking, "what are all of the implications of that, this is getting really confusing."

After the *recognition* stage came the *advocation* stage. Just recognizing that a change would be an improvement was not enough. Had I crimestopped and decided that my idea was not worth acting on, I would have never written my book. I had to tell others what I thought. This seems to mostly be a function of disagreeableness. Someone who is too scared of being contrary will, even if he is contrarian enough to think for himself, keep his mouth shut. This will necessarily prevent the manifestation of any greater action, such as a book or material implementation. If there is no one he feels he can advocate for his idea with, who would he write a book for? How could his idea possibly be implemented?

In the case of my youth book, the *advocation* stage manifested with me telling friends, family, and teachers about my ideas. They offered me arguments and some differing perspectives, some more valid than others. Among them were the idea that I was wrong in my judgment because the teen brain was

undeveloped.

The challenges of the advocacy stage led to the *theorization* stage. I enjoyed research, enjoyed the question I asked, and wondered what the socially optimal amount of school really was. This was answerable only with my book. I believe I was driven by strong altruism, i.e. the desire to optimize society, as well as strong curiosity. Obviously theorization also requires a certain level of intelligence.

Without enough intelligence, I wouldn't have been able to write the book. Without curiosity, which caused me to derive utility from research, I would not have wanted to write it. Without altruism, I wouldn't have gotten an extra boost from imagining a social state optimized for everyone. I could have decided that I was better served by exercising my curiosity doing something that would make *me* more money and status, like machine learning or finance. I would have let my complaint just be a complaint without these things. Perhaps I would follow or support *someone else* who was personally working hard to change the system, if I thought the change would benefit me. But I wouldn't personally derive enough utility from theorization without high curiosity and altruism. Therefore, theorization which attempts to find the best comprimise for everyone requires high intelligence, curiosity, and altruism. A more selfish theory requires high intelligence, and either curiosity if the theory is motivated by a selfish desire to find the truth, or an extreme desire for the change itself if the "theory" is just propaganda.

There is a final / alternative stage that I have not had the power to experience yet: *implementation*. Implementation appears to involve wielding marginal influence such that the change, which is the result either of a prior theorization step, or, if that is not needed, a recognition step, comes to be implemented in the social state. This should essentially involve spending credit and time implementing and overseeing the change. Propaganda campaigns have to be undertaken. Legislation must be drafted. Other elites must be negotiated with. One must be powerful to experience implementation. The change itself has to give enough utility to make the change costs worth it. Recognition, advocation, and theorization all might occur without implementation being worth it, if a person is sufficiently curious, disagreeable, and intelligent. Will anyone ever really implement Patchwork, for instance? Would Yarvin?

3.2.3 Another Example of Political Agency: Curtis Yarvin

I believe Yarvin's work represents the political agency process well. He was known for advocation on Usenet and various blogs before starting *Unqualified Reservations*. This means he performed recognition prior to these comments. His blog was an example of theorization. We can infer that Yarvin is intelligent enough to think critically about society, and indeed he is known to be quite intelligent; he is disagreeable enough to argue for something like monarchism; and he is curious enough to enjoy theorization and the lengthy political reading he underwent in preparation of starting his blog.

Now there are those who would attempt to enter the implementation stage with Yarvin's critiques. Media campaigns are under way. Peter Thiel is on board, and is funding politicians like Blake Masters and JD Vance. Audiences are being built. It is becoming a many-person project.

This raises a question: Yarvin must have high political agency, but what of those who came on board later? What of someone who is convinced of a new idea, who decides to support it, but does not themselves perform original recognition or theorization?

I have experience with this process as well. I was convinced of HBD arguments by Ryan Faulk and others. For this to happen, I had to be interested in listening to the arguments. This takes a certain amount of curiosity and willingness to hypothetically go against the current social state, i.e. disagreeableness. I had to understand the arguments, which takes intelligence. Frequently, when I advocate to people, they do not have the intelligence to understand my arguments. Other times they are not willing to listen, either because they are not willing to accept a position against the status quo for emotional reasons, or because they don't care about the topic and have no curiosity.

Therefore, for any social change, the people who support it must either have originated a recognition stage on their own, or they needed to be convinced by someone else. Either way, they must have a certain amount of disagreeableness and intelligence, as well as curiosity depending on how relevant the change is to their life. Those who agree with a recognition will vary in their capacity to advocate, theorize, and implement. Change will ultimately be advocated, theorized, and implemented by the most agentic part of the group, but those who agree with the recognition will not resist the change, and may help it passively by following, voting, or sending money.

3.2.4 Conclusion

For an idea for change to emerge, somebody with high enough intelligence, creativity, and disagreeableness must recognize that some imagined change would be an improvement. He must be willing, as a disagreeable person, to advocate for the change and potentially, as someone curious, altruistic, or devoted, to theorize so that he may support his effort in advocating. People who are less creative, and somewhat less intelligent and disagreeable may then hear this person and decide to agree with him upon being exposed to his ideas. According to disagreeableness, and how much utility the change brings them, as well as their talents, they will chose how much to support the implementation, theorization, and advocation efforts.

Eventually, powerful people must be convinced, or those who are convinced must become powerful. Then they must derive enough utility from the change to implement it with their talents.

If somebody cannot recognize or agree with a recognition, they cannot perform implementation, meaning $\alpha = 0 \implies \psi = 0$ for that social dimension. If someone exerts marginal influence, they must have imagined a change or agreed with someone else's imagined change and decided correctly, being of sufficient intelligence to not become a manipulated pawn, that the change was in their best interests. Consequently, $\psi > 0 \implies \alpha > 0$.

Important here is the capacity to judge the utility of the change accurately. If one is not of proper intelligence of knowledge, this will not be possible in many cases. Someone who does not understand HBD and who cannot understand HBD cannot tell whether a change regarding non-white immigration is in his best interests. If he is convinced to work against his best interests by propaganda, he does not have sufficient intelligence for political agency, because he lacks the capacity to properly evaluated how a change will effect him.

This essay has yielded several potential ways for political agency to be measured directly. These measurements seem to be appropriately defined such that poor results mean no or low agency. Measures for each stage can be taken. For example, individuals can be tested on their capacities to imagine social counterfactuals to evaluate their capacity for higher recognition, i.e. original recognition. For lower recognition, they can be presented with a true argument regarding HBD or the education system, and can be evaluated based on their understanding and their judgment of the argument. The results of these tests can then be associated with personality test scores, IQ, moral test scores, reading habits, and other predictors. Predictors of particular interest are those with high heritability. If a high heritability trait reliably predicts political agency, then political agency should have high heritability.

Individuals can also be surveyed on their tendency or capacity to advocate or theorize. Advocation can be ascertained with simple survey questions. A theorization test might involve essay writing or reporting on if they have ever theorized or if they would ever theorize based on their intelligence and enjoyment of writing and research.

Finally, an implementation test might involve understanding what it takes to gain power, and measuring how powerful different people could potentially be in this society. This will require further research into the *basis of power*.

3.3 Estimating Recognition, Advocation, and Implementation Capacities of the General Population

Political agency has been modeled as having three main components: the capacity to recognize undesirable social states, the capacity to advocate against them, and the ability to implement more desirable social states. A 100 person survey was undertaken on Prolific to estimate the probability distributions of these capacities. It has been hypothesized that a majority of people lack these capacities, rendering theories of democracy invalid. This is confirmed by the data. Recognition and advocation also predicted the tendency for participants to engage in online dissident politics.

3.3.1 Introduction

The structure of this study was simple. We simply asked participants to estimate their own capacities for various agentic functions. It was hypothesized that most would admit low agency. Because low agency is generally seen as a taboo theory, it is assumed that these results overestimated the true

political agency of the population. Nevertheless, we hypothesized that political agency is so low in the general population, that a simple lower bound provided by this data would be useful.

This is the first empirical study on the exousiological concept of political agency. The idea is not totally original; it has been hinted at verbally by elite theorists including Robert Michels [50], Walter Lippman [51], and Edward Bernays [52]. Until now, no one, however, has attempted to quantify the central idea that the masses are docile and un-agentic.

The term has been used in "political science" (pseudo-science for the most part) literature before. Obviously, the practitioners of that field are not fit to study such a complex topic as exousiology, which is heavily mathematical (see credit theory), built on behavior genetics, and which has no room for Marxist and egalitarian dogmas. It is unsurprising and disqualifying to find, for instance, practitioners making statements in the literature such as "The question concerning the ontological status of the subject is a conundrum all human sciences have had to contend with. Unsurprisingly, it is also the source of many divisions between incommensurable philosophical and theoretical positions (e.g. Badiou, 2009; Lacan, 1977 [1960]; Levi-Strauss, 1969; Rawls, 1971; Sartre, 1966)." [53] The citations are to the nastiest post-modern charlatans, and verbiage like "the ontological status of the subject" has no place in science. A true scientist of man makes man as simple as possible; indeed, men are simple, and are often predictable. A human scientist of good sense sees constantly before him the repetitive behavior of the masses. The goal of social science is to systematize these intuitive patterns. This is done in part with Occam's razor, which narcissistic, feminine egalitarians reject, because their grift is dependent on deception about the nature of man, and because it causes psychological injury to feel simple.

There are two prior works done on exousiology, both found in the beta manuscript [54]. The first estimates political agency from existing IQ and temperament research; it is estimated to be rather low. Less than 5% of the population was found to have full agency. The second models a way to directly measure political agency, so that such a measurement could then be associated with traits like IQ and personality. This study builds off of that model.

3.3.2 Methods

We asked three multiple choice questions, each corresponding to one aspect of our model of political agency. These aspects are recognition, the ability to recognize undesirable social states; advocation, the ability to defy undesirable social states; and implementation, the ability to fix undesirable social states.



The question above is the recognition test. It simple asks participants how they react to taxes. Can they report anything resembling political agency? 74% do not. We predict that this will be the category with the least amount of reported agency, since it likely requires the most originality. It would seem that more people can follow a novel political agent than can actually be a novel political agent. Most people, however, don't even have the agency to follow a dissident figure.



The next question is the easiest advocation test possible. Participants are told that there is a tax that hurts a majority of the population, them included. It should never be easier to simply speak out against such a tax. Still, 40% do not have the capacity to do even that. It would seem they are too docile. And real life situations are never this clear; such a situation would hardly exist for long, because 55% would vote against it. In real life, the numbers are not so even, there are propaganda campaigns obscuring recognition, and there are punishments for speaking out. All of these should increase the non-agentic portion to a majority.



Finally, a majority would not participate in implementation, even for pay. 26% admitted they were not qualified to lead implementation. 10% hate politics too much to work in it for pay. Only 45% would accept the job.

We also collected some numerical data. We asked how much a tax would have to take of participants' current after tax income for them to engage in recognition or advocation. We also asked what multiple of thier current income would an implementation job have to pay them for them to accept. Finally, we asked their income.



A quarter of participants said they would engage in recognition if a tax took between 0 and 5% of their income. The median was 10% of income.



A quarter of participants said they would engage in advocation if a tax took between 0 and 5% of their income. The median was 15% of income.



A quarter of participants said they would engage in implementation if a job paid between 0 and 1 times their income. The median was 2x income.





The income data was vaguely Pareto distributed, with a lower median than is typical, probably because the data comes from people who are making money by taking surveys.

There was one significant correlation ($p < 0.001$).



The correlation was $r = 0.625$. Income in this study did not predict anything, probably due to low sample size (if political agency is g loaded, higher income should predict higher political agency with enough sampling. The relation is probably not greater than $r = 0.30$ or so, since we did not detect it in this study). At the very least, this significant correlation suggests that there is in fact a common factor underlying the concepts of advocation and recognition.

Finally, similar questions were used on the Twitter followers of Joseph Bronski, who were hypothesized to be higher political agency, because Bronski is a dissident scholar. They demonstrated higher political agency on recognition and advocation, $p < 0.05.$, but not on implementation. The implementation question may have not been valid, considering the results overall.





3.3.3 Conclusion

The recognition and advocation questions seem to be linked and valid insofar as they predict a difference between normal people and a dissident political audience. No relation between those contructs and income was detected in this study. Implementation did not differ between groups. More research is needed. Suggestions include linking these concepts to IQ, Big 5 personality traits, and constructing a better implementation test. A spam approach like on other psychological tests, where participants are asked the same question in many forms, and then their responses are summed, might also be developed.

Chapter 4

Credit Theory

4.1 Mechanism of marginal influence independent of direction of influence is identical to credit

Let \$ denote a person's net worth. That is, \$ is the monetary value of all credit he currently possesses. He can, in theory, transfer this credit to anyone, who can then passively convert the credit to cash. Let ψ denote a person's *power* or *marginal influence*, the amount of change in the social state that results when this person changes their desires. Let ψ be measured by the kneeling coefficient, the number of people a person can have kneel for him simultaneously at one time.

Money is power when $r_{\$,\psi} = 1$. This is true if and only if:

$$\psi \leftarrow \psi + n \implies \$ \leftarrow \$ + cn \quad \forall n \in \mathbb{R} \tag{4.1}$$

$$\$ \leftarrow \$ + n \implies \psi \leftarrow \psi + \frac{1}{c}n \quad \forall n \in \mathbb{R} \tag{4.2}$$

In other words, a change n in one of the metrics produces a proportional change in the other metric. Thus, $r_{\$,\psi} = 1$ if both 1) and 2) are true.

Condition 2) is easy to prove. Say a person's \$ increases by n. If the average price of kneeling among the population of non-kneelers is p, the person can now afford $\frac{n}{p}$ new kneelers, which he will always find if the population is arbitrarily large and he can effortlessly sample. Thus $c = p$ and $\$ \leftarrow \$ + n \implies \psi \leftarrow \psi + \frac{1}{p}n \quad \forall n \in \mathbb{R}$.

Now for condition 1). If a person can cause n people to kneel before him through some mechanism of power, then under a single-dimension utility model, that person can induce n utility functions to be raised beyond their defaults, each by a factor which is over the threshold for state transition. In other words, upon being asked to kneel, a person kneels if $U(E_k) + U(E_r) > U(E_0)$ where E_k is kneeling, E_r is the "reward" that makes kneeling preferable ($U(E_k) < U(E_0)$) and E_0 is the default or null environment, e.g. the environment where they do not kneel after being asked, where $U(E_0) = 0$ by definition ($U(E_x)$ should be interpreted as $U(E_x \cup E_0) =: U(E_x + E_0)$).

Thus, if a person gains n kneelers ($\psi \leftarrow \psi + n$), he has gained the ability to grant $nU(E_r) > n(U(E_0) - U(E_k)) = |nU(E_k)|$. But if he has this ability, he can ask each person to pay money with utility equal to $U(E_0) - U(E_k) = |U(E_k)|$. This, on average, is as much money as it would take to pay a person to kneel. Thus if the average price of kneeling is p, when n is arbitrarily large, $\psi \leftarrow \psi + n \implies \$ \leftarrow \$ + pn \quad \forall n \in \mathbb{R}$.

4.2 Fungibility assumption

The main assumption here is that the reward can be paired with any reduction in utility. Kneeling thus becomes fungible. When kneeling is fungible, it is identical to money. Kneeling is fungible when the effect of E_r on utility is independent of E_k: $U(E_k + E_r + E_0) = U(E_k + \neg E_r + E_0) + U(\neg E_k + E_r + E_0) =: U(E_k) + U(E_r)$. If $U(E_k + E_r) > U(E_k) + U(E_r)$, then k is *susceptible* to r, whereas if $U(E_k + E_r) < U(E_k) + U(E_r)$, k is *resistant* to r.

4.3 Extending over time

The above models how net worth at any given time relates to potential marginal influence at that time. A more realistic model would consider cash flow. Continuous power over a person should translate into a continuous income from that person, and continuous income should translate to continuous marginal influence over persons.

We can rewrite the above model with new variables ψ_t and $\$_t$ where these are kneels per time unit (e.g. year) and income per time unit respectively.

$$\psi_t \leftarrow \psi_t + n \implies \$_t \leftarrow \$_t + cn \quad \forall n \in \mathbb{R} \tag{4.3}$$

$$\$_t \leftarrow \$_t + n \implies \psi_t \leftarrow \psi_t + \frac{1}{c}n \quad \forall n \in \mathbb{R} \tag{4.4}$$

Condition 4 is easy, like condition 2. If a person's income per year increases by n, and the market price of kneeling for a year is p dollars per year, then that person can now afford to employ n/p new kneelers per year. Thus $c = p$ and $\$_t \leftarrow \$_t + n \implies \psi_t \leftarrow \psi_t + \frac{1}{p}n \quad \forall n \in \mathbb{R}$.

Condition 3 means that, if a person somehow can make someone kneel for a year, they could instead allow them to not kneel, and make them pay the market price of kneeling every year, increasing income. This is true under the same conditions as condition 1, extended over time. In the instantaneous case, a person kneels if $U(E_k) + U(E_r) > U(E_0)$. Over time, it makes more sense to take the expectation of U. A person stays kneeling if $\mathbb{E}[U(t \mid w(t), E_k + E_r + E_0)] > \mathbb{E}[U(t \mid w(t), E_0)]$ where $w(t)$ is time preference (w is the weight of time t). We can let $\mathbb{E}[U(t \mid w(t), E_0)] = 0$ by definition.

As above, this can be derived by the fungibility assumption as long as it hold through time. If at one moment, $U(E_k + E_r + E_0) = U(E_k + \neg E_r + E_0) + U(\neg E_k + E_r + E_0) =: U(E_k) + U(E_r)$, and this holds over time, then $U(t \mid E_k + E_r + E_0) = U(t \mid E_k + \neg E_r + E_0) + U(t \mid \neg E_k + E_r + E_0) =: U(t \mid E_k) + U(t \mid E_r)$. Given this, because $U(t \mid w(t), E_x) := w(t)U(t \mid E_x)$, $U(t \mid E_k + E_r + E_0) = U(t \mid E_k) + U(t \mid E_r) \implies U(t|w(t), E_k + E_r + E_0) = U(t|w(t), E_k) + U(t|w(t), E_r)$ since $U(t|w(t), E_k + E_r + E_0) = w(t)U(t|, E_k + E_r + E_0) = w(t)(U(t \mid E_k) + U(t \mid E_r)) = w(t)U(t \mid E_k) + w(t)U(t \mid E_r) = U(t \mid w(t), E_k) + U(t \mid w(t), E_r)$.

Now if someone kneels over time when $\mathbb{E}[U(t \mid w(t), E_k + E_r + E_0)] > \mathbb{E}[U(t \mid w(t), E_0)]$, and the fungibility assumption holds, then they kneel when $\mathbb{E}[U(t \mid w(t), E_k + E_r + E_0)] = \mathbb{E}[U(t \mid w(t), E_k) + U(t \mid w(t), E_r)] = \mathbb{E}[U(t \mid w(t), E_k)] + \mathbb{E}[U(t \mid w(t), E_r)] > \mathbb{E}[U(t \mid w(t), E_0)]$.

Thus, a person kneels over time when $\mathbb{E}[U(t \mid w(t), E_r)] > |\mathbb{E}[U(t \mid w(t), E_k)]|$. If p is the market price of kneeling for a year, the kneeler be transferred elsewhere to kneel for a paying kneelmaster. The kneeler's income becomes income of the person who can force the kneeling for whatever reason. Thus, $\psi_t \leftarrow \psi_t + n \implies \$_t \leftarrow \$_t + pn \quad \forall n \in \mathbb{R}$.

4.3.1 Aside: now we have annoying math problems

We can now troll undergrads with obnoxious math problems in Exousiology 101 just like the economists. If $U(t|E_k) = -1$ and $U(t|E_r) = t$, and $w(t) = 1 - \frac{1}{2}t$, given the fungibility assumption, what is $\mathbb{E}[U(t|w(t), E_k + E_r)]$ over a time period $t \in [0, 2]$?

