Adam Rutherford’s book “How to Argue with a Racist” is marketed as a “weapon” against “scientific racism.” One reviewer describes it as “the perfect ammunition to respond to racial discrimination should you encounter someone trying to justify their prejudice with science.” Obviously, it is an example of activist literature, not honest inquiry. Because of this, I debated even bothering to respond. Rutherford and activists like him don’t deserve anyone’s attention. Nevertheless, somebody has to clean up his mess. I think of high potential, red-pillable 15 year olds, how that was me some years back, and how if I had lived in the total information control regime of 1990 or if amazing individuals like Ryan Faulk had never made content like this debunking Patriciate propaganda in a way that is accessible to uneducated, intelligent individuals who don’t yet know there is a problem, I would have never have woken up and could still be some cringe libertarian or normie-con.
For a weapon against “racism”, Rutherford’s book isn’t very sharp. It’s written in that obnoxious New York Times best-seller style — the one where the science is never too dense, lest the author loses money because a decent chunk of the population doesn’t have the functional literacy to read such a text (the average person misses every other question on the reading SAT, so best-seller prose is obviously going to be on a 6th grade level). This indicates that the book, in addition to being blatantly motivated by activism, is also more of a commodity than a work of science. Adding to its style issues are the fact that he doesn’t cite his sources. How did this become acceptable in the mainstream press? Proper citation shouldn’t interfere with the ability of a 100 IQ person to understand a book. It’s yet another indication that this book is a hack-job written by an incompetent, greedy activist, and not a serious scholar. Contrast his book with mine, which features proper citation and dense prose, because I wasn’t about to downgrade an important scientific work for the masses.
Rutherford’s book has four parts. We will deal with each part in their own sections in separate posts.
Part one begins by using the rhetorical tactic known as mystification to attempt to convince the reader that, at worst (from Rutherford’s perspective), the evidence is unclear or inconclusive at to whether or not race is real or “scientific racism” is correct.
The picture of genetic inheritance turned out to be much more complicated in humans than in peas. Our old simplistic models of how a specific gene relates to a particular characteristic have been eroded in the last couple of decades. This is not news in relation to complex human traits, such as intelligence or diseases such as schizophrenia, where dozens or sometimes hundreds of genes have been revealed to play a small but cumulative role in their development. We’ve known this for some years. Genomes are complex and dynamic ecosystems, in which genes have multiple jobs in the body, depending on where and when they are required. A gene involved in the growth of an embryo just after conception might have a very different role later in life, or no role whatsoever. A gene may have multiple roles – an effect we call pleiotropy. Another phenomenon, known as epistasis, means that the impact of one gene is dependent on others; its effect can be positive or negative and can occur between completely different genes in networks, or even between the two copies of each gene that we all have, one set inherited from each parent. Genes do many things in many ways, and even over a lifetime of studying them, you will still find new ways the human genome works. The genetic code has remained static for billions of years, but evolution has incessantly tinkered with how it is used to build a life. (p. 25)
Nothing here is wrong, per se — I’m sure Rutherford would recognize that the Mendelian model works for sickle cell anemia, and not for height or IQ — but the general vibe promotes a feeling of the subversion or “erosion” of the racist old models of the past. The reader is supposed to be primed to think that someone like me is just an outdated Mendelian. The genome is simply too complex and dynamic — too vast and interweaved a tapestry — for something like “black people” to exist.
This is somewhat intelligent on Rutherford’s part — he is attempting to ensure, right off the bat, that if a reader is exposed to a debunking like this, their reaction will be to say, “well, of course Rutherford might have been wrong about some things, or might have left some things out, but that’s expected, because he admitted on the first page that this stuff is really dynamic and complex, and on that basis I find this racist’s certainty unconvincing.” As an expert, I can say with certainty that both his claims about race and his meta-level hand-waving about “complexity” are incorrect. We will see this clearly from the evidence, but for now, think about which side in a debate would be more likely to engage in mystification — activist liars or truth-seekers? If the evidence were clearly on the side of environmentalists, one would expect “scientific racists” to mystify, deconstruct, and make isolated demands for rigor, since their position would be made untenable by the evidence otherwise. The side which truth disfavors is more likely to mystify.
That this is only for him, probably due to a poor grasp on mathematics, if he’s not just being a totally cynical tactical mystifier. Yes, models for polygenic traits are more complicated than models for Mendelian traits. No, they are not “inscrutable” for people in the top percentile of intelligence. With proper statistical models, we should be able to predict hair color with basically total accuracy given a small tolerance threshold for miniscule environmental variation from a DNA sample. Neural networks are, with theoretical certainty, capable of achieving this, so long as we can train them properly on good enough data. If Rutherford is under 120 IQ, however, I could understand if he finds the math implicit in the last two sentences to be inscrutably complex compared to Punnett squares.
After beginning with mystification, Rutherford switches into race denial.
It is wholly unsurprising that, with a population of over 1.2 billion in fifty-four countries, the skin colour of the peoples of the African continent is a vast tapestry, which overlaps with Indians and aboriginal Australians, South Americans and some Europeans. Yet we talk about ‘black people’ or ‘brown people’. The pigmentation of a pale-skinned redheaded Scot is a long way on a colour chart from that of a typical Spaniard, though we call both of them white. The skin colour of more than a billion East Asians is similarly variable, yet nowadays, we tend not to refer to them by skin colour at all. Yellow, though an integral part of the description of East Asians for several centuries during the development of scientific racism, has fallen out of usage and is now generally accepted as being entirely inaccurate and simply racist. Instead, the main racial signifiers for East Asians are the epicanthic fold of the upper eyelid (which is also present in Berbers, the Inuit, Finns, Scandinavians, Poles, Indigenous Americans and people with Downs syndrome), and thick, straight black hair. Traditional racial categories are not consistent in their taxonomic boundaries. (p. 27)
Equating skin color with race is a classic race-denialist straw-man. Obviously, “black people” is basically an American colloquial term for “African-Americans,” who mostly have brown skin similar in tone to a lot of Latinos, Indians, and others, due to European admixture, while many continental Africans have much darker skin.