Answer: the fungibility assumption states :

$$\mathbb{E}[U(t|w(t), E_k + E_r)] = \mathbb{E}[U(t|w(t), E_k) + U(t|w(t), E_r)] \tag{4.5}$$

Because expected value is linear:

$$\mathbb{E}[U(t|w(t), E_k) + U(t|w(t), E_r)] = \mathbb{E}[U(t|w(t), E_k)] + \mathbb{E}[U(t|w(t), E_r)] \tag{4.6}$$

And by the definition of the time preference function:

$$\mathbb{E}[U(t|w(t), E_k)] + \mathbb{E}[U(t|w(t), E_r)] = \mathbb{E}[w(t)U(t|E_k)] + \mathbb{E}[w(t)U(t|E_r)] \tag{4.7}$$

By the mean value theorem for integrals:

$$\mathbb{E}[w(t)U(t|E_k)] + \mathbb{E}[w(t)U(t|E_r)] = \frac{1}{2}\int_0^2 w(t)U(t|E_k)dt + \frac{1}{2}\int_0^2 w(t)U(t|E_r)dt \tag{4.8}$$

Filling in with the given equations:

$$\frac{1}{2}\int_0^2 w(t)U(t|E_k)dt + \frac{1}{2}\int_0^2 w(t)U(t|E_r)dt = \frac{1}{2}\int_0^2 (1-\frac{1}{2}t)(-1)dt + \frac{1}{2}\int_0^2 (1-\frac{1}{2}t)(t)dt \tag{4.9}$$

4.4 Deception isn't a thing in rational utility land

We have shown that power can offer either the carrot or the stick to manipulate the utility function of a rational utility maximizer. Some, however, have claimed that there is a third type of power: deception via information control. This is not possible when dealing with utility maximizing agents.

To see why, consider a utility maximizer who behaves as follows:

$$arg\underset{e}{max}\,\mathbb{E}[U(e,\omega)|\mu] \tag{4.10}$$

Where $e \in E$, such that E is the set of possible behaviors, ω is the actual state of the world, and $\omega \in \Omega$, where Ω is the possible world states; and μ is knowledge or the "prior" about the world, $\mu \in \triangle(\Omega)$, the set of possible probability distributions on Ω.

A power player can send a signal to the utility maximizer, changing his μ in an attempt to change his choice of e. Do do this, he has to send both a signal and the likelihood of a signal under each possible world state. This is Bayes' theorem:

$$P(H|D) = \frac{P(D|H)P(H)}{P(D)} \tag{4.11}$$

$$\mu_n(\omega) \propto P(s|\omega)\mu(\omega) \tag{4.12}$$

The posterior μ_n is proportional to the probability of the signal s given some potential world state times the probability of that world state under the prior μ. The question is, how does a utility maximizing agent verify the signal s and the meaning of s, $P(\cdot|\omega)$? By definition, he does so in a way which maximizes his utility.

He is therefore an epistemic pragmatist a la William James. As an epistemic maximizer, he will trust the information if the information improves his utility. If it lowers his utility (we assume it wouldn't be exactly the same if he changes his action), he will reject the update. Doing otherwise would mean he is not a utility maximizer.

It follows from this that, where deception is designed as lying for the purposes of extracting resources from others, rational Bayesian utility maximizers will not be decieved in the long run, because they would revert updates that failed to give their promised utility returns.

4.5 Alpha and Credit Streams

We can model income by understanding what determines a person's credit stream, $\frac{d\$}{dt}$. First, let's consider credit as a function of time, $\$(t)$. We are interested in how these functions vary between individuals – understanding this will tell us how credit streams vary, which will tell us how marginal influence varies. We could try this:

$$\$(t) = \alpha_i\$_i(t-1) + \alpha_l\$_l(t-1) + 0\$_w(t-1) \tag{4.13}$$

Where

$$\$(t) = \$_i(t) + \$_l(t) + \$_w(t) \tag{4.14}$$

And $\alpha_i\$_i(t-1)$ is credit allocated into investments at time t-1 times the return on investment, l is for labor, and w is wasted money.

But it might make more sense to combine the terms and just have this:

$$\$(t) = \alpha\$(t-1) \tag{4.15}$$

This can represent a person's best return on investment given the optimal allocation of all of their current credit. This model encompasses all imaginable activities – labor can be conceived of as taking

an investment of personal calories, housing, a car, even capital. Putting excess money in the stock market takes time, even if it's only a minute – that's labor. Starting a business might take up all of your labor time just like digging a ditch, but unlike digging a ditch, starting a business takes more seed funds, e.g. $\$(t-1)$.

This model indicates that credit functions vary in just two key ways: alpha and starter credit. This makes sense, alpha very generally denotes skill and natural differences, but it's hard to make $\$20,000,000$ starting with $\$50,000$. It's not as hard if you're starting with $\$19,000,000$.

This model also follows from some basic assumptions: everyone maximizes their alpha and realizes their maximum potential alpha given their starter credit for each time period, and everyone has the same amount of time to spend to allocate said credit. If this is the case, then any difference between credit functions between two people starting with the same amount of money must be in alpha. Furthermore, anyone's alpha given a starting amount of credit over a time period is just $a(\$(t-1)) = \frac{\$(t)}{\$(t-1)}$, where alpha becomes a function of starter credit, since it can vary with starter credit (if you can make $150,000/yr on $50,000 of housing and calories, your alpha given $50,000 is 3, but it does not follow that you can achieve a return of 3 on the $100,000 extra you have to allocate the next year. It is more likely you put it in the stock market and get standard returns on it. Others will blow it all and their alpha will plummet to 1).

So, based on these assumptions, we get:

$$\$(t) = \alpha(\$(t-1))\$(t-1) \tag{4.16}$$

This implies:

$$\frac{d\$}{dt} = \alpha_{-1}(\$(t))\$(t) \tag{4.17}$$

Where

$$\alpha_{-1}(\$(t)) = \alpha(\$(t)) - 1 \tag{4.18}$$

4.6 Appendix: Defining slavery

Let $U(E_d)$ be the utility of the default environment E_d. The default environment can be defined as the environment where the boss in relationship r was never born. Someone enters into a relationship of *free subordination* when $U(E_r) > U(E_d)$ where E_r is the environment which includes the relationship and when the cost of reverting to the default environment $C(E_r \longrightarrow E_d) = 0 = U(E_d) - U(E_r)$. Under free exit, the subordinate should depart the relationship when the juice is no longer worth the squeeze.

When $U(E_d) > U(E_r)$, there is a cost of leaving, as otherwise the subordinate would have already left. $C(E_r \longrightarrow E_d) = U(E_d) - U(E_r) > 0$. We can conceptualize the cost as follows: E_r represents the environment with a consensual relationship. As soon as consent is revoked, E_r transforms into E_d^*. $C(E_r \longrightarrow E_d^*) = 0$ because this this transformation is merely semantic. Under free subordination, the costs of exiting the no-longer-desired relationship are null: $C(E_d^* \longrightarrow E_d) = 0$. Under slavery, $C(E_d^* \longrightarrow E_d) > 0$. In other words, the master continues to disturb the slaves default environment, modifying it to have less utility than the default environment. If the cost is feasible, the slave may initiate the process of escape, "paying off" the cost of transitioning to the default environment from the coercive environment. Sometimes the cost may be only partially payable, such as when a slave can escape but can't stop his master from hunting him; sometimes it is totally unpayable, like when a prisoner can't escape from prison. The key lesson is that the master essentially degrades the default environment of the slave, making the slave choose between cooperation or costly pollution that may be impossible to clean up.

Thus, analyzing slavery comes down to imagining a social counterfactual without the enslaver, and assessing the ways in which the enslaver pollutes the environment of the slave.

You are therefore enslaved to anyone who has *positive death alpha*. In other words, you would be better off if they died. They extract from you by polluting your environment and offering to pollute it less if you give them things, like labor or obedience or tax dollars. An example is a medieval knight who could kill a whole village if he isn't given tribute. He might generate a lot of credit going around threatening villages. They would be better off if he had a heart attack. In contrast, there is *negative*

death alpha, where one promises to improve your environment in exchange for credit. An example is someone inventing the iPhone and offering to let you have one for $500. Through their power to create, they might generate a lot of credit, but as creators, people would be worse off if they died.

A second way of categorizing alpha are by the types of actions involved. In general, it seems that a good typology for this is violence, deception, and wealth creation. As the techno epoch changes, variation in the marginal influence of these types of alpha changes. For example, the firearm lowered the marginal influence of an advantage in violence capacity, because it equalized the potential violence output of the population. If violence and deception are positive death alpha, and wealth creation is negative death alpha, then when the capacity for wealth creation increases in its share of marginal influence, we should expect society to improve, as it has.

Chapter 5

On Memetics

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter we discuss memetics more deeply. In particular, the concept of apparently true beliefs are introduced. Models with qualitative features relating to estimates of h^2, m^2, and e^2 at a single point in time t_i are introduced. These models are related to the "idealism coefficient", m_t^2.

5.2 Three Models of Memetics

Memes as ideas that exist and replicate independent from man's genes and material environment exist only in the case of scientific, or descriptive and apparently true, ideas. Some claim ignorantly claim that normative "ideas", such as "sex changes are good," can spread as memes, but this view is incoherent.

The reason that memes exist only as scientific ideas is that only non-trivial, apparently proven ideas can ever hope to take on a life of their own beyond the basic impulses of men. This, in turn, is inferred from the observation that the mind contains only one impulse that is enough of a sandbox that individually unimaginable ideas may enter it and subsequently act as an independently replicating, potentially mutating external pressure on behavior. That impulse is the desire for truth.

Let's demonstrate this with some models. First imagine a flat, featureless plain. Many classical

memeticists believe this is what the mind is like; they are liberal individualists and blank slatists.[1] For them, memetics is just an impulse that allows them to discuss the obvious evolution of behavior without disobeying by admitting that genes shape behavior [2] (more on this later). Since the mind has no features, behavior is explained solely by whatever memes reside on the plain. Under maximal tabula rasa assumptions, memes get into the mind on a first-come-first-serve basis (making childhood Really Important in keeping with the blank slate tradition), and evolution of the meme-pool occurs as unfit memes cause deadly behaviors. Consequently, neither the gene pool nor the material environment must change as culture changes.

[1]So much here. You can see this immediately in Blackmore's 2002 essay in The Skeptic Encyclopedia of Pseudoscience when she trivializes culture; this is a common blank-slatist tic that usually goes something like this: "Genes determine culture" "Oh so me liking tacos is genetic then? Am I a Mexican then? Is driving on the right instead of the left genetic?" Here's her version:

> Yet memetics did not really take off. Why not? The basic idea is very simple. If Dawkins is right then everything you have learned by imitation from someone else is a meme. This includes all the words in your vocabulary, the stories you know, the skills and habits you have picked up from others and the games you like to play. It includes the songs you sing and the rules you obey. So, for example, whenever you drive on the right (or on the left in my case here in England), eat a hamburger or a pizza, whistle Happy Birthday to You or Mama I Love You, or even shake hands, you are dealing in memes. Memetics is the study of why some memes spread and others do not.

In the same essay she gives us a taste of Dennett's blank slatism:

> Human consciousness, claims Dennett, is itself a huge meme-complex, and a person is best under- stood as a certain sort of ape infested with memes.

This very clearly radically understates the contribution of genetic impulse to things like moral behavior and ideological behavior any way you look at it. The model here is, frankly, a featureless plain of a mind that is occupied randomly by different literally-real information-forms that somehow compete amongst themselves for space in the plane, with the plane exerting no selective pressure one way or another, except insofar as some memes cause the plane to perish more quickly than others.

Blackmore goes on to lament the idea that cultural evolution is related in any way to genetic evolution:

> Perhaps Boyd and Richerson (1990) come closest to treating the cultural unit as a true replicator. However, they still view "genetic and cultural evolution as a tightly coupled co- evolutionary process in humans."

Finally we get her explicit statement:

> Dawkins is clear on this issue when he says "there is no reason why success in a meme should have any connection whatever with genetic success." I agree. I am going to propose a theory of memetics that lies at the far end of this continuum. I suggest that once genetic evolution had created creatures that were capable of imitating each other, a second replicator was born. Since then our brains and minds have been the product of two replicators, not one. Today many of the selection pressures on memes are still of genetic origin (such as whom we find sexy and what food tastes good), but as memetic evolution proceeds faster and faster, our minds are increasingly the product of memes, not genes. If memetics is true then the memes have created human minds and culture just as surely as the genes have created human bodies.

What we see here is essentially a macroscopic view of the mind as a mix of the first and third models, with the first increasingly predominating. Some things are immune to mere info-exposure, but more and more our culture is totally shaped by the featureless sandbox parts of the mind (which in reality do not exist) according to Blackmore.

Lastly I give you Dawkins:

> Consider the idea of God. We do not know how it arose in the meme pool. Probably it originated many times by independent 'mutation'. In any case, it is very old indeed. How does it replicate itself? By the spoken and written word, aided by great music and great art. Why does it have such high survival value? Remember that 'survival value' here does not mean value for a gene in a gene pool, but value for a meme in a meme pool. The question really means: What is it about the idea of a god that gives it its stability and penetrance in the cultural environment? The survival value of the god meme in the meme pool results from its great psychological appeal. It provides a superficially plausible answer to deep and troubling questions about existence. It suggests that injustices in this world may be rectified in the next. The 'everlasting arms' hold out a cushion against our own inadequacies which, like a doctor's placebo, is none the less effective for being imaginary. These are some of the reasons why the idea of God is copied so readily by successive generations of individual brains. God exists, if only in die form of a meme with high survival value, or infective power, in the environment provided by human culture

Here he expresses something a bit more than a featureless plain, roughly model two, but he is still in the tabula rasa tradition since he is hesitant that God itself is an idea we love innately. For Dawkins, God is a coincidence of partial modularity involving more basic impulses that can evolve "selfishly." Indeed, for Dawkins, memetics is clearly a bludgeon used to help explain observations that his denial of group evolution forbids him from explaining otherwise. Dawkins is out of degrees of freedom when he imagines memetics; the theory is the sloppy implication of race denial.

[2]Blackmore says, in *The Skeptic Encyclopedia of Pseudoscience* (2002),

> I am going to make a bold claim. Without the theory of evolution by memetic selection nothing in the world of the mind makes much sense. Without memetics you cannot answer questions like "Why can't I get that thought out of my mind? Why did I decide to write this article and not another one? Who am I?" Without memetics you can only fall back on appeals to an imaginary conscious agent.

V_g	V_e	V_m	V_{gxe}	V_{gxm}
0%	0%	100%	0%	0%

Model 1 variance breakdown

In the second model, the mind has some valleys and crevices. Memes that fit these holes can enter the mind and fill them with various success. Better fitting memes may enter and displace worse fitting memes. Whatever meme currently fills the holes produces the behavior. Memes are selected by symbiotic potential and good fit with the mold, which may be determined by genes and environment. The most appealing memes may not be the most symbiotic, implying the existence of pathological memes that have staying power once attached, in contrast to Model 1's mere first-come first-served basis.

V_g	V_e	V_m	V_{gxe}	V_{gxm}
10-40%	10-40%	30-60%	10-20%	10-20%

Model 2 variance breakdown



In the third model, the mind lets no memes reside within it. Instead, like in Model 2, the mind has a certain shape which can vary based on genetics or environmental factors; unlike in Model 2, in Model 3, behavior is determined merely by the shape of the mind. While Model 3 does allow for environmental factors, including existing culture, to influence the shape of the mind dynamically, it does not allow for the Freud-esque mental-fragility of Model 2 wherein brief exposure to information can drive behavior long after that information is flushed from the subject's immediate environment.

V_g	V_e	V_m	V_{gxe}	V_{gxm}
60-90%	20-40%	0%	10-20%	0%

Model 3 variance breakdown

Model 3 of course includes cultural inertia as a part of the environment, but unlike Model 2 it gives culture no independence from man and his immediate surroundings; in Model 2 (and Model 1), culture can mutate independent of change in the gene pool or material conditions; in Model 3 it cannot. Change in Model 3 proceeds from the relevant starting point, but where there is change in culture there must also be change in the gene pool or the environment-excluding-culture. In Model 3, Culture = E[Phenotype], whereas in Model 2, Culture = E[Phenotype + Memepool].

Which model fits the mind best? It is intuitively apparent to me that Model 2 gives the best explanation for scientific beliefs, while Model 3 is gives the best explanation for normative culture. As such, memetics is garbage when it comes to explaining politics, although it may be useful for modeling how justified true belief proliferates.

Why this intuition? I think the explanation is that memes must be rigorous and apparently true to the average receiver before taking on lives of their own. Obvious nonsense may be unique, but it is still nonsense, hardly even information. An example: there are different species of trees. Say this

The answer to these questions is, of course, your genes and your immediate environment, at least if scientific ideas are not involved.

offends some group that has special logging interests. They begin to state that all trees are the same even though everyone can see that this is obviously untrue. Because the loggers have power, people fall in line as to not offend them. The key observation is that, because the idea is obviously untrue, no one really believes it, so its existence is totally dependent on the loggers maintaining their power. The BS was born out of genes and material conditions and is only maintained in the face of overwhelming arbologoy by said genes and material conditions maintaining sovereignty. Any "mutation" of the political gaslight in any direction other than that of truth is in fact heresy and, because it is false, totally trivial impulse-verbiage. Mutations must require effort; if they are not effortful, then they come from impulse, and if they come from impulse, they appeal to impulse. If they come from impulse quickly and appeal to said impulse, then we are dealing with a mold that produces its own memes. This is Model 3. The mold must not produce the meme; mutation must come from nontrivial effort such that it may appeal to impulse but is not itself impulse in essence. For any descriptive idea that is political instead of scientific, obviously false or unproven instead of true and demonstrated, that idea is going to be, in essence, impulse. In no way does it have life of its own; the idea was essentially already contained in the subjects from which it comes and to which it attaches. To put it most concisely, I believe Model 2 is appropriate for descriptive ideas that are apparently true, while Model 3 is appropriate for normative impulses and descriptive ideas that are accepted due to heavy normative biases.

Sometimes there may be side-shows that approximate Model 2 which are totally dependent on Model 3 processes. Some of the extensive academic "discourse" in wokeism may approximate Model 2 if there is enough double-think in its participants and if the ideas are complicated enough that they aren't just garbage any anti-white person could think up in five minutes (then it's just ideological whining, not memetic exchange). Even if this is sometimes the case, it would be a mistake to model wokeism with Model 2, since the mold in Model 2 would be selecting for ideas that effectively shit on white people. The memetic "discourse" is in this case merely a process of a gene-environment driven, pre-existing hatred for white people. It may correlate with policy but it does not cause policy. Underlying normative hatred for white people causes both. To lose oneself in the memetics of such a vapid political discourse, if it has memes at all, would be to distract oneself and to ignore true causes behind culture.

What of memetics itself then? What we see in memetics is a pseudo-scientific discourse that is probably best modeled with Model 2 insofar as we have found that some form of memetics is half-way plausible sometimes, where the mold selects for ideas that explain group evolution without using group evolution (because that's racist). But since memetics should set off obvious truth alarm bells, the Model 2 discourse may be best encapsulated and situated within a Model 3 where genes and material incentives are discouraging the recognition of race and by extension ideas like group evolution.

Lastly, what can we say about the Idealism Coefficient presented above? On average we should expect it to be low. Different events may possess different coefficients depending on their scientific content. Darwin, for instance, certainly raised the average Idealism Coefficient of the 19th century. Did Marx? That depends on how scientific Marxism really is. Assuming it's essentially just an impulse-ethic, Marx would have only given definite form to Leftist/Communist impulses that already existed. To whatever degree Marxism is rigorous, I assume it would be a weak version of Model 2 where variance in meme exposure accounts for less than 10% of variance in ideological behavior.

5.3 The Lindsay Fallacy

The Lindsay fallacy: A name for the phenomenon where a memetic discourse is assumed to be the cause of sovereignty and sovereignty's agenda, as opposed to a second result of said agenda. I decided to bestow this honor upon Mr. Lindsay after watching the first hour of this video. The thesis of said video is that "the Hegelian dialectic is the operating system of the Left" and specifically that "you need to understand the Hegelian dialectic, their religion, to understand and predict wokeism."

An hour into the video, Lindsay has presented the following evidence: (a) a CRT textbook used the term "dialectic" (b) Marx was influenced by Hegel and used the term "dialectic" (c) The Young Hegelians were leftist and thought that the dialectic of the State was not yet complete.

I believe the following evidence falsifies Lindsay's hypothesis. (a) Lindsay himself mentioned this one: the Young Hegelians were opposed by conservative Hegelians who believed that the Prussian State was the Absolute Idea of the State, the completion of the dialectic. Hegel himself seems to have

leaned this way – Russel states in his summary in A History of Western Philosophy that Hegel was a monarchist and supported the Prussian State. Russel also stated that Hegel said that he believed the dialectic could continue in the Americas via conflict between the Northern continent and the Southern continent, but Hegel was apparently quiet as to what he thought the new synthesis would look like.

(b) Fauerbach, and Marx, stripped Hegelianism of its core metaphysical substance, leaving the dialectic as an empty shell. This means that Hegel's original dialectic did not cause Marxism. Marxism and subsequent Leftisms merely aped Hegelianism and were not truly influenced by it. Hegel himself actually stole the dialectic from a demonstration in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, where it was a tool that was used to demonstrate some hypothesis about space-time. The core to Hegelianism was, apparently, that the world is one Absolute Idea which is evolving. Everything is connected and our thoughts and political organization are determined by the knowledge of this Absolute Idea. Existence is but a thought and man exists so that the Absolute can observe its own thought. The logic of Hegel's dialectic is that the Absolute cannot both be one thing and be not one thing. It cannot be Just and injust, for instance. Just and injust are illusions and the truth is some combination found (imprecisely) by imagining their "synthesis." Political contradictions are also mere illusions which will resolve; time is an illusion as well. Fauerbach, and with him Marx, sucked all of the mystical-occult substance out of this "philosophy" and declared that everything is material, there is no absolute Idea, none of that stuff is true. Marx was an instrumentalist who declared that such abstract philosophy was silly, and that the point was to change things. Hegel, then, was just a skin for Marx, a camouflage if you will, a way to appear en vogue, and he moved away from it in his later years as Hegel's general influence waned. Yet the now-hollow phrase "dialectic" remained, the substance of which for Marx was that of class conflict and the apparent inevitability of Communism. These ideas were nothing like what Hegel thought and did not deeply rely on the "dialectic" aesthetic.

(c) The Marxist dialectic is no longer the "driving force" of the Left. The textbook Lindsay cites for evidence mentions a racial dialectic. Marx never spoke of race conflict, so again the substance has been removed from "dialectic." What is "dialectic" with no substance? Merely "change" or "conflict." The Left is now at least twice removed from the actual meaning of "dialectic" yet Lindsay thinks it's their secret operating system, when in reality it's just a skin passed down via Marx to people who have an in-born temperament that predisposes them to the bleeding-heart ethic that is omnipresent in his work.

What there is here with Lindsay, then, is a clear case of someone seeing an instance of a discourse within a power structure and assuming that the memetic discourse is supreme, that this empty signal which has been passed down is some "operating system," something necessary to "understand" if you want to predict "wokeism." This can't be the case because there are at least 3 different actual understandings of "dialectic," and wokeism is on the 3rd one only, and that understanding is not broached by Lindsay, because it is the understanding that "dialectic" is a shell filled with woke temperament on modern identity issues. The question as to where that temperament comes from is unsolved by Lindsay, because the answer is definitely not "from reading Hegel", or Marx, or anything for that matter.

5.4 Pareto on Memetics

Pareto spends a lot of time on memetics, arguing that ideas mostly don't matter and are downstream of genes and material influences. This is at odds with many safe histories which uncritically assume that ideas are the cause of everything. It is possible that scholars are predisposed to this sentiment because it makes them feel important, whereas Pareto would tell them that they are only pawns, going along with the genetic and material sentiments of the time, like Voltaire, or condemning themselves to relative irrelevance otherwise, like Lucian (both writers were essentially anti-Christian skeptics).

Pareto does not provide much to work off of other than the general idea that residues and sentiments are dominants over derivations (to put things in his terms). He gives copious amounts of examples of pseud derivations being stupid nonsense, and of people seeming to be more influenced by things prior to them, but admits from time to time that derivations and "form" (as opposed to substance) can have some independent effect on behavior.

Because of the scientific inadequacy of Pareto's work on this topic, I will provide the specific hypotheses for him while keeping in line with the spirit of his views, which I tend to agree with.

It's not surprising that Pareto's statements on this topic were relatively vague; it is nontrivial to

hypothesize about these things. Even today there is not much research on "memetics" and part of the reason for that is that very few people have explicitly conceptualized the territory here. Consequently, it will be useful to merely come up with potentially study designs.

First I will share the model I am currently operating under. In this model, apparently-true ideas can truly influence behavior, but nonsensical derivations cannot (although they can reflect the will of someone with power, causing underlings to submit). Let me expand more: there are verifiable ideas which give you predictions about the natural world; these influence behavior with respect to pleasure pursuit as they give you your map for how to attain pleasure or satisfy other residues or whatever internal drives motivate people. If an idea does not give you a prediction about the natural world, then it does not effect your map of the world and consequently your strategy for attainment of desire is unchanged. A sentence can either convey verifiable information in its literal interpretation, or it can convey verifiable information about its sender, or neither. Consequently, where a sentence conveys no verifiable information in its literal words, if it effects behavior it is because it conveyed information about the sender which caused the receiver to change behavior due to obedience. If a sentence conveys no information, it cannot effect behavior any more than random noise.

We also have the culture equation (Note: an older version of much of the subject matter of chapter 2):

$$C = E[P] = E[G + E + M] \tag{5.1}$$

Where G is genetics, M is memetics, and E is other environment. We can begin by asking what proportion of variation in elite behavior variation in memetics explains at some time, such as now. In other words, we want to know:

$$\frac{Var(M)}{Var(P)} \leq 1 - \frac{Var(G+E)}{Var(P)} = 1 - (h^2 + \frac{Var(E)}{Var(P)}) \tag{5.2}$$

In other words, just estimating the heritability of elite political behavior puts a lower bound on the influence of memetics. If the heritability of their behavior is, say, 0.80, then memetics can explain no more than 0.20 of the variance in behavior. If material factors such as business interests can explain 0.10 of the variance in behavior, then memetics is down to at most 0.10 of the variance and so on.

An amazing 2021 twin study anticipated this: [20]

> Twin studies function as natural experiments that reveal political ideology's substantial genetic roots, but how does that comport with research showing a largely nonideological public? This study integrates two important literatures and tests whether political sophistication – itself heritable – provides an "enriched environment" for genetic predispositions to actualize in political attitudes. Estimates from the Minnesota Twin Study show that sociopolitical conservatism is extraordinarily heritable (74%) for the most informed fifth of the public – much more so than population-level results (57%) – but with much lower heritability (29%) for the public's bottom half. This heterogeneity is clearest in the Wilson–Patterson (W-P) index, with similar patterns for individual index items, an ideological constraint measure, and ideological identification. The results resolve tensions between two key fields by showing that political knowledge facilitates the expression of genetic predispositions in mass politics.

From my chapter on political agency, the elite are highly intelligent, and others have directly found them to be informed [21], which should be expected from the fact that the bottom 80 percent of Americans are basically retarded, and elites are not. When you are 120+ IQ, it is not hard to be in the top 20 percent of informed people. 55 or 60 percent of the country don't even vote. Consequently, variation in memetic exposure explains at most 26 percent of variation in elite behavior, and probably less than that since we have specifically singled out the elite as informed, i.e. they face low variation in information or memetics.

This alone is enough to accept Pareto's gist. I will leave with some ideas to go further. First, if we can show that material incentives explain 25 percent of the variation in elite political phenotype, then memetics explains none of it. For the effect of memetics between elite groups (across time basically), we can do studies where we literally go through Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Marx, etc (there are a finite number of pseuds) and see if people learning about them and hypothetically agreeing with them will

hypothetically change their political preferences. Then do same for "apparently true ideas" like HBD and compare the effect sizes. This will give us estimates of the effects of these writings and ideas on elites who are exposed to them en masse upon release. I hypothesize that the pseuds will have little to no effect, and apparently true ideas like HBD would have, on average, a mild to moderate effect.

5.5 Pareto vs. Mind Viruses

Mind virus theory predicts that Woke behavior, and political behavior more generally, is caused in large part by bad beliefs, i.e. "mind viruses." In contrast, Paretian theory predicts that political behavior is mostly a function of rational, utility maximizing behavior, which is a function of genetic tastes and economic incentives. Stated beliefs that should be irrational, i.e. costly, do not actually pay their negative rent. In other words, the proportion of behavior that memetics explains is predicted to be quite low, while mind virus theorists predict it is high. We devise a method to test these contrasting hypotheses and find consistent vindication for the Paretian hypothesis, while falsifying the mind virus hypothesis. We conclude that "Wokeness" is not caused by bad belief – rather, it must be caused by a mix of genetics and economic incentives created by the powerful.

5.5.1 Introduction

In 1916, Vilfredo Pareto published his theory of residues and derivations [47]. "Residues" are, according to Pareto, intrinsic sentiments which are determined mostly by genetic factors, while derivations are auto-generated word soups which communicate residues. To Pareto, political ideologies were just mass derivations, conformed to by groups to aid the efficiency of collective action.

The more folkish view contrasts with this idea. Most recently, the folkish, idealist viewpoint has been called the "mind virus" theory. The view itself is likely a derivation relating to signaling a willingness to compromise with one's enemies. The theory goes like this: We are correct, and the Other has a mistaken belief – this belief causes the differing behavior of the Other. If this belief could be "uninstalled", the Other could be cured [48].

5.5.2 Theory

Wokeism provides us with a natural experiment. Both the Paretian theory and the mind virus theory agree that something like the handing-out of a "prior" has occured under wokeism. The Paretian view, however, predicts that this is signaling, while the mind virus view predicts that people really believe the information they are receiving.

Why are these predictions the case? The Paretian theory postulates the following:

$$e = \underset{e}{arg\,max}\, \mathbb{E}[U(e,\omega)|\mu] \tag{5.3}$$

When acting, people can be modeled as following this equation, where $e \in E$, such that E is the set of possible behaviors, ω is the actual state of the world, and $\omega \in \Omega$, where Ω is the possible world states; and μ is knowledge or the "prior" about the world, $\mu \in \triangle(\Omega)$, the set of possible probability distributions on Ω.

When changing their priors, they use Bayes' theorem. They must recieve both a signal s and a likelihood function $P(\cdot|\omega)$:

$$\mu_n(\omega) \propto P(s|\omega)\mu(\omega) \tag{5.4}$$

The posterior μ_n is proportional to the probability of the signal s given some potential world state times the probability of that world state under the prior μ. The question is, how does a utility maximizing agent verify the signal s and the meaning of s, $P(\cdot|\omega)$? By definition, he does so in a way which maximizes his utility.

This is, for now, the key place where the Paretian and the mind virus theory diverge. Paretians predict that a signal is trusted if it increases expected utility in its domain:

$$\mu_s(\omega) = \underset{\mu\in\{\mu_o,\mu_n\}}{arg\,max}\ (\underset{e}{max}\, \mathbb{E}[U(e,\omega)|\mu]) \tag{5.5}$$

Mind virus theorists follow some other equation where a signal is genuinely trusted if it is repeated or encountered when young or some combination of these factors. Both Paretians and mind virus theorists assume that wokeness is information which more or less constitutes a signal and a likelihood function. Paretians think that people who claim to believe woke priors don't, because they are actually rational Bayesians, and therefore must be claiming to believe it falsely (and rationally). Mind virus theorists think they that they have really absorbed these priors.

Paretians believe that when people claim to have a costly prior, it won't be reflected in their behavior (equation 3). They may have been instilled with it repetitively, but they only repeat it for economic reasons (equation 1). They are hypocrites. Mind virus theorists predict they really will believe it. Thus if we have the following before-exposure distribution of behaviors, where 0 is low cost and 1 is assumed to be high cost, where people without the bad meme may engage in the high cost behavior at a low rate due to genetic abnormalities or payments:

$$X \sim Bernoulli(p_1) \tag{5.6}$$

And we have the following distribution after exposure:

$$Y \sim Bernoulli(p_2) \tag{5.7}$$

Thus mind virus theorists predict $p_2 > p_1$. Paretians predict $p_2 = p_1$ given that the measure of exposure is not correlated with genetic or environmental factors that induce costly behavior.

It may be possible that some people are mind virus susceptible, while others are rational Bayesians. We can estimate the probability that someone is mind virus suscepitible, given our assumptions, with the following equation:

$$p_s = \frac{p_2 - p_1}{1 - p_1} \tag{5.8}$$

p_1 can be interpreted as the fraction of genetically broken or paid off people without meme exposure, p_2 is the fraction of people engaging in costly behavior after meme exposure, and p_s are the fraction of people susceptible to flipping to costly behavior status after meme exposure.

p_s is an upper bound because we are assuming no correlation between "exposure" and genetics or economic environment. This means the setup is maximally charitable to mind virus theorists.

We can further model behavior as follows:

$$P = G + E + M \tag{5.9}$$

Where P is phenotype, G is genotype, E is economic environment, and M is meme exposure. Here, each factor is binary, Bernoilli distributed, and + signifies the logical OR operation. $\frac{\mathbb{V}(M)}{\mathbb{V}(P)}$ can be taken as the memetability m^2 and can be estimated with $r^2_{P,M}$. When M covaries with G and E, this method will overestimate m^2. At any p_1, this value increases monotonically and nonlinearly with p_s. The proof of this is left as an exercise for the reader. When $p_s = 0$, $m^2 = 0$.

5.5.3 Methods

To test the two models, we recruited 100 American participants with children born in between 2000 and 2007 from the survey website Prolific. We asked four pairs of questions. The first attempted to measure meme exposure. The second attempted to measure costly behavior resulting from genuine belief in that meme.

The first pair of questions was: "Are drag queens good?" and "How many drag queen shows have you taken your child to?". The second pair was "Is sex transition for transgenders beginning under 18 good?" and "How many times have you talked to your child about whether they question their assigned gender?". The third was "Is being gay good?" and "How many times you encouraged your son or daughter to experiment sexually with members of the same sex?" and the fourth was "Is sex work good?" and "How many times have you encouraged your son or daughter to make extra money by engaging in sex work?".

Non-numerical responses were ignored and responses were mapped onto 0 or 1.

5.5.4 Results

No r^2 or p_s value was significantly greater than zero, as the Paretian theory predicts. Noise was added to the behavioral variable to enhance viewing, but the statistics were computed before noise was added.

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R-squared: 0.000989486703772191
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

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R-squared: 0.029613563788213892
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


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p-value for R-squared: 0.40386530975753654
R-squared: 0.0035714285714283367
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

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p-value for R-squared: 0.6843698155041333
R-squared: 0.012745358090185954
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

5.5.5 Conclusion

We conclude that, given the experimental validity of our test, the mind virus theory has been convincingly falsified. This should be the case, since the major flaws in the study design were charitable to the mind virus theory. Significantly above 0 r^2 and p_s values could signify either covariance between M and G or E, as under the Paretian theory, or a win for mind virus theory. However, mind virus theory cannot interpret null results unless they add n arbitrary epicycles, where n is the number of different memetic domains sampled.

We have here sampled 4 domains, and there is at least one more in the literature: black people and white flight. It turns out white people who are into black egalitarians do not live around blacks more than non-egalitarians. They engage in white flight at the same levels [49]. This means mind virus theorists need 5 epicycles. The Paretian theory roughly predicts that mind virus theory is not a real prior, rather it is a signal denoting goodwill towards one's enemies, and that many will therefore attempt to add these epicycles, contrary to mind virus theory taken at face value.

The main potential limitation of this study is the validity of its measurements. Further replication will signify greater validity.

Future studies must investigate other implications of the Paretian theory. This study is consistent with the Paretian theory, but does not prove it alone. One further avenue of research is investigating the economic and genetic determinants of signaling and political behavior. We can also investigate the rationality of people facing deception using experimental games. We predict that we would witness equation (3) occur in a game involving a knowledgeable deceiver who is motivated to divert funds to himself. Per equation (1), we predict that dishonest signalers are likely signaling for an economic purpose, mediated by genetics. Finding that signalers would lose friends, income, and other goods if they did not signal costly priors when asked is predicted by our theory, along with significant heritability of political signaling and behavior.

Chapter 6

Pareto Cycles and other Paretian Hypotheses

6.1 Introduction

Pareto makes interesting claims in his magnum opus, *The Mind and Society,* but provides no quantitative evidence, due to the fact that such evidence did not exist in his day. Instead, he opted for historical anecdote. Despite this epistemic shortcoming, his hypotheses are compelling and deserve attention. This chapter will address these hypotheses quantitatively.

6.2 Class I and Class II Residues

Pareto claims that in elite classes there are members with varying amounts of "Class I" and "Class II" residues. These are essentially two clusters of mental traits. Class I-tilted people are more open, higher IQ, more deceptive, and more leftist. Class II people are less intelligent and open, and more religious and patriotic. To quote my earlier summary of Pareto:

> The most important of these are class 1 and class 2 because these are the only ones he refers to in his social analysis. Class 1 residues are simple enough – they come down to curiosity, openness, irreligiousity, risk-taking and intelligence in Pareto's final account of his system. His evidence, as well as probably anybody's personal experience, shows that these residues are deep parts of our psyche not motivated by other fundamental drives plus reasoning. His evidence fails, however, to at all correlate these different aspects, or to sample the population as to establish how the expression of these residues vary between people. This matter will be investigated using modern psychological evidence near the end of this writing.
>
> His class 2 residues have to do with attachment to the family, the home, and by extension, the nation. They also involve obedience to tradition – it is unclear exactly how this tradition is instilled in people or what power this gives "derivations." Pareto's treatment of this is vague and far too short. At times Pareto seems to think that these residues negatively correlate with Class 1 residues, that people tend to be either un-open, unintelligent, averse to risk, and attached to one's family and homeland, or else one is open, intelligent, irreligious, risk-tolerant, and hedonically unattached to family and nation. It is unclear, however, why loyalty to family and nation, religiosity, and risk-taking would correlate. I suspect Pareto is only partially correct here, and I hope to clear up this scheme and isolate what truth it has in my analysis of contemporary evidence below. For now this summary suffices; Pareto seems to play loose with his definitions anyway in his fourth volume so we will clarify these concepts more as needed soon. ... People with class 1 residues are greedy and short-sighted.

What we have here is essentially a hypothesis about the correlation of various mental traits. Modern psychometrics attempt to measure much of what Pareto spoke of, and offers correlations between these

measurements. After examining the data on this, it appears that Pareto was definitely onto something. The traits he speaks of do modestly correlate with each other in the directions he predicted.

Table 5. Effect Size of the Relation Between Intelligence and Religiosity for Selected Groups.

	College uncorrected		College corrected		Non-college	
Effect size	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted
All studies						
r	−.14	−.15	−.21	−.22	−.23	−.15
d	−.28	−.30	−.43	−.45	−.47	−.30
IQ points	4.2	4.5	6.4	6.8	7.1	4.5
Studies with religiosity measure assessing religious beliefs						
r	−.16	−.17	−.24	−.25	−.25	−.20
d	−.32	−.34	−.49	−.52	−.52	−.41
IQ points	4.8	5.1	7.4	7.8	7.8	6.2

The above table is from a 2013 meta-analysis [12]. It shows that the IQ-religiosity correlation is about r = -0.20. This is small but significant. Emil Kirkegaard found [13] a correlation of about r = -0.40 with n = 67,000. This may be more trustworthy since Kirkegaard's religiosity questionaire was likely less retarded than that of academic psychologists but it is hard to tell.

TABLE 2

Intercorrelations Among Study Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Neuroticism	1.00	−.43**	−.10	−.62**	−.49**	−.30**	−.22*	−.26**	−.26**	−.34**
2. Extraversion	−.62**	1.00	.07	.26**	−.24**	.09	−.06	.25**	.00	.18†
3. Openness to experience	−.07	.18**	1.00	−.25**	.34**	.51**	.21*	.10	.32**	.26**
4. Agreeableness	−.44**	.24**	−.10	1.00	.25	−.10	.13	−.01	−.02	.01
5. Conscientiousness	−.65**	.18**	.03	.18**	1.00	.53**	.40**	.16†	.49**	.41**
6. General mental ability	−.22**	.14†	.33**	−.07	.29**	1.00	.30**	.31**	.51**	.53**
7. Job satisfaction	−.26**	.12	−.09	−.26**	.20**	.25**	1.00	.26**	.12†	.25**
8. Income	−.32**	.24**	−.01	−.11	.34**	.29**	.26**	1.00	.35**	.82**
9. Occupational status	−.27**	.09	.26**	−.04	.48**	.48**	.12†	.35**	1.00	.83**
10. Extrinsic career success	−.34**	.19*	.14†	−.11	.50**	.53**	.25**	.82**	.83**	1.00

Note: Correlations above the diagonal are for the childhood assessment of personality and general mental ability. Correlations below the diagonal are for the adulthood assessments of personality and general mental ability. Because different sample sizes were available for the variables, correlations were estimated using pairwise deletion (average *N* above diagonal = 166, average *N* below diagonal = 194).
†$p < .10$ *$p < .05$ **$p < .01$

Above is data from a 1999 study [14]. IQ correlates with openness at r = 0.50 and income at about r = 0.40 (the best studies here say r = 0.50). Pareto claimed that smarter, more open and creative people were less religious and traditional, and secured their power through income acquisition. So far it seems that higher IQ people are less religious, more open (i.e. creative, less prone to what Pareto called Class II group-persistences), and are better at acquiring income. As elite IQ increases, so would openness, and religiosity would decrease. Pareto hypothesizes in his cycle theory that the ability to acquire wealth becomes a selection mechanism for the elite, and in turn Class I residues increase. Just from this data, as elite income increases, we would expect IQ and openness to increase signficantly, and religosity to decrease significantly. Specifically, if income increased by 1 SD, IQ might increase by 0.50 SD, openness by 0.25 SD, and religiosity might decrease by 0.10 SD. Tail effects could produce more extreme phenomena than otherwise expected from these effect sizes if these traits are normally distributed. Consider also that in the Pareto cycle, income might go up by even 2 SD during the Class I influx phase, producing potentially a 1 SD increase in IQ, a 0.50 increase in openness, and a 0.20 decrease in religiosity.

Another study found: [17]

> Significant positive phenotypic correlations with IQ were seen for agreeableness (r = 0.21) and openness to experience (r = 0.32). A negative correlation emerged for neuroticism and IQ (r = 0.10). Genetic factors explained (nearly) all of the covariance between personality traits and IQ. Genetic correlations were 0.3–0.4 between IQ and agreeableness and openness. The genetic correlation between IQ and neuroticism was around 0.18. Thus, personality and IQ did not appear to be independent dimensions, and low neuroticism, high agreeableness and high scores on openness all contributed to higher IQ scores.

This provides some evidence for Pareto's "foxes vs. lions" conjecture. The Class I residue foxes are supposedly more agreeable. A 2014 study with n = 3618 found a significant r = 0.20 relationship between "psychopathy" and conservatism, further contributing to this idea [18].

Next we get into Haidt's moral schema. It is very useful here because it conforms to Pareto's hypotheses. In it, leftists are essentially hedonists deficient in patriotism and sacred values. This aligns with Pareto's description of Class I vs. Class II elites.

To begin, according to a 2022 study, [15] Haidt's moral foundations are separately heritable along two dimensions, essentially corresponding to Class I and Class II residues:

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) predicts that moral behaviour reflects at least five foundational traits, each hypothesised to be heritable. Here, we report two independent twin studies (total n = 2020), using multivariate multi-group common pathway models to test the following three predictions from the MFT: (1) The moral foundations will show significant heritability; (2) The moral foundations will each be genetically distinct and (3) The clustering of moral concerns around individualising and binding domains will show significant heritability. Supporting predictions 1 and 3, Study 1 showed evidence for significant heritability of two broad moral factors corresponding to individualising and binding domains. In Study 2, we added the second dataset, testing replication of the Study 1 model in a joint approach. This further corroborated evidence for heritable influence, showed strong influences on the individualising and binding domains (h2 = 49% and 66%, respectively) and, partially supporting prediction 2, showed foundation-specific, heritable influences on Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity and Purity/Sanctity foundations. A general morality factor was required, also showing substantial genetic effects (40%). These findings indicate that moral foundations have significant genetic bases. These influenced the individual foundations themselves as well as a general concern for the individual, for the group, and overall moral concern.

	Harm-Care	Fairness-Reciprocity	Ingroup-Loyalty	Authority-Respect	Purity-Sanctity
Neuroticism	.03	.13	.02	.00	−.02
Volatility	.01	.04	.00	.10	−.07
Withdrawal	.03	.12	.02	−.11	.08
Extraversion	.10	.10	−.06	.03	.04
Assertiveness	−.04	.00	−.09	−.01	−.07
Enthusiasm	.15	.11	.00	.04	.10
Openness-Intellect	.13	.14	−.12	−.25*	−.20*
Intellect	.03	−.04	−.14	−.26*	−.25*
Openness	.12	.17	−.02	−.06	−.01
Agreeableness	.38*	.21*	−.02	.06	.08
Compassion	.32*	.20*	−.10	−.13	−.06
Politeness	.16	.06	.07	.19*	.15
Conscientiousness	−.03	−.02	.25*	.29*	.27*
Industriousness	−.03	−.05	.06	.10	.11
Orderliness	.00	.09	.22*	.24*	.21*

*p < .05.

From a Jordan B. Peterson study [16], intellect negatively correlates with the right-wing moral foundations Authority-Respect and Purity-Sanctity at r = -0.25. These are analogous to Class II group-persistence and religiosity residues. If IQ increased in the elite by 1 SD, we could expect a 0.25 SD decrease in Purity-Sanctity and Authority-Respect, in other words.



Finally, from a 2018 study, [19] CRT, a cognitive measure which correlated with IQ are r = 0.44, was significantly lower in people with more rightist moral foundations.

The evidence suggests that Pareto was onto something with his Class I and Class II residue scheme. If income increased by 1 SD, IQ might increase by 0.50 SD, openness by 0.25 SD, and religiosity might decrease by 0.10 SD, while Purity-Sanctity and Authority-Respect would decrease by 0.125 SD. Tail effects could produce more extreme phenomena than otherwise expected from these effect sizes if these traits are normally distributed. Furthermore, we should not rule out the possibility that elites are actually directly selected on some or all of these traits in a Class I influx period. We have also seen that, genetically, Liberal and Conservative moral foundations, which might be termed Class I and Class

II moral foundations, seem to vary independently; in addition, IQ genes seemed to cause an increase in openness as well as agreeableness, lending much credit to the lions vs. foxes conjecture, wherein Class I elites are foxes who are more agreeable, sly, deceptive, and less prone to direct confrontation and violence.

6.3 The Pareto Cycle: Some Preliminary Evidence from Turchin

On top of his residue scheme, Pareto advances his cycle theory, which states, basically, that as parvenus enter the governing elite due to merit, Class I residues increase; eventually there are too many foxes, and too much infighting, and not enough action, and a Caesar takes over and closes off the elites. Class I residues decrease for some reason, perhaps regression to the mean, and Class II residues come to predominate. Eventually the governing elite cannot compete with a new, burgeoning, high Class I residue counter elite, and there is a revolution and the doors to the governing elite are once again thrown open to aspiring parvenus. Then the cycle repeats.

This hypothesis is hard to test without large amounts of historical data; luckily, Peter Turchin and his cliodynamicists focus on just this type of thing. Consequently, I did some preliminary skimming of Turchin to see if he concurs with Pareto (eventually I will read his work in full, after I get through my current huge reading list). The results were promising. I will quote a book review on Turchin's work *Secular Cycles* at length:

> But nobles go through a related process. As a cycle begins, their numbers are low. As time goes on, their population expands, both through natural reproduction and through upward mobility. Eventually, there are more nobles than there are good positions and the nobles form "rival patronage networks" to fight for the few remaining good spots. The state goes from united (or at least all nobles united against the peasants) to divided, with coalitions of nobles duking it out (no pun intended). This can lead either to successful peasant rebellion, as some nobles support the peasants as part of inter-noble power plays, or just to civil war. There are about a hundred years of unalloyed growth, as peasant and noble populations rebound from the last disaster. During this period, the economy is strong, the people are optimistic and patriotic, and the state is strong and united.
>
> After this come about fifty years of "stagflation". There is no more room for easy growth, but the system is able to absorb the surplus population without cracking. Peasants may not have enough land, but they go to the city in search of jobs. Nobles may not have enough of the positions they want, but they go to college in order to become bureaucrats, or join the retinues of stronger nobles. The price of labor reaches its lowest point, and the haves are able to exploit the desperation of the have-nots to reach the zenith of their power. From the outside, this period can look like a golden age: huge cities buzzing with people, universities crammed with students, ultra-rich nobles throwing money at the arts and sciences. From the inside, for most people it will look like a narrowing of opportunity and a hard-to-explain but growing sense that something is wrong. After this comes a crisis. The mechanisms that have previously absorbed surplus population fail. Famine and disease ravage the peasantry. State finances fall apart. Social trust and patriotism disappear as it becomes increasingly obvious that it's every man for himself and that people with scruples will be defeated or exploited by people without.
>
> After this comes the depression period (marked "intercycle" on this graph, but I'm going to stick with the book's term). This graph makes it look puny, but it can last 100 to 150 years. During this period, the peasant population is low, but the noble population is still high. This is most likely a period of very weak or even absent state power, frequent barbarian invasions, and frequent civil war. The peasant population is in a good position to expand, but cannot do so because wars keep killing people off or forcing them into walled towns where they can't do any farming. Usually it takes a couple more wars and disasters before the noble population has decreased enough to reverse elite overproduction. At this point the remaining nobles look around, decide that there is more than enough for all of them, and feel incentivized to cooperate with the formation of a strong centralized state.

The first paragraph clearly describes Pareto's Class I influx phase. The last paragraph describes the rise of a Caesar or an autocratic selection system which is closed off. The Class II phase is not

as clearly described and appears to be presented as a period of inter-elite conflict instead. Still, this is only a book review. Eventually I will personally read Turchin's book and write my own review, addressing its fit to Pareto and Jouvenel's cycle theories.

6.4 Afterthoughts

Pareto's general ideas have all been moderately well verified here. I wanted to give thanks to Sebastian Jensen and Werkat for helping me compile these studies. Also I wanted to mention a study showing a correlation of r = -0.48 between sensation seeking (basically a measure of hedonism) and conservatism. The p value was quite low (p ¡ 0.01) but the study was on 43 music students in 1985, so I didn't cite it in the main body [22]. Still, it converges with the evidence above is interesting with respect to my idea that left vs. right = hedonism vs. altruism.

Chapter 7

Mass Psychology

7.1 How Selfish is Man?

7.1.1 Introduction

Exousiology postulates three principles of mass behavior: materialism, or poor, overly concrete, consumptive, and degenerative taste (for example, preferring another Bugatti to funding exousiology, or placing little value on the sanctity of marriage, i.e. lacking proper disgust for butthole fetishists); narcissism, or egalitarianism; and hedonism, or high time preference and lack of concern for the social whole. Each of these relate to the literature on selfishness and altruism. Immaterial taste, humility, and non-hedonism are in-line with altruistic behavior.

In fact, altruism could conceivably be the general factor underlying materialism, narcissism, and hedonism. It is easy to see that as selfishness increases, taste will become more earthly, more centered around this life and less around transcendent truth and beauty; the selfish person will demand equality when below average because he is narcissistic and wishes to maximize his own possesions, at an opportunity cost to the whole (exousiology needs reparations more than 85 IQ blacks); and the selfish man will have a time-preference aligned with maximizing the utils he experiences in his awfully short life, while the altruist will have a much lower time preference due to caring for future generations.

Therefore, in this article, I review the existing literature regarding human altruism, with one eye particularly focused on that literature's relation to the three hypothesized principles and another focused on estimating the true probability distribution of "altruism," as it is hypothesized that high altruism is a rare, elite trait, not common to the average peasant.

7.1.2 The Dictator Game

The dictator game is a straight-forward measure of altruism that works like this: person A is have their altruism measured. They are given a sum of money and are told that they can share any amount of it with person B. For each person we want to measure, see how much money they give to person B. The more money they give, the more altruistic they are. The perfectly selfish person gives no money, because typically, person B is anonymous so there will be no reputation damage.



FIG. 1. Histograms of April and September proposals. Each histogram measures the amount of the proposal in dollars on the horizontal axis and the fraction of proposals of this amount on the vertical axis.

Above shows the results of an early and often-cited dictator game experiment [41]. Two batches of participants were used: one in April, and one in September. Chart a shows the results for the dictator game with real money ($5). Chart c is the dictator game without real money, and charts b and d are the ultimatum game, which is a different game where the would-be receiver has the chance to decline the money and altruistically punish the giver if he feels it is unfair.

Chart a shows that the most common play in the dictator game was the most selfish: giving nothing. The next most common play was giving the minimal amount anyone gave: just a dollar.



Fair givers were in the 95th percentile of altruism as measured by this test. 36.5% were totally selfish. 66.5% gave just a dollar or less. Thus are priors should now be that only the top 5% of the

population will go beyond fairness; a super majority will be selfish or nearly selfish, and just 20% or so will be fair or close to it. We may hypothesize that roughly speaking, the selfish class consists of two thirds of people, the fair class consists of a fifth, and the generous class only about a twentieth.

Many studies annoyingly only report mean allocations in the dictator game. This disables us from seeing how many totally selfish people there are directly. Still, means can be useful for comparing between groups.

Study	Location	Students	Mean allocation
Carpenter et al. (2005a)	United States	Yes	0.25
		No	0.45
Ashraf et al. (2006a)	United States	Yes	0.24
	Russia	Yes	0.26
	South Africa	Yes	0.25
Burns (2004a)	South Africa	Yes	0.26
Cardenas and Carpenter (2004)	United States	Yes	0.27
	Colombia	Yes	0.19
Carter and Castillo (2002)	South Africa	No	0.42
Castillo and Carter (2003)	Honduras	No	0.42
Holm and Danielson (2005)	Tanzania	Yes	0.24
	Sweden	Yes	0.28
Ensminger (2000)	Kenya	No	0.31
Gowdy et al. (2003)	Nigeria	No	0.42
Henrich et al. (2006)	United States	Yes	0.32
	United States	No	0.47
	Kenya – Maragoli	No	0.35
	Kenya – Samburu	No	0.40
	Kenya – Gusii	No	0.33
	Ghana – Accra City	No	0.42
	Tanzania – Hadza	No	0.26
	Tanzania – Isanga	No	0.36
	Siberia – Dolgan	No	0.37
	PNG – Au	No	0.41
	PNG – Sursurunga	No	0.41
	Fiji – Yasawa	No	0.35
	Bolivia – Tsimane	No	0.26
	Colombia – Sanquianga	No	0.44
	Ecuador – Shuar	No	0.35

One meta analysis for example found that developing world means on the dictator game tended to be higher, indicating more altruism [42]. This is possibly evidence for selfishness-dysgenics occurring in developed economies, which could be a driver of leftism.

In 2011, a very comprehensive meta-analysis on the dictator game was released [43]. Luckily, it included the total distribution of all data points, $n > 20,000$:



Fig. 2 Distribution of individual give rates

36.1% were totally selfish. Hardly off from the first study.



The CDFs were very close in general. The first study only slightly overestimated selfishness in general.



The paper also replicated the fact that in poorer, less developed economies, people actually gave more.



There was also an effect of age, where people tended to become more altruistic as they got older, but college students were more selfish than children. This may be due to sampling issues – economics students may be more selfish due to expectations or selection. The difference between age groups could also be genetic in origin if the selfish are breeding more. This raises a research question – how does a representative sample do in the dictator game?



Fig. 11 Significant regressors in the complete model meta-regression

It is weird that being old is the most significant predictor of altruism. What about increasing cellular mutations would decrease selfishness? Why do old people vote more conservative, and why did now-dead people (very old) run civilization better? What is the heritability of dictator game performance, how has the average PGS changed with time, and how does performance predict political orientation? We should seek answers to all of these questions.

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Overall	.305	.268	27,266
Total number of studies			
1	.354	.266	12,701
2	.289	.265	5,770
3	.257	.263	3,384
4	.245	.259	2,192
≥5	.231	.256	3,219
Studies completed (self-reported)			
Below or at the median (500)	.344	.276	9,684
Above the median	.255	.267	8,231
Sex			
Female	.331	.257	12,010
Male	.273	.277	12.271
Age group			
Below or at the median (31)	.289	.270	11,611
Above the median	.320	.267	11,593
Size of the stake			
Below or at the median ($0.30)	.335	.260	14,165
Above the median	.272	.273	13,101
Belief that the recipient is real			
Below or at the median (67%)	.285	.273	10,254
Above the median	.328	.280	5,791

Table A1 | Fraction of DG giving as a function of statistics of the variables used in the study.

With regards to our last validity check, we also confirm the expected patterns for age, sex, and self-reported experience. Specifically, a replication of the first model of Table 2, with the relevant variables instead of giving, reveals that experience has a significant positive relationship with age ($p < .001$) and number of previous MTurk studies completed ($p < 0.001$), and no relationship with sex ($p = .211$).

A large MTurk sample yielded similar means as selfish Western students after a few studies, indicating that student selfishness may be due to learning economics [44].

7.2 Altruistic Punishment

There is another game called the ultimatum game. Its standard form is as follows: person A is given a sum of money to split between himself and person B. Person B can either veto the split and leave both with nothing, or can get the split. It has been found that some people, not all, will pay to punish unfair allocations by issuing a veto.

Chart b in figure 1 shows the results of this game. In the study, it is reported that 20% committed altruistic punishment against less than fair offers [41].



Fig. 1. Mini-Dictator and mini-Ultimatum Games, from Charness and Rabin (2002). The percentage figures under each pair of payoffs represent observed frequencies of choice in the experiments.

In another study, 31% were communists and chose an egalitarian outcome over a more optimal outcome. [45]

In the first study ever in this topic [46], subjects could first choose to split $20 evenly (E) or unevenly (taking $18). They then were confronted with two others, one who chose to split it evenly (E) and one unevenly. They could chose to receive $5, and give $5 to student E, or give $6 to themselves and student U.

> The results of the first part of the experiment show that fair allocations are observed even under conditions of complete anonymity and with no possibility of retaliation. Of the 161 students, 122 (76%) divided the $20 evenly. This is stronger evidence for the prevalence of fairness to strangers than was obtained in experiment 1. A fair allocation in an ultimatum game could be explained by the allocator's fear, often justified, that the recipient might reject a small positive offer.
>
> The second stage of the experiment was designed to see whether the subjects would pay $1.00 to punish an unfair allocator and simultaneously reward a fair one. A clear majority (74%) made that choice, indicating a preference to divide $10 evenly with a fair allocator rather than divide $12 with an unfair allocator. Not surprisingly, there was a substantial correlation between the choices made in the two stages. Of 122 subjects who took $10 in the first stage, 107 (88%) preferred to share with student E in the second stage. In contrast, of the 39 subjects who took $18, only 12 (31%) shared with student E.

In general, 74% lost a dollar to give to the fair person. Further, this behavior was reduced among uneven players.

7.2.1 Conclusion

Altruism varies in the human population. In variants of the ultimatum game, 25% of people put no value on fairness and split money with uneven players. About the same amount don't split money evenly when given a choice between that and taking almost all of it. A similar percent (31%) choose equality in the mini-dictator game over a more socially optimal alternative. 75% will not engage in altruistic punishment in the classic ultimatum game.

The dictator game reveals that as much as 40% of people will keep all money for themselves if they can, when there are no external consequences. 75% or more are less than fair on that game. Only a small fraction of people are fair or better.

This holds across populations, although developing populations and old people are more altruistic, and economic students seem to be taught selfishness to a degree. The large positive effect of old age on altruism raises questions about aging and dysgenics.

These questions should be investigated as much as possible. Ideally, a selfishness PGS could be constructed, and average PGS could be computed by generation by using DNA samples from old and dead populations.

Chapter 8

Appendix: Evidence Regarding Centralization and Coordination

8.1 Introduction

This is an older essay wherein I first introduced the concepts of centralization and coordination. It includes a useful literature review that belongs in this manuscript, even though some of its conceptualization is outdated. Eventually as more evidence emerges and concepts are solidified into their final states, this essay will be retired and assimilated into the main body of the text.

8.2 Centralization and Coordination

How history works is a question that has been severely neglected. It is true that in the past, understanding of history was limited due to insufficient data. But it is possible that the time of too little historical knowledge has come to an end. Peter Turchin is one of the most famous and recent thinkers to study this question, performing work that attempts to quantify and predict the macro-level process of history much like those Spengler studied. While it is likely that there is a "cycle" to history, the definite form of the times in this cycle as well as their relative lengths and magnitudes should be a function of the phenotypes of the historical decision makers. Therefore, knowing the structure of the "micro-level" processes of history is the key to manipulation and true understanding of the broad cycles of decline and collapse. To say that population explosion leads to unrest is trivial; to be able to predict the colour of that unrest and who its phenotypic agents will be is empowering.

Understanding the micro-level processes of history involves nothing less than understanding the power structure of human society and how it varies with time, if it varies at all. The parameters of this structure and its varying forms should be able to be fleshed out analytically, with minimal empirical content. For if the questions posed about the power structure have meaning, then they are valid questions and the proposed tests will serve their purpose in elucidating the truth. The tests will even reveal if there is no power structure at all, unless the questions were to be improperly predicated on the assumption of certain empirical facts.

"Power" should be defined before asking who has it and how they wield it: a person who has power over another is one who can have the other do as he pleases. The way in which this is achieved is the mechanism by which power is wielded. Thus, a father who can make his child behave as he wants has power over that child, but if he lacks the ability to shape the child's behavior, he lacks power. The mechanism by which that power is wielded can vary from subtle influence to explicit reward to explicit punishment. Let it suffice to say that any action which the father does that shapes his child's behavior is a mechanism of his power over that child.

But what is the shaping of a child's behavior? Assuming the standard model of behavior genetics for behavior sheds light on this.

$$P = G + E \tag{8.1}$$

The father has influenced the child's behavior when he is a significant environmental factor that contributes to his child's behavioral phenotype. But this means "power" is often far from absolute –

for in any conversation, each participant has power over the other in that each influences the behavior of the other in that moment. But this power is neither very strong nor stable. Nor is there really much of a power differential – the power of each participant over the other is roughly equal compared to that of a father over a child.

It may be said more formally that the magnitude and the stability of the power a talking partner has over the other clearly differs from that of the father over the child. Let magnitude roughly refer to the answer to the question, "how big is the set of behavior that this power can cause in the subject?" This is a meaningful question – it's obvious that that the conversation partner can probably cause a smaller set of set of behaviors than the father can cause in the child. The other meaningful question is, "how long will the power persist?" It is intuitive that a father has less "power" over a 17 year old than a 14 year old even divorced from whether or not the old teen can drive or work a job. So too does a stable State have more power over its citizenry than one on the edge of collapse, even if its laws continue to be largely enforced on the populace to the same extent until the collapse.

For any individual, there's also the question as to how many people he has power over. Absolute power over 1000 is "more" power than absolute power over 1. Partial power over 1000 intuitively seems to be "more" than absolute power over a few. Let it suffice to simply recognize these three variables of power – particular equations don't need to be surmised at this time.

If history is the record of behaviors of a population, then it's reasonable to ask what the distribution of power is in that population. If,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} P = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (G + E) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} G + \sum_{i=1}^{n} E \tag{8.2}$$

then in order to make sense of the behavior of a population, the extent to which power constitutes a significant environmental variable is required. And then if it is known who has power and who is subjected to it, the phenotypes of the subjects can be better predicted by incorporating genes and environments of their masters.

So far it has not been assumed that anyone actually has power. Inquiry could reveal that power is distributed evenly or near-evenly, and the sum of phenotypes is therefore an emergent property of the unweighted aggregate of genomes and their environments. One genotype-in-an-environment (phenotype) might not unduly influence a large set of genotypes-in-an-environment such that the former phenotype receives weighting when the sum of phenotypes is "calculated." But if one phenotype does unduly influence (have power over) another set of phenotypes, then power is unevenly distributed to some degree that the former genotype's X environment is more important when determining the aggregate behavior of the population. If the powerful phenotype varies significantly from the average phenotype, then looking at the average genotype in the average environment and predicting change in the sum of phenotypes based on change in the average genotype or environment will be misleading. What would be more revealing to the extent that power is unevenly distributed would be to examine the environment and genotype of the powerful and how they change.

Since we have already elucidated how we might quantify an individual's amount of "power," it is meaningful to ask about the distribution of power in a group of people. Take a set of five people. If none of them know each other, then they all probably have little to no power over the others. If there is one charismatic leader, that individuals might have a great level of power over the other four, while the other four fail to influence any other member to a great extent. Any combination between these extremes can be modelled. In each, variance from the mean can be calculated in the normal way. If everyone has the same amount of power, that variance is 0. If one person has a lot of power, the variance is larger. Furthermore, the distribution can be examined. There may be no discernable pattern if everyone has wildly varying amounts of power. But if there is a large group with a uniform, small amount of power and a small group with a large amount of power, examining the distribution of power in that group will show how concentrated it is. The extent to which power is concentrated in the hands of the few can even be quantified, perhaps by reporting what percent of the population possesses the top 50% of the power.

Let the concept, the extent to which power is concentrated in the hands of a few, be called centralization. At some moment in time, a society is more centralized the smaller the fraction of people is that possess significant influence. If in some society the media and law enforcement were responsible for 99% of the influence people receive (and that influence is responsible for a large amount of how most people behave), and only about 100 people dictate what is the law and what is on TV, then that

society is more centralized then one where the top 20% of the population effectively decide what is on TV and what is the law. In everyday terms, centralization is simply a function of how many people "have power" or how many "matter to history."

To investigate centralization, we must question the extent to which the average person's behavior is dictated by power. If this amount is significant, then we must determine what the power differential is between the average person and their collection of influences. Finally, we must determine how many people have power over the average person.

If centralization is a function of other, more directly observable variables, then we can deduce that the extent to which centralization varies between time and place depends on the extent to which those variables vary. If centralization is a consequence of a rather fixed trait of all members of the human species, then it follows that centralization would not vary from time and place significantly. If it were moreso a consequence of technological progress, then it follows that centralization would have significantly differed in the past.

What kinds of tests can be performed in order to determine the extent of centralization in some time period and what determines it? Any test or set of tests that allows for a valid approximation of the distribution of power in a population suffices for the purpose of approximating the extent of centralization is some time and place. Suppose a study in the US of 2020 revealed that media exposure significantly predicts the average person's political behavior – how they vote, what they care about. Media significantly modulates public opinion and not the other way around. Then, if what is in the media is a function of the desires of a small group of billionaires who collectively control the media through only 5 corporations, we can deduce that the US of 2020 is highly centralized. A sub-Dunbar amount of people greatly influence the public opinion of a population of 350 million. In a representative democracy, this leads to changes in the law. By syllogism, this small clique effectively controls the law in addition to the media, which has been shown to be a highly important factor for how people behave. On the other hand, if the US were not highly centralized in 2020, it would be expected that studies would show that the media has little causal effect on what people believe. In this case, maybe what is in the media is a function of what the average person believes. That in turn is shown to be a function of an environmental variable like technological progress. Maybe the financing of political campaigns is inefficient. Maybe studies show that when the super-rich and the average person wants different things, the average person tends to win. In these cases we can infer that the distribution of power is quite even. There is no sign that a small group hold a large amount of power. We should then conclude that the US of 2020 is pretty decentralized.

Knowledge of historical events may also be used as a test. If it can be inferred through examination of events which seem to be "grassroots" that "elite" influence is a necessary condition of said events, then it may be said that for the time and place where that inference is valid, there is a high degree of centralization. Furthermore, if we take the set of events from the 20th century that are deemed to be important and we trace their causes, and we find that decisions were virtually always made by the wealthy or for the wealthy with little regard to popularity, then the US in the 20th century may be inferred to have been highly centralized. So too if it is revealed that a small group makes the decisions, and the people lack significant power over those people, then the US is highly centralized. This means that if a study found chronically low approval ratings for elected officials who nonetheless continue to behave stably as a group, we can say the US is centralized if those officials control something of immense power such as the State apparatus. If, on the other hand, successful movements of change rarely, if ever, have elite funding, and representative democracy were found to yield majority approval ratings of the government, and the most important decisions of the recent past were made by the masses or for fear of the masses, then we should say that it would appear that the US is quite decentralized.

Just how centralized the US should also be able to be approximated with these methods. Of course it is possible that while centralized, the US could be essentially ruled by 5% of the population. If this is the case, then important decisions should be made for fear of these people or by these people without significant influence by the hyper-rich. They should approve of the decisions made by the US government. If the media matters, the structure of it should be such that this 5% controls it. Popular movements should have to be supported by these people but not necessarily the super-rich in order to succeed. Hypothetical direct examination of these people should reveal an independence of will at the group-level; they are not unduly influenced by the hyper-rich.

With the same or similar tests, we can approximate the factors behind centralization. If a major piece of evidence is the power of the media, then perhaps it is a probable hypothesis that centralization

was less when media technology was less sophisticated. If the need of social movements for elite patronage were another strong piece of evidence, then perhaps centralization varies from time and place with how equally wealth is distributed. Of course, it could all balance out if there are a number of important factors behind centralization.

In a society with a power distribution that exists such that the society may fairly be called centralized, there should be large gaps in power between the few and the many to the extent that there is a power threshold that a person must cross in order to be "Important" or significant in regards to predicting history. Beyond this threshold there still may be power differentials among the few. Even small power differentials, or even the existence of influence but no power differential, can lead to "coordination," a term that is here defined as the extent to which the powerful influence each other. A centralized but uncoordinated society features an atomized elite wherein introducing a new environmental factor to one will hardly have an overall effect (assuming the society is not ruled by few enough people). But a centralized and coordinated society can suffer from activist elites dominating neutral elites. If the coordination is hierarchical, people that may seem equally powerful from the outside may not be equal at all. One may matter much more than the other; the one may be a puppet and the other a puppet master, or alternatively the two may be master and apprentice. This was the condition of American society during the Revolutionary era. Virtually all of the leaders were Free Masons; among them therefore were Master and Apprentice. Their coordination was not only formal and hierarchical, but also semi-secret. The extent to which coordination is secret may be termed as the extent to which there is conspiracy. Names on the Declaration of Independence were nowhere near equal, yet each partook in the share of centralized power to some degree (if we suppose the society was centralized). This is all trivial to demonstrate. Among any group, including the one that possesses centralized power, the extent to which that group is coordinated is simply a question of the power distribution within the group (although there are indirect signs as well: the ability to reproduce the group will without family, obvious signs of acting in unison that cannot be explained by common genes and environment, etc.) Where the major disagreement comes is in regards to the idea that the list of Masonic names which fills the history books actually had centralized power. If society was actually decentralized, and these people were merely the representatives of some emergent will of the society-in-an-environment, then the coordination hardly matters, secret or not. The genotypes of these few people did not necessarily play an amplified role in history. But if power is centralized, if there is an influence differential, then the mass did not need to want a revolution. It is possible, even probable, that the American Revolution was a result of the desire of a few people in a few unique environments. Discourse about mass ideas would then be meaningless: what was predictive was the will of the few.

Therefore let the centralization of society be put to the test. Consider a typical historical text. How many names are found in it, and what are those people like? Making a list should be unnecessary. Obviously there are very few names in history books, and those that are in them overwhelmingly tend to by high status and wealthy. But occasionally there are histories with no names, where only events are discussed and it is assumed that they are the result of some ideological dissemination or technological development. Other times it is claimed that the high status men of history are merely the representatives of "the people." In the former case, the small group of people making the decisions is simply obscured. The Roman Senate is hidden behind "Rome." Is the latter case plausible? How often in history are these men overthrown if they fail to express the will of the people? The mystery of power is that they are hardly ever. What members of the public desired Stalin's rule, even upon joining the Red Army in the early days of their revolution? Which among even the Roman upper class desires the many clownish emperors of Rome in later days? Surely not many. If not somehow concentrated solely in the hands of Stalin, surely power must have been centralized, since what terrorized commoners would have not used any available influence to displace the tyrant? And the Russian Revolution which overthrew the Tsar was carried out men of more intelligence and status, even if they weren't quite elite. More than that, however, they had the backing of American bankers and agents of the German government (Sutton 1981, 172). These things were largely obscured from the public. So how could they have been emergent from it? When such few men wield such power as to finance a revolution, knowing their personal vicissitudes becomes integral to the understanding of history.

You might say, "But what if the funding was just aid and not a necessary condition? How could a revolution have been carried out if the people were unwilling to perform it?" Power is influence. When there is centralized power over a mass, that mass can be made to do things it wouldn't otherwise do. Communism as a doctrine originated among elite minds funded by elite wealth [25, p. 13]: Marx was

supported not by the workers of the world but by his uncle Lion Philips, grandfather of the brothers who started Philips Electronics. What workers were there among the early Communists? Class consciousness was a major problem discussed among these rich, often Jewish, ideologues. To my own knowledge, there were not any members of the working class lifted up and funded for their support of Communism; the whole movement was created by an elite class. It is claimed that the League of Just, which paid Marx and Engels to write the Communist Manifesto, was set up in part by bankers such as the Schiffs and Warburgs [24, p. 21], who were also heavily involved in the dissemination of Reform Judaism among the Jewish masses, a process which involved a clear showing of centralized influence. Regardless of whatever evidence exists tying these ultra-rich figures to Communism, even Wikipedia states that the primary members of the League of Just consisted of the upper class: academics, physicians, merchants, and so on. But more than this, there is a letter from a man named Herzen, a Russian Communist agitator, to Marx's mentor, the "Zionist Socialist" Moses Hess. In this letter Herzen speaks of a "moment" – that is, the culmination of the desired revolution in Russia – and also his connection to members of the Rothschild banking family [25, p. 42]. It would appear that a group of rich Jews were the first to desire a Communist revolution in Russia. Did the masses ever stand a chance? Perhaps with the protection of a strong monarchy, but WWI destroyed any semblance of that.

Enough of this digression away from modern America. Maybe things were different from Russian serfs. Maybe everyone wanted a Communist revolution except the dirty old Tsar. Perhaps the rich Jews responded no differently to the environment than the Russian masses and their support simply made the inevitable more stylish among the upper class. This is unlikely, but it is the way many seem to think. On the other hand, if the obvious is true, then the Communist revolution happened because of the influence of a select few. And given the outcomes of that revolution, it's doubtful that these men were just altruists. Some, however, express skepticism at the idea that anyone actually believes themselves to be the "bad guy." This skepticism is fair, but it is not my claim that the Rothschilds or the activists or the writers thought themselves to be that bad guys. It is possible for a group of people to practice deception for what they think is the greater good; the success of their race, for instance. And do people not have a great ability to deceive themselves?

Only with the assumption that one chain of events is representative of them all will talk about Russia shed light on the current state of the West. This assumption indeed may not be a bad one, but here we seek more than assumptions.

It is the case that, in general, propaganda is highly effective. Attentive lived experience should prove as much. But there is more objective evidence as well: for instance, "woke-related term-usage [in the MSM] significantly predicts subsequent racial liberalism [popular opinion] while racial liberalism does not significantly predict subsequent term-usage" [29]. In other words, the mainstream media caused public opinion on race to morph into what it is today. This power should be extensive; while the media is not necessarily the culprit behind every shift in public opinion, it is a strong possibility that where there is a shift, the media is to blame, especially when that shift is to the "left." Regardless, the fact is that the media wields a massive amount of influence on the populace, which is just another way of saying there must be some significant level of centralization. The question now becomes: "who controls the media?" It could be the case that a broad upper class of around, say, 5% are integral to the media, and it was merely natural change in the beliefs of this somewhat large group that led to wokeism in the media. Furthermore, who's to say that natural change wouldn't have come to the masses anyway? Maybe the above evidence is just an illusion. Maybe the professional class was simply effected first.

It is unlikely that some "natural change" could make white people hate themselves. I can't think of anything but top down social pressure that would spur the white masses to say "please call me evil, discriminate against me in hiring and education, and eliminate my bloodline!" The honest should admit without studies that not the automobile, nor the radio, nor TV, nor the birth control pill, nor the internet, nor social media, nor any other technology or geopolitical situation could produce this result. So what if there is Twitter and TV and radio? That doesn't imply women or black people should be allowed to vote. Further evidence can confer more certainty onto this hypothesis: specifically, evidence relating to just how influenceable the average person is. If the typical person is highly influenceable, and indeed highly influenced, then it would be unreasonable to doubt the power of having control over the average person's media.



The above charts reveal a seemingly paradoxical pattern: as women and blacks get younger or more educated, they report more discrimination. How could this be when society has been obsessed with making things equitable for these groups? It can't be. The reality is that education and other routes of influence are making Millennials and Gen Xers feel more discriminated against than women born before the Sexual Revolution and blacks born before "Civil Rights."

This evidence seems to indicate people are influenceable to a significant extent. Startling evidence from generations ago corroborates this hypothesis: the well-known Asch conformity experiments [26]. In these studies, participants were literally shown a set of a few lines with clearly visible differences in length and were asked to tell which one was the longest or shortest. The catch was that for every trial, there were a number of fake subjects who were coached to give answers which were visibly incorrect. It was found that 37% of people would comply with the group and consistently lie, and only 25% would go against the astroturfed shills. The rest would lie some of the time. These studies are telling not only because they show that people will blatantly lie about mere line lengths in order to obey, but also because they demonstrate a possible model of the origination of mass delusion, one where the liars are shills paid by a Polish Jew named Solomon to deny basic reality, and where the cattle simply fall in line behind the centralized, top-down, and false reality.

If people are so influencable in a setting that, experimental method aside, should minimize conformity (the participants were knowingly participating in a psychological experiment, and the lies they were pressured to tell had no cost of not telling and were obvious), what chance do the majority of people stand against the Jewish question? The reality there is easier to ignore than the reality about the lengths of some lines. And who should study it, lest they be condemned by their close ones and the society at large? Surely a great number of people stand no chance of recognizing controversial truths, all because they are influenced by some lying group. But for there to be centralization, simple influenceability does not suffice; there must be a power differential, meaning that the influencables must have not simply influenced themselves. Some outside group with more influence-power per person must have caused the conformers to conform, as in the Asch line tests.

So the question remains: who controls the media? The people are surely influenced by it to a significant extent. To deny this would be to deny that people are so influenceable that they will lie about obvious sense-experiences. If somehow a small clique were able to decide the contents of 90+% of the media in a civilization, they could surely use that to significantly alter national "discourse" over time on questions more complicated than the length of lines.

Quite simply, the media is corporate and therefore structured in a top-down fashion. If journalists are allowed to initiate their own stories, that is only by the grace of their employers. The "Sinclair

script" demonstrated this reality [27] – dozens of local news anchors who worked for channels with branding ranging from Fox to NBC to CBS that are owned by a corporation known as Sinclair Video were caught saying the same paragraph word-for-word: "Our greatest responsibility is to our [local community name] communities. We are extremely proud of the quality, balanced journalism that [channel name] produces. But, we are concerned about irresponsible, one sided news stories plaguing our countries . . . the sharing of biased and false news has become all too common on social media . . . this is extremely dangerous to our democracy." Your local news anchors do not necessarily write their own scripts.

James Murdoch's recent resignation letter is convergent with the Sinclair script. In it he writes, "I hereby tender my resignation as a member of the Board of Directors of News Corporation (the 'Company'), effective as of the date hereof. My resignation is due to disagreements over certain editorial content published by the Company's news outlets and certain other strategic decisions" [32]. This letter strongly implies the Board of Directors has direct control over editorial content published by all of the News Corporation's outlets, and that it was and expected to be used.

This all heavily implies a power differential between the few owners of the media and the broad mass that consumes it, which includes many of the employees of the media companies, who lack autonomous executive capabilities. It is very easy for this small group at the top to unleash massive amounts of influence on the public, while the mass does not seem to possess as strong a means of counter-influencing. There is certainly a large power differential per person between the owners and the masses, and probably a power differential between the total influence capabilities of each group, in favor of the elite.

This is based off the observation that the media generally seems to do what benefits the elite and not the masses, when the two conflict. Spreading anti-white racism in a majority white country is a good example of this: Sean Last [31] showed that media executives are at least a third Jewish, and that Jews tend to be extremely "liberal" (against whites). The large white population would probably be overall happier with the media if it weren't so anti-white; even white liberals don't seem to innately beg for anti-whiteness, but rather seem to simply go along with it in obedience due to high agreeableness.

And here we come to perhaps the strongest single piece of evidence in favor of centralization, a brute-force study published in 2014 that looked at thousands of American policy changes along with polling data and which divined what economic group's preferences best predicted the changes on the aggregate.

Table 3
Policy outcomes and the policy preferences of average citizens, economic elites, and interest groups

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Preferences of average citizens	.64 (.08)***	—	—	.03 (.08)
Preferences of economic elites	—	.81 (.08)***	—	.76 (.08)***
Alignment of interest groups	—	—	.59 (.09)***	.56 (.09)***
R-sq	.031	.049	.028	.074

***p<.001

Note: All predictors are scaled to range from 0 to 1. The dependent variable is the policy outcome, coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. Predictors are the logits of the imputed percent of respondents at the fiftieth ("average citizens") or ninetieth ("economic elites") income percentile that favor the proposed policy change, and the Net Interest-Group Alignment Index described in the text. Standard errors are asymptotically distribution-free, and all analyses reflect estimated measurement error in the predictors, as described in Appendix 2. The standardized coefficients for model 4 in this table are .01, .21, and .16 for average citizens, economic elites, and interest groups, respectively. N=1,779.

Figure 1
Predicted probability of policy adoption (dark lines, left axes) by policy disposition; the distribution of preferences (gray columns, right axes)



The study revealed that the preferences of economic elites strongly predict policy change, while the preferences of average citizens plainly predict nothing [28]. Centralization to some significant extent is therefore the case, at least via the law. And if the law is controlled, it makes sense for the media to be as well. In fact, the numbers above imply that the preferences of average citizens are, to some

real degree, created by the elite: considered alone, the preferences of average citizens do correlate with policy change, but that correlation totally vanishes in the multiple regression model.

The evidence, originating from diverse fields, converges to a single truth: that society is highly centralized. The masses are malleable, and are indeed malleableized. The evidence has furthermore given hints as to how centralization works; the masses are docile and obedient, their minds easily shaped by media and "education." Money grants not only the power to control the media from the top down, but also the power to shape public policy somewhat independently from public opinion (which should then conform itself to policy in obedience).

Just how centralized is it then? The evidence implies "very." Most congressmen are millionaires, and it takes hundreds of millions, if not billions, to continuously lobby. The media is similarly controlled by corporations whose owners are filthy rich. Wealth and ownership seem to be the key, the core of power. But I suppose it could still be conceivably argued that the upper-middle-intellectual class, the "5%," are really the ones in power.

The answer to the question of coordination should be addressed first, before the absurd neo-reactionary idea that the professional managerial class are the ones with the power. Coordination is essentially nothing more than the quality and quantity of centralization among those thought to wield a significant portion of centralized power in a society: by definition, coordination varies based on the level of inter-influence and the extent of centralization among the powerful. An elite with high levels of inter-influence can be said to be coordinated, hierarchically so if there are significant power differentials, formally if there are institutions of coordination, and so on.

The economic elite are significantly socially interconnected, and in consequence, this group possesses high levels of inter-influence, meaning that, in the terminology developed here, they are highly coordinated. This coordination is, at the least, somewhat formal, and therefore easy to see: the multitude of elite clubs are the examples. These include the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bilderberg Group, Le Cercle, and the Bohemian Grove. Another group was exposed by Sutton (1983): the Skull and Bones Society. Both Presidential candidates in 2004 were members of this secretive Yale senior-fraternity. But this is no kid's club – membership is forever and as Sutton outlines, it's run by the elders, who pick college students for membership if they are to be welcomed into the world of the economic elite. They even give $15,000 to each new member! Club members swear allegiance to one another, and there are multiple instances of clear membership-based nepotism outlined by Sutton.

Historically, the Free Masons were very similar to the Skull and Bones Society. Now the membership pool is diluted, and most of the economic elite do not appear to be members of the society, but virtually every significant figure (all of whom were rich by the way) in the American Revolution was involved in in Masonry [30]. In those days, the Masonic invitation taboo had not yet come about or was only recently invented [34], and the ability for one Mason to blackball a prospect would have kept out the riff raff either way. Also relevant is Robinson's convincing argument that Masonry actually descended from the Knights Templar, a group of elite knights-gone-bankers who were purged by the Church in the 14th century but who largely escaped to Britain. The only likely alternative is that Masonry was founded by British State operatives around the time of Francis Bacon and the Rosicrucians, which was the early 17th century. The Rosicrucians were a Franco-German group similar to the Masons with serious ties to the British and the Protestant Bohemians [37]. It is with certainty that the Masons were active in the 17th century. Nonetheless, Robinson showed that, while there are records of other types of guilds, there are no records of there being stone mason guilds in Britain. Much of Masonic tradition appears to be derivative of the Knights Templar as well. As such, it is likely that there was a proto-masonic organization that existed in late medieval Britain that was derivative of the Knights Templar, and that Masonry proper was a version supported by British State operatives starting in the 17th century.

The point is that the elite have been coordinating forever. The Skull and Bones is only a recent iteration of this old type of pseudo-spiritual elite fraternity structure. The past and continued existence of such groups convincingly demonstrates that the elite coordinate in what is at least a semi-formal and semi-hierarchical fashion. If coordination were low or were not the case, then it would be expected that the elite should tend to interact on a class-blind basis. Any societies with elites should also be significantly composed of non-elites. Nepotism should be low. They should not meet to discuss and execute policy, yet they do in their numerous clubs.

The famous book, None Dare Call it Conspiracy [23], explained the founding of the Federal Reserve, a most centralized and coordinated event wherein lead bankers planned the policy in secret on Jekyll

Island and then had it executed in Congress by their politicians. At the same time, those same politicians also legalized the federal income tax. Both policies were popularly resisted, but the nation succumbed nonetheless. The CFR was furthermore founded by absurdly rich financiers, and many presidential cabinets have been composed of its members. Despite its huge importance, the CFR receives no media scrutiny, and barely any coverage, as Allen and Abraham noted half a century ago.

None of this is expected if coordination is low. Even with high centralization, bankers 100 years ago should not have so easily met and discussed their plans, a meeting only in the public knowledge due to the admittance of it of some attendees. Low coordination would predict that the bankers would have all engaged in "mass action" in an "uncoordinated manor," coming together "spontaneously" to achieve their "common interests," without actually influencing one another. There should not be over 60 members of the CFR or the Bilderberg Group in Trump's cabinet (a stable observation, as Allen and Abraham also lamented that Nixon's cabinet was mostly composed of CFR members) And no, this is not a partisan phenomenon. The ruling class is a club, and you aren't in it.

This is all enough to conclusively state that there are high levels of semi-formal and semi-hierarchical coordination among the elite. To whatever degree they are committed to progressive principles, they will enforce conformity on that point among the elite, attempting to ensure there are no defectors. New elite are often chosen consciously, even formally, such as when a young man is admitted into the Skull and Bones Society and later the CFR. The current elite can directly dictate who will be the elite of tomorrow to a significant degree, meaning they can make sure their biases live on.

These findings provide clues to the mystery of elite phenotype. While the neoserf or proletariat was shown to be stupid and docile, the average billionaire has an IQ of 130. High levels of coordination reveal high levels of class consciousness and power awareness. The elite actively seek to be among other elite, and organize as to retain their collective grip on power. That is, their meetings mainly serve as discussions regarding how to wield their power, and as control mechanisms that decide who may not partake in the power. In contrast, the neoserf is unaware of power, considering it a dirty word and himself equal to his master, which he paradoxically always obeys because he is so lacking in will. The neoserf is a most dirty and lowly slave who thinks he is free, while the elite is a self-aware master that consciously exerts his power.

Considering all of this, what may be said about the origins of progressivism? It has already been shown how journalists are beholden to the economic elite. Professors are as well. Most research funding comes from the rich. It is also the rich who sit on the board of directors of the schools thanks to their donations (this is little known, and was hard to find, but research who controls Harvard policy). Their grip over the means of propaganda is also enough to control the academy from afar. It is also the case that business leaders have so much control over the politicians, that in 1939 they were able to pass the Hatch Act, which prohibited civil service employees from engaging in certain forms of political activity, including the organization of donations [33].

Progressivism, then, is a project of the economic elite. The only question is why it appeals to them. It is a most unnatural ideology, at least for white middle class neoserfs, who eat it up so graciously only when served. It has always struck me that never would such a dumpster fire of an "ideology" ever emerge among white proles organically. The neoserf is low, but history shows that hatred of one's own race is unprecedented, as are the sins against other traditions included in progressivism. It must be an alien phenomenon, pushed onto the rest by a few aberrations. This was always my intuition, and the evidence accumulated here supports it more or less.

The relevant gene pool that progressivism must naturally appeal to is small. Generally, for a set of behaviors to "appeal" to a gene pool, it must be instrumental to its existence and dominance, unless that gene pool is so mutated that it is killing itself. A gene pool such as the elite gene pool is also more likely than the population gene pool to function for dominance. It is a fit gene pool that seeks power.

Progressivism proper is most clearly instrumental to and supported by the Jewish element of the elite gene pool, and is tolerated by the white capitalist element. It was created, then, to secure and exalt the Jewish element of the elite gene pool, and the elite generally (as are all dominant ideologies). This is why progressivism is so concerned with racism: tabooing that prevents a genocide of the racial group that is always concerned with that. At the same time, racism functions as a distractor, dividing and conquering the proles. Finally, the white capitalists have long been internationalists, and anti-racism allows them to get the cheap labor and mass markets that keep them in power. It is hard, perhaps impossible to imagine another ideology that doesn't step on Jews or the material security of

the ruling class. Unifying ideologies would leave too much attention left over for the elite class. Any racial ideology scares the Jews. Libertarianism endangers their material security. The other major aspects of progressivism are similarly fine-tuned. For instance, feminism divides and conquers, and weakens white men, and gives the capitalist class a larger wage labor pool.

This should not preclude a more empirical analysis of the origins of progressivism, or liberalism for that matter. Let this instead serve as an educated hypothesis, based off of the priors elaborated on herein.

Likewise, a more rigorous study should be made of neoserf and elite phenotype. The way these people are seems to be often misconceived by analysts, and a clear, empirical portrait of these two groups can help flesh out the realities of power relations. Given the way it appears neoserfs are, ideas contrary to power-elitism are absurd. Proprietors of such ideas can only thrive when it is thought that the average person is intelligent and active, as opposed to stupid and docile.

Finally, the main topic of this essay can never suffer from more investigation. I will most likely do more, if I'm not killed by the Illuminati. At this stage I doubt that will happen, because it doesn't appear that there is evidence of one "Illuminati" that controls everything. The ruling class is small, and intelligent, but I don't think they're genius nor a few dozen. Conspiracies almost certainly exist, and are significant, but it is unlikely, even impossible, that one controls the whole world. Exposed conspiracies such as the Bavarian Illuminati and the Rhode's Round Table are likely good models for the average active, concealed conspiracy.

Chapter 9

Appendix: Domhoff's Evidence for the Patriciate

9.1 Introduction

G. William Domhoff is a professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and a long-time power researcher. His career started in the 1960s and was massively inspired by C. Wright Mills and his work *The Power Elite.* Domhoff runs a website called *Who Rules America,* and writes a textbook under the same name, which is on its 8th edition.

This review focuses on the content on his website, which is broad and, by our estimation, more complete than any one of his books. We have, however, read the 7th edition of his book *Who Rules America?* as well as his book *Diversity in the Power Elite.*

9.2 Domhoff's model

Domhoff promotes "class domination theory." We have labeled the ruling class in this theory the Patriciate, and have begun to work on expanding the theory to give it more detail and a firm basis in biology. As such, Domhoff's foundation is an important influence on exousiology.

In Domhoff's formulation, the Patriciate can be uncovered by four power metrics. Three of these are key; they are the "who sits?" metric, the "who benefits?" metric, and the "who wins?" metric. The fourth metric is reputation for power. Domhoff's research focuses on the first three metrics, and among those the "who sits?" metric recieves the most of his attention, following in the footsteps of Mills.

The "who sits?" metric looks at who has formal positions of power in institutions of great influence. "Who benefits?" just asks who has the most money, and "who wins?" looks at direct policy influence, trying to see what people get their way when there is conflict over what policies to implement. Domhoff claims that one class of people have the highest scores on all three metrics, and that (in our terms), these people are the Patriciate.

The way he uncovered this was by starting with the "who sits?" metric. He simply looked at official positions of power in big businesses, government, and what he calls the policy planning network (think tanks, academia, and planning groups). He documented institutional interlocks in this network – this is the phenomenon where one member of an institution can be a member of several others. For example, the President of Harvard might sit on the board of directors at Twitter and might be a fellow at the Hoover Institute. This creates interlocks between Twitter, the Hoover Institute, and Harvard. These are institutional interlocks; personal interlocks can also be examined; these are, for each person, the people who belong to the same organization and oneself. The president of Harvard in this instance would be considered to be connected to the other directors at Twitter, the other fellows at the Hoover Institute, and anybody else of concern at Harvard. Obviously, a whole network is created with this approach. Twitter might be connected to the Hoover Institute, Harvard, Columbia, Visa, Salesforce, and more. The President of Harvard would then be only one degree of connection away from the people at Visa.

Under the pluralist system many laymen imagine, there should be few connections. Powerful institutions should tend to form islands. Maybe Twitter is connected to a few other newer Big Tech companies, but surely Big Tech as a whole is not well connected to every other giant corporation, government positions, think tanks, and academia. More ideally, each company should tend to be an island unto itself. Many people imagine that if they just work hard and rise through the ranks, they might be a CEO one day. If they are aware of what a board of directors is, they might also imagine that they could rise to that position as well, through merit, under the pluralist, decentralized democratic system. Mondelez Inc. executives and leaders should be people who have worked at Coca-Cola for decades. They are not expected to be connected to dozens of other corporations, in a giant, well connected network, with massive over-representation in government, policy planning networks, and little-known, upper class social clubs.

Domhoff is not a pluralist, because he did not find what was just described. Instead, he found a cohesive, well-connected, super-rich ruling class that also constantly wins its policy battles. Uh oh!



Above is a small taste of what Domhoff found. It is a visualization of just the connections of the Mondelez Inc. network taken from Domhoff's website. It shows institutional connections ranging from Goldman Sachs, Princeton University, the Business Roundtable (a power policy planning group for the Patriciate few have heard of), Mastercard, TimeWarner, Duke University, and more.

Domhoff summarizes the totality of his data in tables using centrality scores. These simply measure which institutions have the most well connected members. They are a decent, but not infallible, metric of power.

Table 2: The 15 most central organizations in the corporate/foundation/ think tank/policy-planning group/university/charity/advisory committee network.

Organization	Sector/Subsector	Centrality score
Committee for Economic Development	Think Tank	140.81
University of Chicago	University	3.66
Conference Board	Think Tank	3.60
Verizon	Business	3.29
Proctor & Gamble	Business	3.21
National Bureau of Economic Research	Think Tank	3.01
Network Reliability and Interoperability Council	Government Advisory Board	2.41
President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee	Government Advisory Board	2.38
Allied Signal	Business	2.36
Exxon Mobil	Business	2.36
President's Export Council	Government Advisory Board	2.32
Columbia University	University	1.66
Ford Foundation	Foundation	1.66
Sara Lee Corporation	Business	1.66
National Petroleum Council	Government Advisory Board	1.66

Above is a table showing the most central institutions in a data set containing top corporations, foundations, think tanks, policy planning groups, universities, charities, and federal advisory committees. The latter type of institution are not well known. They are boards which the executive branch erects for advice on executive policy. They are much more likely to be filled with rich, ruling class members than with the average American. In fact, Domhoff reports they are basically filled with either academic experts or corporate executives. Verbatim:

> Another recent study used a comparison of committees with open or closed meetings to test various theories concerning their role (Karty, 2002). It first of all found that 58% of all federal advisory committee members in the years from 1997 through 2000 were from universities and independent research institutes, reflecting the large role of professors and researchers in reviewing scientific grant proposals and in providing advice on medical and technical issues. Another 18% of committee members were from corporations or business trade associations. They served on very different committees than the professors and researchers. Another 13% of members came from the government. The remainder came from a wide range of areas, including nonprofit organizations, foundations, public interest groups, and trade unions. ...
>
> A study of high-level executives from the largest 50 financial corporations and largest 150 non-financials revealed that 72% of the companies had an executive on at least one advisory committee in 1973, with the figure falling to 47.5% in 1977 (Priest, Sylves, & Scudder, 1984). The researchers suggest that the decline was due to the legislation leading to greater publicity for committee members. When they looked at business representation by executive department, they agreed with Useem (1980) on state, defense, commerce, and interior, but added the Department of Treasury and the newly founded Department of Energy to the list. In fact, business involvement was greatest in 1977 with the various agencies that were put into the Department of Energy.

Domhoff also shows the centrality of just business organizations:

Table 6. The 40 highest-ranking organizations in the combined Fortune 500 and policy-planning networks

1	Business Roundtable	21	National Bureau of Economic Research
2	Business Council	22	Chevron
3	Committee for Economic Development	23	Deere
4	Brookings Institution	24	Eli Lilly
5	Center for Strategic and Int'l Studies	25	General Electric
6	Institute for International Economics	26	Pfizer
7	National Association of Manufacturers	27	3M
8	Atlantic Council	28	AT&T
9	Chamber of Commerce	29	American Express
10	Council on Foreign Relations	30	Boeing
11	Aspen Institute*	31	FedEx
12	Marathon Oil	32	Medtronic
13	American Enterprise Institute	33	Aetna
14	Caterpillar	34	Coca-Cola
15	IBM	35	ConocoPhillips
16	RAND Corporation	36	General Mills
17	United Technologies	37	McDonald's
18	Alcoa	38	Verizon
19	Conference Board	39	Wells Fargo
20	Ford Motor	40	Abbott Laboratories

*Although the Aspen Institute is usually listed as a think tank, it does not issue specific policy recommendations with a corporate imprimatur and is best described as a general discussion center.

And the role of foundations, both their connections with the broader network and their funding of think tanks:

Table 7: Foundation funding of the top 50 think tanks, 2003-2012

foundation	total amount	grants	% of total
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation	$264,045,194	128	13.1
Ford Foundation	$142,322,132	378	7.0
The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation	$92,616,000	172	4.6
The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation	$84,030,190	151	4.2
Carnegie Corporation of New York	$74,421,800	181	3.7
The Rockefeller Foundation	$69,752,237	159	3.4
The New York Community Trust	$69,414,835	383	3.4
The Annie E. Casey Foundation	$57,250,059	352	2.8
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation	$52,185,862	206	2.6
The Starr Foundation	$47,044,314	75	2.3
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation	$45,007,450	117	2.2
Smith Richardson Foundation, Inc.	$43,725,030	307	2.2
The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, Inc.	$29,909,328	289	1.5
Open Society Institute	$28,551,839	163	1.4
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation	$25,623,042	80	1.3

Table 8: Corporate and think-tank linkages for the ten largest foundations and the Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Sloan foundations for 2011-2012

rank	foundation	total trustees	trustees with corporate connections	total corporate links	think tank links
1	Gates Foundation	27	10	26	7
2	Ford Foundation	17	1	1	2
3	Robert Wood Johnson Foundation	26	5	10	3
4	Lilly Endowment	13	1	2	0
5	W. K. Kellogg Foundation	18	3	4	0
6	The Annenberg Foundation	4	0	0	0
7	Packard Foundation	19	3	13	2
8	Gordon/Betty Moore Foundation	14	1	2	1
9	MacArthur Foundation	21	2	6	2
10	Hewlett Foundation	17	2	3	2
20	Rockefeller Foundation	25	3	4	3
62	Carnegie Corporation	21	4	9	1
66	Alfred P. Sloan Foundation	18	6	12	2

The emerging picture is clearly that it's a club, and we aren't in it.

Table 1: Individuals with more than one organizational connection

number of ties	count	percentage
2 or more	3,215	35.2%
3 or more	1,701	18.6%
4 or more	837	9.2%
5 or more	390	4.3%
6 or more	195	2.1%
7 or more	106	1.2%
8 or more	51	0.6%
9 or more	29	0.3%
10 or more	16	0.2%
11 or more	10	0.1%

Above, Domhoff gives us the size of the Patriciate and its coordination-distribution. This data allows us to estimate values for "centralization" and "coordination", concepts I have written on in the past. The total size was estimated to be about 9000 people out of 350 million, and the inner component is between 1000 and 3000 people. If the average organization is a dozen Patricians strong, then the average personal connections per Patrician is probably about 20, only counting official institutional connections.

What has been established at this point is that there is a network of highly interconnected people who possess powerful official positions over society's important institutions. Domhoff proceeds to ask a number of questions about these people, such as what their personal origins are like, their demographics, their net worths, how they influence government policy, how they interact with politicians, who are not found in the network yet who make the immediate decisions of State, and so on.

Beginning with their personal origins, Domhoff investigated whether these people have something approximating a cohesive culture. To Domhoff, the existence of some sort of culture is important for class consciousness, so if it does exist, this group can properly be called a social class. Domhoff found that they do have a cohesive culture, and it revolves around often being born into wealthy families, frequently going to pre-university prep schools, attending prestigious private universities, and joining exclusive social clubs as an adult.

On wealth, Domhoff thoroughly rebuts Burnham's predicted "managerial revolution:"

> This chapter demonstrates that the corporate community and the upper class are closely intertwined. Such a demonstration is important for three reasons. First, it shows there is no separation between corporate ownership and corporate control in the United States, a separation that seemed possible as the number of hired managers expanded in past decades. ... the evidence presented in the final third of this chapter shows that (1) members of the upper class own a large share of all privately held corporate stock; (2) many super-wealthy stockholding families in the upper class continue to be involved in the direction of major corporations through family offices, various types of investment partnerships, and "holding companies," which exist to hold the controlling stock in other companies; and (3) the professional managers of middle-level origins are assimilated into the upper class both socially and economically and share the values of upper-class owners. (Who Rules America, 8th edition, p.108).

He also discusses class-consciousness:

> Evidence for the overlap of the corporate community and the upper class is important for a second reason: research in social psychology shows the most socially cohesive groups more often succeed in arriving at consensus when asked to deal with a problem. The members are more likely to listen to each other and seek common ground because they are proud of their identification with the group, and they come to trust each other through their friendly interactions. As a classic study of the upper class in New York in the 1930s concluded: "The elaborate private life of the plutocracy serves in considerable measure to separate them out in their own consciousness as a superior, more refined element. (Ibid).

Social clubs are key for class consciousness in adults. Domhoff reports findings regarding Bohemian Grove, one of the most central clubs:

> An even more intensive study, which included participant observation and interviews, along with a membership network analysis, extended the sociological understanding of the Bohemian Grove into the 1990s. Using a list of 1,144 corporations, well beyond the 800 used in the studies for 1970 and 1980, the study found that 24% of these companies had at least one director who was a member or guest in 1993. For the top 100 corporations outside of California, the figure was 42%, compared to 64% in 1970. ...
>
> In 2008, in a study carried out for an earlier edition of this book, there were 101 directors of 116 companies among the 2,259 members. This percentage is lower than in the previous studies because it does not include guests, only members, at the Grove. (p. 127).

Going beyond Bohemian Grove, elite social clubs were traditionally segregated by race and religion. In fact, in his book *Diversity in the Power Elite,* Domhoff claims that WASP clubs disallowed Jews until the 1970s, when they were spurred by the Civil Rights movement to begin accepting outsiders. They began accepting some amount of outsiders, but Jews had already established their own parallel social clubs, which still exist to this day. Occasionally, they accept non-Jewish minorities, as one Jewish club did with Barack Obama (whose campaign was massively funded by the Jewish Pritzker family). Understandably, Domhoff mainly recounts late 20th century data on the WASP club network.

First, he states that the club network is deeply interlocked:

> An indication of the nature and extent of this overlapping is revealed in a membership network analyses of 20–30 clubs in several major cities across the country in the late 1960s, including the Links Club in New York, the Chicago Club in Chicago, the Pacific Union Club in San Francisco, and the California Club in Los Angeles. There was sufficient overlap among 18 of the 20 clubs to form three regional groupings and a fourth group that provided a bridge between the two largest regional groups. The several dozen men in three or more of the clubs, most of them very wealthy people who sat on several corporate boards, were especially important in creating the overall pattern. The fact that these clubs often have from 1,000 to 2,000 members made the percentage of overlap within this small number of clubs relatively small, ranging from a high of 20– 30% between clubs in the same city to as low as 1 or 2% in clubs at opposite ends of the country (WRA, p. 122).

Next, he establishes the link between this network and the corporate network:

> The overlap of this club network with corporate boards of directors provides further evidence for the intertwining of the upper class and corporate community. In a study in the 1960s, for an earlier edition of this book, the club memberships of the chairpersons and outside directors of the 20 largest industrial corporations were counted. The overlaps with upper-class clubs, in general, were ubiquitous, but the concentration of directors in a few clubs was especially notable. At least one director from 12 of the 20 corporations was a member of the Links Club, which is the New York meeting ground of the national corporate establishment. Seven of General Electric's directors at the time were members, as were four from Chrysler, four from Westinghouse, and three from IBM. In addition to the Links, several other clubs had directors from four or more corporations (Domhoff 1967 p. 26). Another study, using membership lists from 11 prestigious clubs in different parts of the country, confirmed and extended these findings. A majority of the top 25 corporations in every major sector of the economy had directors in at least one of these clubs, and several had many more. For example, all of the 25 largest industrials had one or more directors in these 11 clubs. The Links in New York, with 79 connections to 21 industrial corporations had the most (Domhoff 1975). (Ibid).

Regarding children, Domhoff gives some data on social mobility:

> Forbes, the business magazine that began publishing an annual list of the 400 richest Americans in 1982, has taken up the Horatio Alger storyline. "Forget old money," said the article that introduces the 1996 list, a theme that has been repeated since the list was first

> compiled in 1982. "Forget silver spoons. Great fortunes are being created almost monthly in the U.S. today by young entrepreneurs who hadn't a dime when we created this list 14 years ago" (Marsh 1996). But the Horatio Alger story is no less rare today than it was in the 1890s. In 2011, 21% inherited enough money to make the list, another 7% inherited $50 million or more, and another 11.5inherited $1 million or more or received a significant amount of startup money from a relative to found a company. Another 22% had upper-class backgrounds or received a significant amount of start-up money for a business from a relative. Thirty-five percent came from a middle-class or lower-class background (Moriarty et al. 2012). As for the immigrants often extolled on the Forbes list, they too sometimes come from wealthy families; contrary to the stereotype, not all immigrants to the United States arrive poor (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1982, 2018).

Only about a third rise into the ruling class from the lower classes. This data is similar to Mills' in his 1950s book *The Power Elite*.

How many in the ruling class attend top secondary and post-secondary schools?

Table 2: Undergraduate degree from top 50 schools (*US News and World Report*, 2011) among *Fortune* 500 directors and CEOs

	Fortune 500 directors	*Fortune* 500 CEOs
White males	31.3% (n=1717)	21.3% (n=122)
White females	38.6% (n=487)	37.2% (n=43)
African Americans	24.5% (n=265)	29.4% (n=17)
Latinos	28% (n=100)	24% (n=20)
Asian Americans	34.2% (n=76)	25% (n=16)
ALL	32% (n=2491)	27.8%
	$\chi^2 = 17.90$ $df = 4$ $p < .001$ $r = -.01$	$\chi^2 = 2.87$ $df = 4$ n.s.

A big chunk, but not a majority apparently. As for elite high schools, Domhoff does not seem to give data on how many elites come from those schools directly. Instead, he tells us that as many as 80% of students from elite high schools go to elite colleges. Apparently, it's hard to find out what high schools elites went to, because, like most people, they often don't report it on resumes or public documents. Still, it follows from these figures than less than 30% of elites went to those schools, at a maximum. Obama's high school has 2700 people enrolled in K-12, which is about 280 12th graders. If 80% go to elite colleges, that's 220 people. If there are 10 of these elite high schools and they send the same amount of students to elite schools, then they send 2800 per year. This is about the size of 1.5 Ivy League school graduating classes, leaving the rest of the elite colleges for the plebs. There are 8 Ivy League schools alone, plus other top schools like MIT, Stanford, and Caltech the liberal arts colleges like Amherst, and down the line there are the Southern Ivies like Duke, Vanderbilt, and Emory, and then finally there are highly respected, large public institutions like UC Berkely, UCLA, University of Virginia, and University of Michigan, before finally descending down the latter of typical public state schools into garbage colleges that shouldn't exist.

Domhoff claims that exclusiveness increases with firm size (WRA 8th ed, p 139):

> The findings presented in this section explain how rising corporate executives are assimilated into the upper class and come to share its values. The aspirations of professional managers for themselves and for their offspring lead them into the upper class in behavior, values, and style of life. To begin with, they are educated and trained in a small number of private universities and business schools. Several different studies reveal that about one-third of those who manage the nation's largest firms graduated from Harvard, Yale, or Princeton, and two-thirds studied at one of the 12 most heavily endowed schools (Useem 1980). People of color who are not from wealthy families show the same educational patterns as other upwardly mobile corporate executives in terms of attendance at these same schools, due, in part, to the talent-search programs discussed earlier in this chapter (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 2003, 2018).

He also gives some old data on how many of those who make it in send their kids to top schools (Ibid):

> Upwardly mobile executives also become personally connected to members of the upper class through the educational careers of their children. As their children go to day schools and boarding schools, the executives take part in evening and weekend events for parents, participate in fund-raising activities, and sometimes become trustees in their own right. The way in which the children of upwardly mobile middle-class managers become involved in upper-class institutions also can be seen in their patterns of college attendance. This is demonstrated very clearly in a study of upwardly mobile corporate presidents. Whereas only 29% of the presidents went to an Ivy League college, 70% of their sons and daughters did so (Hacker 1961).

One can conclude that a significant minority of elites come from prestigious colleges; a smaller, though significant minority come from prestigious high schools, and two-thirds come from significant wealth, while one-third are born poor or middle class. Assuming IQ equality of everyone, as many sociologists do, it would seem that being born to money has the largest effect on joining the ruling class, and going to prestigious institutions while young has a smaller, though significant effect. It is of course not the case that people are born equal in intelligence. A future analysis should attempt to estimate the degree of social mobility, corrected for genetic IQ and other traits that are relevant for power.

There is a class-culture shared by a significant portion of the people Domhoff decided to study. Most people are probably not friends with anyone who went to Harvard, much less Exeter, yet the average member of this ruling network is, if they did not go themselves. Neither the clubs, nor the schools, nor growing up rich are universal, but rates of 30-60% people of this network having these things compared to the based rate of ¡1% in the general population is a big finding.

Domhoff has shown that these people control the economy and have a vast network of thought producing machinery, including corporate media, prestigious universities, and policy planning organizations like think tanks and round tables. They also often advise the federal government, especially on economic matters. In terms of the IEMP model, the idea, which Domhoff subscribes to, that four networks (ideological, economic, military, and political) are important in administering power, this network essentially controls the first two. In the US, the military is most directly subordinate to the political. For centuries American soldiers have sworn to uphold the Constitution, and the President has served as commander-in-chief. For the purposes of this review, we can consider the military to be a subset of the political. This means one question remains: what of this network's relation to the political elite? Do people from this network find themselves in public office frequently? Do politicians find themselves on director boards? Do they all belong to the same clubs? Are the corporations and the policy planning networks powerful enough to determine what politicians win elections or what politicians can say? Or are politicians different and independent from this unelected class? Finally, what is the legislative win record of this ruling class? Do politicians do what they want while legislating and issuing executive decisions, and if so how frequently and why?



Figure 4.1 The Policy-Planning Network.

Above is Domhoff's overall view of the system. He says, in this regard,

> Who rules America? The owners and managers of large income-producing properties; i.e., the owners of corporations, banks, other financial institutions, and agri-businesses. But they have plenty of help from the managers and experts they hire.

The above chart shows how the corporate community influences the decisions of the government at any given point in time. It does no show the candidate selection process or the existence of members of the corporate rich in public office.

Distinct from the ruling class is the Power Elite. The ruling class is pseudo-organic for Domhoff, while the Power Elite is like their shadow-state. He says:

> The foundations, think tanks, and policy-discussion groups in the policy planning network, in concert with the large corporations and financial institutions in the corporate community, provide the organizational basis for an institutionalized leadership group for the corporate rich. This leadership group is called the power elite. The concept of a power elite makes it possible to integrate class and organizational insights in order to create a more complete theory of power in America. Once again, as in the case of the boards of directors of corporations, the key point is that any differences in perspective between class and organizational concerns can be taken into consideration and worked out in meetings of the boards of trustees of the nonprofit organizations in the policy-planning network, where wealthy owners and CEO's from major corporations meet with the top employees of the nonprofit organizations.



Figure 4.2 The Power Elite.

On legislative wins, Domhoff says the following (Ibid, p 188):

> Even when a majority clearly expresses a vigorous preference for one or another alternative concerning a specific piece of legislation, it is not usually adopted against the opposition of the corporate community. Instead, a large body of evidence suggests the majority's opinion is often ignored. This point is demonstrated historically by the conservative directions taken by the Carter and Reagan administrations from 1978 to 1983, even though a majority of people remained liberal on many of the issues being discussed: "Throughout that period the public consistently favored more spending on the environment, education, medical care, the cities, and other matters, and it never accepted the full Reagan agenda of 'deregulation'" (Page and Shapiro 1992, p. 117). Another detailed analysis of survey data, which also related to the alleged rightward shift in public sentiment in the 1970s and 1980s, found little support for this repeated assertion by party leaders and media outlets, except on issues related to crime. Democratic and Republican leaders embraced conservatism in the 1970s, the researcher concluded, but the American electorate did not follow their lead (Gold 1992).

There is a key study on this cited in my essay on centralization from 2014 showing this to be the case on a ton of issues. The economic elite's opinions predicted policy outcomes, and the public's opinions did not. At first glance, establishing this is the case for stuff like healthcare policy may seem avoidant of cultural issues. But a developing theory known as agency theory, specifically the economic preferential primacy hypothesis, states wagers that people generally care more about stuff than they do about morality or "cultural issues." It makes sense – wouldn't most people prioritize giving themselves and their family free healthcare over abstract (to them) rights for smaller and smaller minority groups like transgenders? Why would people care more about the normality or legality of HRT for less than 1% of the population than about getting their own children free college? If the public can't win and won't rebel on stuff when they disagree with the elite, they're not going to win or rebel on culture when they disagree with the elite. And if the elite isn't intimidated by the public when it comes to blatant economics, they're not going to be intimidated when it comes to ahistorical rights for extremely small behavioral minorities. It follows from economic preferential primacy that if the elite win on free college or free healthcare, and if their preferences aren't shaped by the masses on those topics, and if the masses obey on those topics, then cultural topics are even more top down and elite centered. This is bolstered more when one considers that the poorer someone is, the more they will care about improving their economic position via the government. Social programs are really important to most people, but a millionaire won't be effected either way. They should almost be neutral on those topics, at least when it comes to economic motivations. They have a lot more free time to think about cultural topics, since they are so money-saturated. The masses have very little time or desire to care about culture topics when they are money-hungry, potentially predisposing them to go along with the elite,

especially if there are handouts, such as high status, high paying jobs, for doing so, and economic penalties, like cancellation (when the elite won't hire you, debank you, ban you from flights, or delete your internet gig) for disagreeing.

Domhoff cites this study and another (Ibid):

> These past findings are reinforced by a comprehensive analysis of thousands of questions drawn from several hundred opinion surveys, which were carried out primarily between 1981 and 2002. The analysis was augmented by questions from surveys from 1964 to 1968 and 2005 to 2006. This book-length study discovered the American government was responsive to only the "most affluent citizens" on issues of taxes, economic regulation, and social welfare: "the preferences of the vast majority of Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which policies the government does or doesn't adopt" on these issues (Gilens 2012, p. 1, Gilens and Page 2014). There are too few high-income respondents in standard surveys to determine whether or not this conclusion holds for the top 1–3% of citizens, so the definition of the most affluent citizens includes the top 10%. A further refinement of this pathbreaking study, which utilized three general social surveys, had a large enough sample size to compare the top 4% of income earners with the remaining 96%. It concluded public influence is limited to that even smaller percentage of the income ladder (Page and Hennessy 2010).

The ruling class gets its way electorally. In fact, Domhoff claims they have never lost on unions and other topics for generations. The only thing Domhoff thinks was potentially not a product of the ruling class is the Civil Rights movement. His statements on this are circuitous, however – he generally avoids the topic, and cites material discussing how the corporate community had prepared for Civil Rights years prior to its arrival. He also talks about how Civil Rights passed because Republicans in congress betrayed Southern Democrats and the behest of business leaders.

The ruling class also shapes public opinion and directly interferes in elections. On public opinion, as I have shown in my essay on centralization, the US media is highly centralized. Something around 95% of it is controlled by five corporations. The internet is hardly loosening this grip – Big Tech censorship gets worse by the day, and according to Domhoff the Big Tech leadership network is integrated with the wider ruling class (Ibid). In fact, today my Twitter account was banned and hidden for posting an ilicit infographic about who controls the media!

On candidate selection, and who politicans are, Domhoff says (Ibid, p 256):

> What kinds of elected officials emerge from a candidate-selection process that narrows down to two political parties and puts great emphasis on campaign finance, personal image, and name recognition? The answer is available from numerous studies. First, politicians come from the top 10 to 15% of the occupational and income ladders, especially those who hold the highest elective offices. Only a small minority was from the upper class or corporate community, but in a majority of cases, they shared a business or legal background in common with members of the power elite. Between 1950 and 2010, the 10% of the workforce in business or law contributed 75% of the members of Congress, whereas less than 2the members of Congress were former blue-collar workers or union officials (Carnes 2012, p. 6). Nonetheless, politicians feel a need to stress the humble nature of their social backgrounds whenever it is possible. ...
>
> In the Roll Call article reporting on their February 2018 analysis, which was based on 2016 financial disclosure statements for those who were in Congress as of January 1, 2018, David Hawkings concluded: "The people's representatives just keep getting richer, and doing so faster than the people represented. The cumulative net worth of senators and House members jumped by one-fifth in the two years before the start of this Congress, outperforming the typical American's improved fortunes as well as the solid performance of investment markets during that time." More specifically, Hawkings explained that in this current report "the median minimum net worth (meaning half are worth more, half less) of today's senators and House members was $511,000 at the start of this Congress, an upward push of 16 percent over just two years — and quintuple the median net worth of an American household, which the Federal Reserve pegged at $97,300 in 2016."

Politicians are upper middle class. How are they controlled? Domhoff discusses campaign finance but gives very little data. This MSM source suggests that the top 100 zip codes give 20% of the campaign dollars, and 12 people give 7.5%. There is also the special interest process:

> The special-interest process, as noted at earlier points in the book, consists of the many and varied means by which wealthy families, individual corporations, and business sectors gain the tax breaks, subsidies, regulatory rulings, and other governmental assistance they need to realize their narrow and short-run interests. The process is based on frequent personal contact with elected officials and their staff. Its most important ingredients are the information and financial support the lobbyists have to offer. Lobbying is practiced by people from a wide range of occupational backgrounds: former elected officials, employees of trade associations, experts who once served on congressional staff or worked for regulatory agencies, corporate executives whose explicit function is government liaison, and an assortment of lawyers and public relations specialists (Luger 2000, Schlozman et al. 2005, Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2012). In 2012, for example, 521 former Congressional and agency employees worked for the TV/movie/music industry, 423 for the automotive industry, and 279 for finance and credit companies (OpenSecrets 2012a). At the same time, a large number of lobbyists are part of a few big firms that are major businesses in and of themselves, with revenues of several hundred million dollars each year. Several of these lobbying firms, in turn, are owned by the public relations firms, which were discussed in Chapter 5 as part of the opinion-shaping network (OpenSecrets 2012b).
>
> The special-interest process often is used to create loopholes in new legislation that was accepted in principle by the corporate community. "I spent the last seven years fighting the Clean Air Act," a corporate lobbyist in charge of PAC donations for his company told researchers. He then went on to explain why he gave money to elected officials who voted for the strengthening of the Clean Air Act in 1990: "How a person votes on the final piece of legislation is not representative of what they have done." Most members of Congress voted for the act, he continued, "But during the process some of them were very sympathetic to some of our concerns" (Clawson et al. 1998, p. 6). Translated into results, this means there were 40 pages of exceptions, extensions, and other loopholes in the 1990 version of the act after a 13-year standoff between the Business Roundtable's Clean Air Working Group and the liberal-labor alliance's National Clean Air Coalition.
>
> Intricate and arcane tax breaks are one of the most important aspects of the special-interest process, starting with a variety of legal loopholes, which save individuals and families many hundreds of millions in taxes each year (Johnston 2003, 2007). In addition, corporations also benefit from similar strategies. In 2020, 55 corporations, including Fed Ex and Nike, did not pay federal taxes, and a few of them received tax rebates (Gardner and Wamhoff 2021).

This is how the ruling class has structured the tax system such that it is progressive (taxes rich people more) up until the 99.5th percentile, where taxes suddenly regress (they are lowered compared to the 90th-99th percentiles).

Next is the policy making process. Bills are hard to write; the general public can't do it. Specialized organizations do.

> The impact of major policy-discussion groups on legislative outcomes is demonstrated systematically in a study of 295 policy statements that representatives of the Council on Foreign Relations presented to several different Congressional committees between 1982 and 2002 (Luther-Davies et al. 2020). The legislative influence of these statements was analyzed by means of a quantitative method (multivariate logistic regression analysis), which can determine the relative importance of several organizations in effecting a legislative outcome. The study therefore could compare the relative success of the CFR with that of 24 interest groups (mostly business trade associations) and a sample of well-off citizens, most of whom were very conservative (Gilens and Page 2014, Page and Gilens 2017). In addition, the positions taken by the CFR, the interest groups, and the wealthy conservatives were compared with the majority opinion of the general public on each issue, as determined earlier in a comprehensive analysis of thousands of survey questions (Gilens 2012). The results

> from the multivariate analysis agreed with earlier studies that showed public opinion has no influence on the legislative outcome on a wider range of policy issues (Gilens 2012, Page and Gilens 2017). Nor did any of the 24 interest groups have any impact. However, the study did find that the preferences of the CFR were consistent with the legislative outcomes on 75% of the proposals. When the CFR and the welloffconservatives shared the same policy preferences, their shared preferences prevailed on 89.5% of the issues (Luther-Davies et al. 2020, pp. 18–19).

Finally, elites are appointed to important positions:

> There have been numerous studies of top-level governmental appointees. They are unanimous in their conclusion that the majority in most Republican and Democratic administrations have been corporate directors and their corporate lawyers, or members of boards of trustees in the policy-planning network, and hence members of the power elite. For example, 64% of the appointees to the major cabinet, diplomatic, and court posts were members of the corporate community from 1934 to 1980, but with only 47% during the New Deal, and most of them had connections to the policyplanning network (Burch 1980). A second study, which focused more narrowly on the 205 individuals who served in presidential cabinets between 1897 and 1972, reported that 60% were members of the upper class and 78% were members of the corporate community. There were no differences in the overall percentages for Democrats and Republicans or for the years before and after 1933 (Mintz 1975).

9.3 Conclusion

What can be said with virtual certainty based on Domhoff's work? The key claim he verified is that there is a well-connected network consisting of those who hold leadership positions in top corporations, which includes the corporate media, exerts strong marginal influence over the universities or controls them directly as trustees, exerts very strong marginal influence over the foundations and policy writing organizations, and exerts strong marginal influence over politicians via money, media control, and positions on boards such as FACs. This network, defined by their virtual positions, scores extremely high on two other metrics of power: cui bono and qui vincit. They control the economic positions, are extremely wealthy, exert vast influence on thought producing organizations and politicians, and their policy wins reflect this.

This is the Patriciate. Domhoff has done great empirical work in giving us the labels for our dataset, which we now must model and understand in biological terms, a task which Domhoff is prevented from doing by his New Left political commitments.

9.4 Appendix: Diversity Data

Diversity data is also provided by Domhoff. My commentary will be sparse – but this data may help with explaining the rise of diversity ideology in the future.

Figure 1: White male CEOs and "New CEOs" in the Fortune 500, 2000-2020



Figure 3: Women, African-American, Asian-American, and Latinx CEOs, 2000-2020



Table 2. *Fortune* 500 CEOs by ethnicity and gender, 2005 & 2015

2005

	All CEOs	Men	Women	% men
Whites	477	467	10	97.9%
Latinos	9	9	0	100.0%
Asian Americans	8	7	1	87.5%
African Americans	6	6	0	100.0%
TOTAL	500	489	11	97.8%

2015

	All CEOs	Men	Women	% men
Whites	470	445	25	94.7%
Latinos	13	13	0	100.0%
Asian Americans	11	9	2	81.8%
African Americans	6	5	1	83.3%
TOTAL	500	472	28	94.4%

Table 1: *Fortune 500* directors by race, ethnicity and gender

	% of U.S. population	% of directors	% male directors	% female directors	M/F ratio
Whites (n=3791)	74.6%	87.2%	74.4%	13.3%	5.6 to 1
African Americans (n=293)	13.6%	6.8%	5.3%	1.5%	3.5 to 1
Latinos (n=136)	16.3%	3.1%	2.4%	0.7%	3.4 to 1
Asian Americans (n=104)	5.6%	2.4%	2.0%	0.4%	5 to 1
TOTAL (n=4324)			84.5%	15.5%	5.5 to 1

Table 4: Rankings of the *Fortune 500* companies on which directors sit, by race/ethnicity

	Mean ranking
African Americans (n=282)	188.2
Latinos (n=131)	199.3
White females (n=565)	222.4
Asian Americans (n=100)	231.4
White males (n=3143)	238.6

$df = 3$, $F = 10.66$, $p < .001$.

Table 2: Percentage of corporate directors serving on one vs. multiple boards, by race/ethnicity

	1 board	2+ boards
Whites (n=3791)	82.2%	17.8%
African Americans (n=293)	67.7%	32.3%
Latinos (n=136)	73.7%	26.3%
Asian Americans (n=104)	83.7%	16.3%

Table 3: Proportions of interlocking directors by race/ethnicity and gender

	1 board only (n=3501)	2 boards (n=650)	3 or more boards (n=173)
Whites (n=3791)	89.0%	82.9%	78.6%
men	75.8%	69.4%	64.2%
women	13.2%	13.5%	14.4%
African Americans (n=293)	5.7%	10.3%	16.2%
men	4.6%	7.4%	12.1%
women	1.1%	2.9%	4.0%
Latinos (n=136)	2.9%	4.6%	3.5%
men	2.3%	3.2%	2.9%
women	0.6%	1.4%	0.6%
Asian Americans (n=104)	2.5%	2.2%	1.7%
men	2.0%	2.0%	1.2%
women	0.5%	0.2%	0.5%

Table 2.1. Jews in the Corporate Elite

Year	*Jews in the Corporate Elite (%)*	*Jews in the Population (%)**	*Source***
1900	3.4	—	Newcomer
1925	4.3	3.4	Newcomer
1950	4.6	3.3	Newcomer
1972	6.9	2.9	Alba and Moore
1976	7.0	2.7	Burck
1976	6.0	2.7	Sturdivant and Adler
1986	7.6	2.5	McComas
1986	7.4	2.5	Bennett
1995	7.7	2.3	DJN technique
2004	11.1	2.2	DJN technique
2011	8.7	2.1	DJN technique

* The figures in this column are from the *American Jewish Yearbook* and the *Encyclopedia Judaica*; prior to 1925, the estimates included only those Jews who were members of Jewish congregations, so no figure appears for 1900. The 2011 estimate of 2.1 percent is based on Ira M. Sheskin and Arnold Dashefsky, *Jewish Population in the United States, 2011* (Storrs, CT: North American Jewish Data Bank, 2011), http://www.jewishdatabank.org/studies/downloadFile.cfm?FileID=2919), 15.
** Mabel Newcomer, *The Big Business Executive: The Factors That Made Him, 1900–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); Richard D. Alba and Gwen Moore, "Ethnicity in the American Elite," *American Sociological Review* 47 (1982): 373–83; Charles G. Burck, "A Group Profile of the Fortune 500 Chief Executive," *Fortune*, May 1976, 174–75; Frederick D. Sturdivant and Roy D. Adler, "Executive Origins: Still a Gray Flannel World," *Harvard Business Review* (November–December 1976): 125–33; Maggie McComas, "Atop the Fortune 500: A Survey of the C.E.O.," *Fortune*, April 28, 1986, 26–31; Robert A. Bennett, "No Longer a WASP Preserve," *New York Times*, June 29, 1986.

There is some other interesting information on Jews in *Diversity in the Power Elite* by Domhoff and Zweigenhaft. A massive wave of Jewish immigration from Germany and Poland occurred from 1880 to 1920 when it was closed off by the major immigration act of that decade (p. 26). Franklin D. Roosevelt was accused of being a "negro loving Jew" named Rozenfelt by Henry Ford, and 50% of Americans before WWII thought that Jews were the biggest threat to the country because they were sneaky, and therefore they should have legal disabilities, which were never given (p. 27). Attitude apparently changed because of the Holocaust narrative and anti-Nazi propaganda (p. 28). Jews were not admitted to WASP social clubds until the 1970s when the ADL and similar organizations pressured them severely. Despite this, before the 1970s Jews were known to be very active behind the scenes in politics:

> When a journalist of German-Jewish heritage, Stephen Isaacs, who grew up in Kentucky, published his book on Jews and American Politics in 1974, he reported widespread Jewish involvement in all aspects of politics, motivated in fair measure by the fear that "It could happen here." But his interviews also made clear that it seemed too risky to most Jews to run for office anywhere outside of New York in the face of lingering anti-Semitism. (p. 28).

In the mid-1970's, 50% of Yale Law School professers were Jewish, 33% of Harvard professors were Jewish, and 25% of HYPSM students were Jewish (p. 27). In 1993, Jews headed 5/8 of the Ivy Leagues as Presidents. While WASP clubs let Jews in in the 1970s, Jewish clubs did not let in WASPs; although occasionally they allow in non-whites, like Obama (p. 28).

Jews vote 70% Democrat, including Patrician Jews, despite their wealth (p. 28). 45% of Jewish CEOs give only to Democrats and are 4.5 times more likely to give to Democrats than gentile CEOs. This pattern goes back to 1948.

> In 1968, when the Democrats raised money for a last-minute flurry of ads to tip the presidential election to Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, fourteen of the twenty- two donors who gave $95,000 or more for these ads were Jewish. In our view, the fact that Jews continue to vote Democratic, and donate to Democrats, the political party that is clearly identified with the liberal-labor coalition, is a sign that most Jews, even wealthy Jews, still feel a certain amount of wariness about the strong conservatism of the Republican Party and its clear identification with white Christians and their desire to eliminate some if not all of the barriers that have separated church and state since the founding of the country.

From 1900 to about 1950 Jews were only about three or 4% of corporations, however, they were concentrated in the media (p. 32). They did not to rise through the ranks like the Gentiles; rather, they would come in from the outside because they were experts in public relations or finance.

On the causes of increased woman diversity, the book point to Catalyst, which was founded by Jews:

> In 1977, a women's advocacy group that had been founded in 1962, Catalyst, began a program called the Corporate Board Resource. This program was designed to draw on Catalyst's database of women of achievement "to help board chairmen carefully select and recruit female directors." By the late 1970s, Catalyst was systematically monitoring the progress of women on boards and simultaneously working with boards to increase the presence of women. (p. 47).

On the origins of black diversity, the book reports:

> Obviously, the appointment of two black men to corporate boards in 1964 was a product of the civil rights movement, but why these particular companies at this particular time? ... Has it been more typical for boards to integrate because of socially conscious CEOs or as a reaction to protest? According to sociologist Sharon Collins, who has conducted extensive interviews with black executives, most were hired not because of a commitment to equality and diversity on the part of senior management, though some senior managers may have had such a commitment, but because of pressures of one kind or another on their companies. In addition to the specific protests against individual companies for particular policies, such as the refusal of some W. T. Grant stores to serve blacks at their lunch counters, federal laws created general pressures to integrate the higher levels of management. Not only did companies have to deal with overt protests, or the threat of them, but they had to adhere to newly legislated guidelines in order to obtain government contracts. Most of Collins's interviewees attributed the opportunities that opened for them to both overt protests and federal policies against discrimination. As she puts it in Black Corporate Executives, the black executives she interviewed "believe that new job opportunities emerged because of this federal affirmative action legislation and because of community-based political pressures, including urban violence." (pg. 99).
>
> James Roche, CEO and chairman at GM, who had been on his feet for most of the troubled six-and-a-half-hour meeting, made an embarrassing slip of the tongue. He was challenged by a young minister from Dayton, Ohio, about Blacks in the Power Elite GM's failure to send a representative to a television station in Dayton to respond to some of the criticisms of GM. Was GM not, the minister asked, a "public corporation"? Roche responded by claiming, "We are a public corporation owned by free, white—" At this point, as some people in the audience gasped and others laughed at his use of a well-known racist phrase, Roche lamely added, "umm—and—and—and black and yellow people all over the world." Though Roche later tried to downplay any meaningfulness to the slip and asserted that he simply had become confused by the audience's laughter, it was clearly an embarrassing episode in a long and difficult day.
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>
> Roche's decision to pursue Sullivan for the GM board therefore is quite revealing, for Sullivan certainly differed from the other early black corporate directors both in his academic

background and in his professional and political experience. It is likely that Roche and the GM board assumed that naming a highly visible and politically active minister would serve as an effective response to those shareholders who were protesting various of the company's policies.

One of Sullivan's first acts as a board member was to vote against the entire board on a controversial resolution. In its coverage of GM's 1971 shareholders meeting, the Wall Street Journal reported, "The meeting's dramatic highlight was an impassioned and unprecedented speech by the Rev. Leon Sullivan, GM's recently appointed Negro director, supporting the Episcopal Church's efforts to get the company out of South Africa. It was the first time that a GM director had ever spoken against management at an annual meeting." This challenge to boardroom hegemony may have been just what Roche needed to demonstrate GM's willingness to tolerate criticism. As Forbes magazine explained, "Such public dissent is rare in big business, and it certainly didn't harm GM's reputation."

...

People and organizations within the power elite continue to support the kinds of programs founded during the uprisings and riots in inner cities in the 1960s. In doing so, they have been able in part to offset a small part of the Republican-led decline in government support for equal opportunity. In particular, they have supported a set of corporate-sponsored programs designed to identify and educate academically talented African American youngsters who can be groomed for elite universities and possible incorporation into the power elite. These programs begin in elementary school in some areas of the country, then carry through to private high schools, Ivy League universities, and corporate internships. These programs are also financed by donations from the large charitable foundations that the corporate rich in turn influence through financial donations and directorship positions, as well as by a myriad of small family foundations that donate a few hundred thousand to a few million dollars each year. Since we have written about these programs elsewhere, with a special emphasis on the first and largest of them, A Better Chance, founded in the early 1960s by a handful of New England boarding school headmasters with help from the Rockefeller Foundation, we will provide only three examples here.

Despite hesitation among pro-integration Americans about breaking the taboo on quotas and preferences, including on the part of the social psychologists and black activists who had been working toward integration for decades, affirmative action policies were hurriedly adopted by political and business elites in 1967. These leaders within the power elite acted in haste in the face of the estimated 329 major disturbances in 257 cities between 1964 and 1968, which resulted in 220 deaths, 8,371 injuries, and 52,629 arrests. At the urging of first President Kennedy and then President Johnson at off-the-record meetings with the Business Council, at the time the most central organization in the power elite, corporate CEOs took the lead in calling on all businesses to provide more jobs for African Americans as quickly as possible. They thereby helped legitimize what they knew was preferential hiring because job programs were seen not only as the fastest and surest way to restore domestic tranquility but also as a means of avoiding larger government programs and expanded welfare benefits as well. Moreover, it was the corporate-backed Nixon administration in 1969 that created the stringent guidelines for hiring by government contractors (under the guise of "good faith" efforts at meeting numerical "targets"), which were soon attacked by ultraconservatives as a "quota" system once the upheavals and the burning of cities had subsided.

Figure 4: Women CEOs, Women in the U.S. Senate, and Women in the U.S. House of Representatives, 2000-2020



Figure 5: Black CEOs, Black members of the U.S. Senate, and Black members of the U.S. House of Representatives, 2000-2020



Table 2. Median net worth of members of Congress: white males and minority groups

group	net worth
White males (*n*=362)	$576,510
Jews (*n*=30)	$1,136,062
White females (*n*=67)	$972,021
African Americans (*n*=49)	$90,011
Latinos (*n*=39)	$28,008
Asian Americans (*n*=14)	$949,019
LGBT (*n*=7)	$91,004

Table 3. Proportion of each group in Congress with negative net worth

group	percent with negative net worth	raw numbers
White males	21%	77 of 362
Jews	20%	6 of 30
White females	15%	10 of 67
African Americans	41%	20 of 49
Latinos	42%	16 of 38
Asian Americans	7%	1 of 14
LGBT	29%	2 of 7

Although this was not the case when we began doing research on diversity in the power elite,[10] Jews now are well-represented in Congress. In 1975, there were only ten Jews in the House, mostly from districts in New York, and there were three Jews in the Senate. As of 2017, there were 22 Jews in the House (5.1%), and eight in the Senate (8%). Given that only about 2% of the national population is Jewish, Jews are now over-represented in Congress.

The Jews in Congress fit with the general finding that Jews have become economically successful. The list of 43 who qualified as superrich (reported net worth of more than $10.4 million) included five Jews: Congressman Jared Polis (D-CO), who is also openly gay, was #3 on the list, with holdings of at least $122.6 million; Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) was #9 on the list with at least $70 million; Dianne Feinstein was #10, with at least $58.5 million; Representative Brad Schneider (D-IL), was #33 at $14.9 million, and Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY) was #41 at $10.9 million. On the other hand, six of the 30 Jews (20%) reported negative net worth.

Every Jew was a democrat.

Finally, some data on the number of corporate boards of directors that are minimally diverse: 2/3 boards have brown director and 99% have woman director. Since women are 7% total this is weird, 0.93^{12} is 41%.

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